

The Auditor-General  
Audit Report No.43 2010–11  
Performance Audit

# **Australian Federal Police Protection Services**

**Australian Federal Police**

Australian National Audit Office

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of Australia 2011

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Canberra ACT  
25 May 2011

Dear Mr President  
Dear Mr Speaker

The Australian National Audit Office has undertaken an independent performance audit in the Australian Federal Police with the authority contained in the *Auditor-General Act 1997*. I present the report of this audit and the accompanying brochure to the Parliament. The report is titled *Australian Federal Police Protection Services*.

Following its presentation and receipt, the report will be placed on the Australian National Audit Office's Homepage—<http://www.anao.gov.au>.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ian McPhee', is positioned above the printed name.

Ian McPhee  
Auditor-General

The Honourable the President of the Senate  
The Honourable the Speaker of the House of Representatives  
Parliament House  
Canberra ACT

## AUDITING FOR AUSTRALIA

The Auditor-General is head of the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO). The ANAO assists the Auditor-General to carry out his duties under the *Auditor-General Act 1997* to undertake performance audits and financial statement audits of Commonwealth public sector bodies and to provide independent reports and advice for the Parliament, the Australian Government and the community. The aim is to improve Commonwealth public sector administration and accountability.

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# Contents

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Contents .....	5
Abbreviations.....	7
<b>Summary .....</b>	<b>9</b>
Summary .....	11
Introduction .....	11
Federal Audit of Police Capabilities .....	13
Audit objective and scope .....	13
Overall conclusion.....	14
Key findings.....	15
Summary of agency response .....	23
<b>Audit Findings and Conclusions .....</b>	<b>25</b>
1. Introduction .....	27
Background .....	27
Structure and location of the AFP Protection Service.....	27
Integrating the Australian Protective Service into the AFP .....	29
Federal Audit of Police Capabilities .....	31
The audit .....	31
2. Strategic Planning and Integration.....	34
Introduction .....	34
Strategic planning .....	34
Managing risk.....	38
Integration of the APS into the AFP .....	41
3. Managing the Protection Workforce.....	45
Introduction .....	45
Workforce planning .....	45
Unscheduled absences.....	51
Professional standards.....	54
4. Uniform Protection Training and Guidance.....	58
Introduction .....	58
PSO training.....	58
PSO guidance .....	66
5. Managing the Delivery of Uniform Protection Services .....	70
Introduction .....	70
Coordinating protection services with stakeholders.....	70
Managing client requirements.....	72
Recovering costs from certain clients .....	78
Managing client satisfaction.....	82

6. Managing Close Personal Protection Services.....	85
Introduction .....	85
CPP training .....	86
CPP guidance—standard operating procedures .....	88
Delivery of CPP services .....	88
Interaction and interoperability with Uniform Protection .....	93
Managing client satisfaction.....	94
<b>Appendices .....</b>	<b>97</b>
Appendix 1: Agency response.....	99
Index.....	100
Series Titles.....	101
Current Better Practice Guides .....	106

## Tables

Table 1.1	Protection's operational groups and the services they provide.....	28
Table 2.1	Protection's key performance indicators for 2009–10 .....	35
Table 2.2	Example of performance indicators in Protection's 2010–2011 Business Plan.....	37
Table 3.1	Examples of Protection demographic data.....	49
Table 3.2	Overview of Protection findings from AFP surveys .....	50
Table 5.1	Key provisions contained in Protection's MOUs.....	73
Table 5.2	ANAO findings from discussions with stakeholders and clients.....	83
Table 6.1	CPP performance measures from 2006–07 to 2009–10.....	94

## Figures

Figure S 1	Location of UP Stations and CPP staff in Australia.....	12
Figure 1.1	Location of UP Stations and CPP staff in Australia.....	29
Figure 1.2	Structure of the report.....	33
Figure 3.1	Breakdown of unscheduled absences for 2009–10 .....	52
Figure 3.2	Number of workers' compensation claims per 1000 employees.....	54
Figure 3.3	Submitted conduct issues per 1000 employees.....	56
Figure 4.1	A selection of online courses is available from the AFP's iAspire system .....	64

# Abbreviations

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AFP	Australian Federal Police
AGD	Attorney-General's Department
ANAO	Australian National Audit Office
ANSTO	Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation
APS	Australian Protective Service
CPP	Close Personal Protection
CRAMS	Complaint Recording and Management System
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DPS	Department of Parliamentary Services
DPU	Diplomatic Protection Unit
FTE	Full-time equivalent
HQJOC	Headquarters Joint Operations Command
KPI	Key performance indicator
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
PM&C	Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
PROMIS	Police Real-time Online Management Information System
Protection	Australian Federal Police Protection Service
PSO	Protective Service Officer
PVR	Post Visit Report
SLG	Strategic Leaders Group

SOP	Standard operating procedure
STP	Standard Tactical Plan
UP	Uniform Protection



# Summary



# Summary

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## Introduction

1. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) is the primary law enforcement agency through which the Australian Government enforces Commonwealth law. Established by the *Australian Federal Police Act 1979*, its functions include the provision of policing services in relation to Commonwealth laws and property, and the safeguarding of Commonwealth interests. The AFP also provides community policing services to the Australian Capital Territory and the Jervis Bay Territory.

2. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 in the United States of America, the Government reviewed Australia's counter-terrorism arrangements across the whole of government and decided, among other things, to integrate the Australian Protective Service (APS) into the AFP to facilitate close coordination between these two key counter-terrorist agencies. Organisational integration was completed in July 2004 and the APS was retitled the AFP Protection Service (Protection). This brought together the AFP's existing personal protection functions with the APS's guarding functions. It also involved the integration of corporate systems and processes, including training arrangements and workforce management.


3. Protection's objective is to ensure that individuals and interests identified to be at risk by the Commonwealth are kept safe from acts of terrorism, violent protest and issues-motivated violence. Its workforce of some 700 staff as at January 2011 is divided between three main operational groups:

- **Uniform Protection (UP)**, which provides highly visible static and mobile guarding services to foreign diplomatic missions, official establishments (such as The Lodge and Government House), six sensitive Defence Force establishments (including Russell Offices in Canberra and the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap) and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO);
- **Close Personal Protection (CPP)**, which provides personal protection to Australian high office holders (including the Prime Minister and the Governor-General), internationally protected persons (such as the American and Israeli Ambassadors), and visiting dignitaries (for example, foreign heads of state); and

- **Witness Protection**, which provides protection and assistance to witnesses identified as being at risk because of assistance they have given to police and other law enforcement agencies.
4. Protection staff operate from eight locations across Australia, as shown in Figure S 1. Across these locations, there are 15 UP ‘stations’, which are managed by Station Managers. CPP staff are based in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne and Perth.

**Figure S 1**

### Location of UP Stations and CPP staff in Australia



Source: ANAO.

5. In 2010–11, the AFP received funding of \$103 million for UP and CPP services, comprising a mix of appropriated funding (47 per cent) and cost-recovered funding (53 per cent).

6. UP staff are known as Protective Service Officers (PSOs); they are not police officers. Police officers are sworn to an oath under the *Australian Federal Police Act 1979* and have broad powers to arrest and detain persons for a range of offences. While PSOs are also sworn officers, they have a more specialised role and more limited powers to arrest and search persons for certain offences relating to Commonwealth property. CPP (bodyguard) services are largely performed by sworn police officers.

## Federal Audit of Police Capabilities

7. In 2009, the Federal Audit of Police Capabilities (the ‘Beale Review’)<sup>1</sup> examined the AFP’s capacity to meet contemporary and future demands and government priorities. The review briefly assessed the Protection function and found that the services provided by UP and CPP were generally effective.

8. The Government’s December 2009 decision to implement the Beale Review recommendations relating to airport security will see the AFP Aviation function becoming staffed by sworn police. The transition, known as Project Macer, will take place over three to five years and may result in significant numbers of current Aviation staff (also PSOs) transferring to Protection Services, because they are unable or unwilling to make the transition to sworn police.<sup>2</sup> In addition, Protection PSOs are also being given the opportunity to make the transition to sworn police.<sup>3</sup> The net impact of PSO movements on the Protection function will not be known for some time.

## Audit objective and scope

9. The objective of the audit was to examine whether the UP and CPP services provided by the Australian Federal Police Protection Service are being managed effectively. In particular, the audit examined:

- whether the Protection function has been effectively integrated into the AFP, and sound arrangements are in place to strategically plan Protection services and manage risks;

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<sup>1</sup> *New Realities: National Policing in the 21st Century—Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*—Independent Reviewer: Roger Beale, 30 June 2009.

<sup>2</sup> At 21 December 2010, 45 Aviation PSOs had expressed an intention to transfer to Protection.

<sup>3</sup> A survey commissioned by the AFP indicates that 31 per cent of Protection PSOs are considering transitioning to a sworn AFP police officer.

- whether Protection staff have access to appropriate training and guidance; and
- the management arrangements for UP and CPP services.

10. The audit scope excluded PSOs employed within the Aviation function, Protection staff deployed overseas, and those engaged in Witness Protection.

## Overall conclusion

11. The management of the AFP's Protection Service is a multifaceted undertaking involving the deployment of some 700 staff, and the delivery of a range of security services, at a diverse range of sites across Australia.

