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The objective of the audit was to report on the effectiveness of Defence’s approach to the acceptance into service of Navy capability, and to identify where better practice may be used by CDG, DMO and Navy.
The objective of the audit was to assess whether the Council Allocation component of the RLCIP has been effectively designed, implemented and administered. The audit examined each of the three funding rounds, albeit with a focus on the first round (as it was due to be completed by 30 September 2009), with the second round not due to be completed until late in the audit timetable (31 December 2010) and third round funding agreements being signed and payments being made at the time audit work was completed.
The objective of the audit was to examine the effectiveness of the management of maintenance of the Defence estate, taking particular account of planning and delivery aspects.
The audit examined: Defence’s policies, procedures, processes and supporting tools related to the planning and delivery of the maintenance of the estate; and services provided to Defence by private sector firms in relation to maintenance activities. The audit did not focus on contract management matters, nor on the systems used by Defence to maintain information related to estate maintenance.
The objective of the audit was to assess whether Defence is effectively managing the EO Services Contract.
The audit focused mainly on Defence's contract management framework, including the arrangements to monitor the contractor’s performance in delivering services under the contract. The audit also examined the processes used by Defence to develop the current version of the contract and the extent to which the revised contract, as negotiated in 2006, provides an assurance of better value for money when compared to the original contract signed in 2001.
The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of Department of Infrastructure and Transport’s and the Attorney‐General’s Department’s management of the Aviation and Maritime Security Identification Card (ASIC and MSIC) schemes.
The objective of this audit was to examine the effectiveness of Defence’s management of explosive ordnance by the end users of this materiel in Air Force, Army and Navy (the Services). In particular, the focus was on the effectiveness of arrangements for the oversight and physical control of explosive ordnance once it is issued to Service units.
The audit reviewed Defence’s policies, procedures, processes and inventory management systems for explosive ordnance at the unit level in the ADF, from receipt and storage through to the use or return of explosive ordnance.The audit also examined the relationship between the management of explosive ordnance at the unit level and the Explosive Ordnance Services Contract and, where relevant, the regional Garrison Support Services (GSS) Contracts.
The objective of the audit was to assess the administrative effectiveness of FaHCSIA's and IBA's management of the HOIL program. In particular, the audit examined the administrative design of the program, its implementation and progress in achieving the expected results.
The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of FaHCSIA's management of the Fixing Houses for Better Health program since 2005.
The audit reviewed the two elements of the program for which FaHCSIA is responsible: management of the service delivery arrangements and overall performance monitoring and reporting. Following the development of the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous Housing, which introduced new approaches to the delivery of Indigenous programs, FaHCSIA made changes to FHBH for the 2009–11 phase. The audit has focused on both the 2005–09 and the 2009–11 phases. This provided coverage of the program's normal operations as well enabling the audit to consider the modifications made to the program for the 2009–11 phase.
Against this background, the audit considered whether:
program management arrangements had been established that were suitable for the size, nature and objectives of the FHBH program;
service delivery arrangements were designed to support the achievement of the program's objectives and FaHCSIA's management of the program; and
FaHCSIA used robust systems to monitor achievement of the program objectives.
The ANAO also considered whether there was any experience from the department's management of FHBH that could be broadly applied to FaHCSIA's management of the National Partnership Agreement.
The audit assessed FaHCSIA's management of AACAP and how the department monitors the contribution the program is making to the improvement of primary and environmental health, and living conditions, in remote Indigenous communities.
The audit examined program delivery under the 2006–2009 MoU, as well as the planning for the 2010 project under the variation to the 2006–2009 MoU. As part of the audit the ANAO considered:
program strategy and implementation including the roles and responsibilities of the major stakeholders, community selection and scope of works (Chapter 2);
the financial management of the program and the changing role of the Contracted Program Manager (Chapter 3); and
performance measures, including FaHCSIA's performance reporting framework, and approach to monitoring and reporting performance against the stated program objectives (Chapter 4).
The audit focused on AACAP in so far as it relates to Indigenous community outcomes. It did not consider the program from the perspective of the Australian Defence Force capability building.
The objective of the audit was to assess the administrative effectiveness of FaHCSIA's management of the GBM initiative, and the extent to which the initiative has contributed to improvements in community engagement and government coordination in the Northern Territory.
The audit focused on FaHCSIA's management of the GBM initiative under the NTER. The audit scope did not include additional functions assigned to some GBMs in the Northern Territory under the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Service Delivery (the National Partnership Agreement), or to Australian Government staff with similar roles and functions supporting the implementation of the National Partnership Agreement in Queensland and Western Australia.