12. After the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, the APS was reintegrated into the AFP to facilitate closer coordination between the two counter-terrorist agencies. Since that time, Protection has evolved from a commercially-focused service provider that was in competition with the private sector for Commonwealth guarding contracts to one providing services that are not readily available from the private sector. This evolution, together with the fact that some of Protection's clients are not permitted to choose alternative suppliers, was instrumental in a 2009 decision to exempt Protection from the continuing application of the Commonwealth's competitive neutrality policy.

13. The ANAO concluded that the UP and CPP services provided by the AFP Protection Service are being managed effectively. The functional integration of the APS into the AFP has largely been completed, with key elements such as recruitment, training and human resource management delivered and monitored through common AFP-wide systems. Protection has in place an administrative framework that enables it to effectively manage, monitor and deliver its services across the diverse sites at which it operates. In particular, Protection has established sound planning and risk management arrangements, which underpin its service delivery. It has also put in place effective arrangements to monitor and manage its UP and CPP workforces on a day-to-day basis, strengthened its training arrangements for new and existing PSOs and CPP officers, and developed adequate guidance for staff.

14. Protection's focus over the last nine years has shifted away from being a protective security provider directly competing with the private sector, but it retains a strong client focus. Protection management and station management

are generally responsive and professional in delivering services to client organisations.

15. While management oversight and service delivery are generally sound, there are a number of weaknesses in some of Protection's supporting administrative arrangements that have the potential to impede effective management decision-making and the allocation of resources. In particular, there would be benefits to both Protection and its clients in increasing the transparency of Protection's cost-recovery arrangements, strengthening its reporting arrangements to clients, and improving the performance information for both the Protection function as a whole, and for individual UP clients. Management has been active in dealing with integration issues such as differences in employment conditions and career and training opportunities that have emerged. However, staff surveys have found that Protection staff have lower job satisfaction and feel a sense of disengagement from the rest of the organisation, which indicates that there is still work to be done to achieve greater functional and workforce integration into the AFP.

16. During the audit, Protection management acknowledged these weaknesses in its supporting administrative arrangements and advised that it had commenced work to address them. In this light, the ANAO has not made any formal recommendations.

## Key findings

### Strategic planning and integration

17. Protection has developed a Business Plan that reflects sound planning practice—it is documented, time-specific, identifies the broader context, and identifies a range of goals and strategies to achieve them. In addition, it links those strategies to performance indicators and related targets. Protection's achievements against the indicators and targets are reported internally twice a year, providing a sound means for both the AFP and Protection management to monitor progress.

18. Protection reported against two key performance indicators (KPIs) in the AFP's Annual Report 2009–10, which addressed the level of client/stakeholder satisfaction for UP and for CPP. While these indicators fell short of their target of 90 per cent of clients either satisfied or very satisfied in 2009–10 (75 per cent for UP and 81 per cent for CPP), Protection's small client base and low survey response rate means that the results should be treated with caution. Protection is aware of these limitations and is trialling additional



KPIs, which address the number of avoidable incidents per 1000 CPP movements; the percentage of time dedicated to preventative activities; and the percentage of time dedicated to high-visibility UP patrolling and CPP activities. These additional KPIs have the potential to strengthen Protection's performance reporting to the public.

**19.** Protection maintains formal risk registers for the function as a whole and for individual UP stations. The registers reflect sound risk management practice, involving the systematic identification, documentation, assessment and rating of risks. For those risks where further treatment is necessary, additional treatments are identified, together with the residual risk level, implementation timetable, performance measures and processes for monitoring/review.

**20.** The ANAO observed that the controls identified in respect of one key security risk were rated as inadequate by two of the stations. This risk involved a potential threat to both personnel and facilities. In response to the audit observations, Protection management advised that it had commenced a review of the risk. The review is due to be completed by 1 July 2011.

**21.** The functional integration of the former APS was completed in 2004. Key elements such as planning, risk management, training, professional services and human resource management are now being delivered, monitored and managed through common AFP-wide systems and approaches. However, the process of integrating APS staff into the AFP culture is ongoing. Post-integration staff surveys indicate that Protection staff tend to be more negative in their cultural perceptions of the AFP than other areas.

**22.** While full cultural integration will take some time to complete, integration to date has been of benefit to PSOs, providing them with access to better equipment, wages, management, training and opportunities for development. Overall, integration has largely been effective, with AFP management active in dealing with issues—such as differences in employment conditions, and career and training opportunities—that have emerged. Some Protection staff believe that many police officers do not have a good appreciation of their role and capabilities; in short, they feel undervalued. Protection management is aware of the need to better communicate the role and capabilities of Protection to the broader AFP. It is also seeking to identify further career opportunities for PSOs, both within Protection and more broadly within the AFP.



## Managing the Protection workforce

23. The AFP recently developed an interim, agency-wide workforce plan and has foreshadowed the development of resource plans for each functional area, including Protection, and for its broader National Security program, which includes Protection. These plans should assist Protection's strategic workforce planning and decision-making processes. At the operational level, Protection has put in place, or has access to, a number of key tools that enable it to adequately monitor and manage its workforce on a day-to-day basis. These include reporting arrangements to forecast expected staffing levels, identify associated trends and risks and monitor actual staffing levels.

24. Although some UP stations are over-staffed, the overall staffing level across all UP stations is 4.8 per cent under the authorised full-time equivalent (FTE) numbers, with the four remote stations being 20.9 per cent below their authorised numbers. These shortages are currently being managed by temporarily redeploying staff from other stations or by maintaining minimal staffing levels in consultation with the client organisation. Protection is seeking to address staff shortages by running additional recruit courses in 2011 and by recruiting staff locally. However, this planning is being complicated by changes underway in other parts of the AFP. These changes follow the Government's December 2009 decision to implement the recommendations of the Federal Audit of Police Capabilities<sup>4</sup> and may see significant numbers of staff transfer to Protection as PSOs (offset by some Protection PSOs transitioning to sworn policing roles).

25. Both UP and CPP currently have a limited surge capacity in the event of increased demand for their services. The staffing changes mentioned above may help alleviate this issue for UP because it employs PSOs. CPP management has commenced planning for the next known surge that will arise from the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Perth in October 2011. Strategies include identifying staff who have previously undertaken CPP training with a view to requalifying them, and instituting a leave embargo for Protection and CPP qualified staff. Protection management

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<sup>4</sup> The Government's December 2009 decision to implement the recommendations of the Federal Audit of Police Capabilities (the Beale Review) relating to airport security will see the AFP Aviation function becoming staffed by sworn police. The transition will take place over three to five years and may result in significant numbers of current Aviation staff (also PSOs) transferring to Protection Services, because they are unable or unwilling to make the transition to sworn police. At 21 December 2010, 45 Aviation PSOs had expressed an intention to transfer to Protection.

recognises the need to develop a surge capacity strategy for the Protection portfolio as a whole, given the potential importance of this issue for both UP and CPP.

26. The AFP has undertaken a number of staff surveys over recent years. The surveys have shown that Protection staff have felt a lack of motivation and a sense of disengagement from the rest of the organisation, with the most recent survey indicating that Protection staff had the lowest level of job satisfaction across the AFP. The AFP has been seeking to address these issues through a number of wider initiatives, including through measures to facilitate functional and workforce integration, referred to earlier. Preliminary results from the 2010 survey suggest these initiatives are having positive effects.

27. Protection's rate of unscheduled absences (days per employee per year) is 11.3, which is higher than the AFP overall at 10.3 and the Australian Public Service rate at 10.5. Protection monitors the absence rate and has recently taken action to identify causes and reduce the incidence. Similarly, the AFP has been actively monitoring and managing workers' compensation claims for Protection staff since integration. This has been effective in reducing the number of claims for Protection by 56 per cent since 2006–07 and in reducing the AFP's Comcare premium by 23 per cent in 2010–11.

28. The Professional Standards unit monitors conduct issues involving AFP staff that range from minor administration matters to serious allegations of corruption. Protection staff generally have a much lower number of professional conduct issues—less than half—recorded against them than other AFP staff. This may reflect, at least in part, the nature of Protection Services' work and its different client profile.

29. Of those issues that are raised, Protection staff are more likely to have them 'established' (49 per cent, compared with 18 per cent for the rest of the AFP). Protection, with the assistance of the AFP's Professional Standards unit, has developed strategies to monitor and manage conduct issues involving PSOs, including the development of PSO training in ethics and professional standards.

## **Uniform Protection training and guidance**

30. Following the integration of the APS into the AFP, a training needs analysis was undertaken to review the training needs of PSOs. The analysis led to the introduction of an enhanced recruit course in 2008. The longer course (increased from eight to 13 weeks) included revised training in a number of

areas, and the award of a nationally recognised certificate. Stations visited by the ANAO were generally satisfied with the quality of the graduating recruits deployed to their stations.

31. Following the introduction of the revised course, Protection sought to bring the knowledge and skills of existing PSOs into line with those of new recruits by providing refresher training through PSO Development Workshops. While these were generally well regarded, only 63 per cent of eligible Protection PSOs attended the workshops over the three years they were run. This attendance rate, in part, reflected rostering constraints at some stations, which prevented some staff from being released. Given the general usefulness of the course in updating PSO knowledge and skills, there would be merit in the AFP running further workshops for those who missed out, and exploring options to overcome the rostering constraints that prevented some staff from attending.

32. Station Managers and PSOs have ready access through the AFP intranet to a range of AFP guidelines. Protection itself has developed a useful aide memoire notebook for PSOs that assists them in performing their day-to-day duties.

33. At the station level, standard operating procedures (SOPs) have been developed, which set out staff roles and responsibilities, and operational procedures. Each station visited by the ANAO had an adequate set of SOPs which was either up-to-date or in the process of being updated. However, update arrangements were generally ad hoc and at the discretion of the Station Manager, and there was no central oversight or review of SOP coverage. There would be merit in developing a better practice template and checklist to ensure that SOPs meet minimum requirements, and also of reminding stations periodically of the need to review and update them. Protection acknowledged the inconsistent approach to SOP development, implementation and review, and advised that it will commence a review of the adequacy of station guidance and procedures across a selection of stations in the first half of 2011.

## **Managing the delivery of Uniform Protection services**

34. Protection management is focused on working cooperatively with other agencies that play a role in determining those who receive protection and the level of protection required. In addition, Protection displays a strong client focus in the delivery of its services at both the management level and the

station level and has recently established a Client Charter of Service which, among other things, sets out its commitments to clients.

35. Protection has MOUs in place with its three main cost-recovered clients. The MOUs set out basic information on key provisions such as outcomes, deliverables, roles and responsibilities, resourcing, and reporting arrangements. However, there is scope to improve the MOUs to better inform effective and efficient management practices. Of particular benefit would be explicitly identifying the objectives of the services being provided to help focus the overall intention of the agreement, and expressing desired outcomes more clearly and precisely. There would also be merit in Protection taking these observations into account during the current MOU review and renewal process.

36. In addition, reports to clients on the outcomes and performance measures set out in the MOUs varied in quality and detail between stations and reports, with the standard monthly report format generally providing a limited range of information. Protection has recognised the need to improve its reporting and is working with clients to this end.

37. The protection of the Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) facility near Bungendore, New South Wales, is particularly complex because the facility occupant (Defence) and the facility owner (a private company) also play a role in providing security services. This complexity is resulting in the security arrangements taking time to bed down and some friction over a number of unresolved issues. In particular, there were differing views on the ground about the scope of Protection's day-to-day roles and responsibilities, a lack of agreement and documentation relating to responsibilities for controlling security incidents, and a lack of a single, overarching security and emergency management plan. This situation creates a risk that should a major security incident occur, there will be confusion or disagreement about the appropriate response. These issues had been acknowledged by Protection, and by Defence and the facility owner at the local level, and were the subject of review and discussion at the time of the audit. Defence anticipates that whole-of-base security and emergency management plans will be signed by 30 June 2011. Given that HQJOC opened in March 2009, there would be merit in Protection management keeping the issues under active review to facilitate a timely resolution.

38. Protection recovers costs from the Department of Defence, the Department of Parliamentary Services, ANSTO and the Department of Foreign

Affairs and Trade using a cost-recovery model. The model has been examined on a number of occasions in recent years by internal reviews, which have found that, while the cost allocation methodology used to recover direct costs is sound, there is no methodology to support the recovery of indirect costs (corporate overhead charge) of 22.6 per cent. The reviews also found the model to be complex and time-consuming to administer, which makes it difficult for Protection to explain to clients how costs have been determined.

39. These issues came to a head while Protection was negotiating the 2009–10 costs for servicing Parliament House. This led to the Government deciding in April 2010 that the costing model for this site should be reviewed by the Department of Finance and Deregulation and the AFP, in consultation with the Department of Parliamentary Services. This review was underway at the time of the audit. While it is not clear whether any revised model will be applied more broadly, the use of a consistent and transparent pricing model for all clients would facilitate equity across clients and help simplify the administrative arrangements.

## **Managing Close Personal Protection services**

40. Through its CPP services, Protection seeks to maintain the personal safety of high office holders and the dignity of the offices they occupy.

41. To this end, the AFP has established an appropriate regime to equip its CPP staff with timely and appropriate skills and knowledge. Specialised CPP training at the AFP College is well established, considered to be better practice, and results in a nationally recognised tertiary qualification. CPP skills are maintained through annual recertification and biannual fitness testing.

42. CPP operations are facilitated by up-to-date and relevant guidelines, templates and checklists. These include well-established and well-understood standard packages of protection for persons being protected (known as ‘Principals’), but with sufficient discretion to tailor packages to particular threat levels and circumstances. Electronic and easy-to-complete Standard Tactical Plan templates are used to facilitate planning for non-routine operations. The ANAO reviewed all 14 completed operations that required a Standard Tactical Plan during a six-month period and found that a plan had been prepared for each one.

43. However, two other useful tools designed to help plan CPP operations—that is, a checklist to help plan international and domestic travel and a Decision Making Matrix to help guide the deployment of CPP

resources—had not been prepared or uploaded into the relevant database as required. The AFP has now reminded CPP officers of the need to comply with these requirements.

44. The AFP has also developed a Post Visit Report (PVR) template that provides a sound and consistent approach to reviewing certain CPP operations and facilitates the identification and promulgation of lessons learned. The ANAO reviewed all operations requiring a PVR during a six-month period and found that a PVR had been prepared for each one. While there were delays in completing some PVRs, and isolated cases of incorrect approvals of PVRs, these were acceptable given the tempo of CPP operations and staff shortages. However, there would be merit in Protection management periodically reviewing a sample of PVRs to check their compliance with the guidelines.

45. At the time of the audit, the CPP staffing level was 13 per cent below the authorised level. Although CPP management has put in place measures to manage this on a day-to-day basis, there is likely to be a limit to which these can be effective in the longer term. At the time of the audit, Protection management was seeking to identify other longer-term solutions, including developing a surge capacity strategy.

46. One way of managing staff shortages is to increase the interoperability between UP and CPP staff. The effectiveness of this was most recently demonstrated during the 2010 Federal Election when PSOs were successfully used to provide certain CPP support functions. Protection management has identified further opportunities for interoperability and was considering or implementing these at the time of the audit.

47. Protection uses three performance measures to assess the success of its CPP activities. Over the last four years two of these measures—*resources directed to high and very high impact cases* and the *number of avoidable incidents per 1000 movements*—have met their respective targets. In 2009–10, the third measure—*client satisfaction*—recorded client satisfaction of 81 per cent against a target of 90 per cent. However, the survey outcome has varied from year to year primarily because of the small client base and low response rate. At the time of the audit, Protection was seeking to develop a more comprehensive set of outcome-focused indicators for 2011–12.

## Summary of agency response

48. The proposed report was provided to the AFP for comment. The AFP's full response to the audit is at Appendix 1. Its summary response is as follows:

The AFP welcomes the ANAO audit report on the *Australian Federal Police Protection Services* and it is noted that no recommendations have been made by the ANAO. The findings in the report are accepted and, as acknowledged throughout the report, AFP management had already instigated strategies for improvement in these areas.

The AFP will take into consideration each of the ANAO findings and incorporate these into the forward program of work within Protection Services, in order to continue the provision of high quality protection services for and on behalf of the Commonwealth government.





## **Audit Findings and Conclusions**



# 1. Introduction

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*This chapter provides an overview of the arrangements for the management of the Australian Federal Police Protection Service. It also outlines the audit approach.*

## Background

**1.1** The Australian Federal Police (AFP) is the primary law enforcement agency through which the Australian Government enforces Commonwealth law. Established by the *Australian Federal Police Act 1979*, its functions include the provision of policing services in relation to Commonwealth laws and property, and the safeguarding of Commonwealth interests. The AFP also provides community policing services to the Australian Capital Territory and the Jervis Bay Territory.

**1.2** Another important function is undertaken by the AFP's Protection Service (Protection), which is the Australian Government's specialist protective security provider. Protection's objective is to ensure that individuals and interests identified to be at risk by the Commonwealth are kept safe from acts of terrorism, violent protest and issues-motivated violence. Protection does this in partnership with other Commonwealth departments, and state and territory agencies and police services.

## Structure and location of the AFP Protection Service

**1.3** Protection is headed by an Assistant Commissioner performing the role of National Manager. The National Manager reports to the Deputy Commissioner National Security, who in turn reports to the Commissioner.

**1.4** Protection's workforce of some 700 staff<sup>5</sup> is divided between three main operational groups: Uniform Protection (UP), Close Personal Protection (CPP) and Witness Protection. Table 1.1 sets out these operational groups and briefly explains the services they provide. This report does not identify the actual number of staff within each group, as that information is considered by the AFP to be operationally sensitive.

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<sup>5</sup> The number of staff at January 2011 was 697.

**Table 1.1****Protection's operational groups and the services they provide**

Operational group	Audit coverage
<b>Uniform Protection (UP)</b>	
<p>UP provides highly visible static and mobile guarding services to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Foreign diplomatic and consular missions and staff resident in Australia;</li> <li>• Commonwealth buildings and official establishments considered to be at risk, such as Parliament House, The Lodge and Government House in Canberra, and Kirribilli and Admiralty Houses in Sydney;</li> <li>• six sensitive Australian Defence Force sites, including Russell Offices in Canberra, Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) near Bungendore, New South Wales, and the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap;<sup>(1)</sup></li> <li>• the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO); and</li> <li>• two Australian diplomatic missions overseas.<sup>(2)</sup></li> </ul> <p>Funding for these services comes from a mix of appropriation funding (diplomatic missions and official establishments) and funds recovered under a user-pays arrangement (for example, Defence sites, ANSTO and Parliament House).</p>	Yes
<b>Close Personal Protection (CPP)</b>	
<p>CPP provides personal protection to individuals—known as 'Principals'—including Australian high office holders (such as the Prime Minister and the Governor-General, both in Australia and when travelling overseas), internationally protected persons (such as the American and Israeli Ambassadors), and visiting dignitaries (for example, foreign heads of state). Funding is via appropriation.</p>	Yes
<b>Witness Protection</b>	
<p>The National Witness Protection Program provides protection and assistance to witnesses identified as being at risk because of assistance they have given to police and other law enforcement agencies in significant criminal prosecutions.</p>	No

Source: ANAO analysis.

Notes: (1) Defence advised that the number of existing sites would reduce from six to five by the end of May 2011. However, consideration was also being given to adding a number of new Defence sites to those currently being protected.

(2) Protection provided UP services to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in respect of the R G Casey Building in Canberra up until 30 June 2010. Limited services continue to be provided overseas at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and the Australian High Commission in Port Moresby.


**1.5** In addition to performing these duties, Protection also helps to provide security at special events that are of national interest, for example, it will be assisting with security at the upcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Perth in October 2011.

**1.6** AFP Protection staff operate from eight locations across Australia, as shown in Figure 1.1. Across these locations there are 15 UP 'stations', which

are managed by Station Managers. CPP staff are based in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne and Perth, but may also accompany Principals when they are travelling.

**Figure 1.1**

### Location of UP Stations and CPP staff in Australia



Source: ANAO.

**1.7** In 2010–11, the AFP received funding of \$103 million for UP and CPP services, comprising a mix of appropriated funding (47 per cent) and cost-recovered funding (53 per cent).

## Integrating the Australian Protective Service into the AFP

**1.8** The AFP was formed in 1979 in the wake of the February 1978 bombing at the Hilton Hotel in Sydney, bringing together the Australian Capital Territory Police and the Commonwealth Police. In 1984, the protective service

component separated from the AFP and became an independent uniformed force to protect government property. This protection force became known as the Australian Protective Service (APS), and operated under the *Australian Protective Service Act 1987*.

**1.9** In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 in the United States of America, the Government reviewed Australia's counter-terrorism arrangements across the whole of government. One outcome was a significant expansion of the AFP's capacity to undertake counter-terrorism investigations. Another was to reintegrate the APS into the AFP to facilitate close coordination between these two key counter-terrorist agencies.

**1.10** Reintegration took place in two stages. Firstly, in 2002 the APS became an 'operating division' of the AFP (reporting to the Commissioner rather than the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department) and some 1400 staff were transferred to the AFP. A large number of these staff were engaged in aviation security, providing services such as counter terrorism first response at major airports and the Air Security Officer program. Aviation security staff are currently in AFP Aviation Services, a separate program to Protection Services. Secondly, from 1 July 2004 the APS became fully integrated with the AFP, was retitled the AFP Protection Service and operated under the *Australian Federal Police Act 1979*.<sup>6</sup> The AFP Protection Service brought together the AFP's existing personal protection functions with the APS's guarding functions. It also involved the integration of corporate systems and processes, including training arrangements and workforce management.

**1.11** Uniform Protection staff are known as Protective Service Officers (PSOs); they are not police officers. Police officers are sworn to an oath under the *Australian Federal Police Act 1979* and have broad powers to arrest and detain persons for a range of offences. While PSOs are also sworn officers, they have a more specialised role and more limited powers under the *Australian Federal Police Act 1979*. These include powers to arrest and search persons for certain Commonwealth offences ('protective services offences') relating to Commonwealth property. CPP (bodyguard) services are largely performed by sworn police officers.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The *Australian Protective Service Act 1987* was repealed.

<sup>7</sup> A number of CPP support roles have been performed by PSOs in recent years. These roles are discussed further in this report.

## Federal Audit of Police Capabilities

**1.12** In 2009, the Federal Audit of Police Capabilities (the ‘Beale Review’)<sup>8</sup> examined the AFP’s capacity to meet contemporary and future demands and government priorities. The review briefly assessed the Protection function and found that the services provided by UP and CPP were generally effective.

**1.13** The Government’s December 2009 decision to implement the Beale Review recommendations relating to airport security will see the AFP Aviation function becoming staffed by sworn police. The transition, known as Project Macer, will take place over three to five years and may result in significant numbers of current Aviation staff (also PSOs) transferring to Protection Services, because they are unable or unwilling to make the transition to sworn police.<sup>9</sup> In addition, Protection PSOs are also being given the opportunity to make the transition to sworn police.<sup>10</sup> The net impact of PSO movements on the Protection function will not be known for some time.

## The audit

### Audit objective and scope

**1.14** The objective of the audit was to examine whether the UP and CPP services provided by the Australian Federal Police Protection Service are being managed effectively. In particular, the audit examined:

- whether the Protection function has been effectively integrated into the AFP, and sound arrangements are in place to strategically plan Protection services and manage risks;
- whether Protection staff have access to appropriate training and guidance; and
- the management arrangements for UP and CPP services.

**1.15** The audit focused on PSOs employed within the AFP’s Protection function. It did not cover PSOs employed within the Aviation function, Protection staff deployed overseas, and those engaged in Witness Protection.

<sup>8</sup> *New Realities: National Policing in the 21st Century—Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*—Independent Reviewer: Roger Beale, 30 June 2009.

<sup>9</sup> At 21 December 2010, 45 Aviation PSOs had expressed an intention to transfer to Protection.

<sup>10</sup> A survey commissioned by the AFP indicates that 31 per cent of Protection PSOs are considering transitioning to a sworn AFP police officer.

The adequacy of the physical security measures in place at Protection stations was also outside the scope of the audit.

## **Audit methodology**

**1.16** Audit fieldwork was mainly undertaken at AFP Headquarters in Canberra. The ANAO interviewed relevant officers and reviewed files and other documentation. It also consulted with key stakeholders in Canberra, including the Attorney-General's Department and the Departments of: the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Finance and Deregulation, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Parliamentary Services.


**1.17** The ANAO visited a cross-section of the 15 UP stations across Australia, including: the Diplomatic Protection Units in Canberra and Sydney, Parliament House, Headquarters Joint Operations Command, Kirribilli and Admiralty Houses in Sydney, The Lodge in Canberra, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation and the Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap. Where possible, the ANAO spoke to Station Managers, stakeholders and PSOs during these visits.

**1.18** The audit was conducted in accordance with ANAO auditing standards. The cost of the audit to report tabling was approximately \$350 000.

## **Report structure**

**1.19** The report structure is illustrated in Figure 1.2.



**Figure 1.2****Structure of the report**

## 2. Strategic Planning and Integration

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*This chapter discusses the arrangements for planning and overseeing the management of Protection, and managing its associated risks. It also examines whether any residual issues from the integration of the Australian Protective Service (APS) into the AFP are impacting on outcomes.*

### Introduction

**2.1** Protection is a multifaceted undertaking that involves the deployment of some 700 staff, and the delivery of a range of security services, at diverse sites across Australia. The effective management of these services requires the identification and monitoring of program objectives and strategies through strategic planning, and the effective identification and management of risks to their achievement.

**2.2** The ANAO examined these processes, together with the integration of the former APS into the AFP.

### Strategic planning

**2.3** Effective planning is one of the attributes of a well-governed organisation. Protection follows a multilayered approach to strategic planning that involves the preparation of an annual functional Business Plan and a lower level Action Plan.

#### *Business Plan*

**2.4** Protection's 2010–2011 Business Plan reflects sound planning practice—it is documented, time-specific, identifies the broader context (environment and stakeholders), and identifies a range of goals and strategies to achieve them. In addition, it links these strategies to performance indicators and related targets. The plan also broadly aligns with higher level AFP-wide plans and planning processes.

**2.5** Quarterly reports on the Plan's implementation and progress are provided to Protection management. Reports use a colour-coded traffic light format and set out actions to date, and goals for the next quarter, against each strategy. This provides a sound means to monitor progress over the course of the year.

## Action Plan

2.6 Protection has also developed an Action Plan for 2010–11 to facilitate the implementation of the goals/strategies set out in its Business Plan.<sup>11</sup> The Action Plan sets out specific actions to implement each strategy and incorporates a quarterly reporting process. While the Action Plan should help Protection to monitor its progress against actions on a quarterly basis, the identification of persons with primary responsibility for implementing each action, and the estimated completion date, would assist accountability as progress is monitored throughout the year.<sup>12</sup>

## Performance indicators

2.7 The ANAO examined the performance indicators used by Protection to report its achievements to determine whether they enable managers and stakeholders to draw well-informed conclusions on the program's performance and progress.

### High-level indicators

2.8 To this end, Protection reported on two key performance indicators (KPIs) in the AFP's Annual Report for 2009–10. Table 2.1 sets out these KPIs, together with their targets and outcomes.

**Table 2.1**

### Protection's key performance indicators for 2009–10

Indicator	Identified Target (%)	Reported Outcome (%)
<i>Level of client/stakeholder satisfaction for close personal protection principals (% of clients satisfied or very satisfied)</i>	90	81
<i>Level of client/stakeholder satisfaction for uniform protection at respective Commonwealth facilities/premises (% of clients satisfied or very satisfied)</i>	90	75

Note: These two KPIs are aggregated into one in the AFP Portfolio Budget Statements 2010–11.

Source: AFP Annual Report 2009–10.

<sup>11</sup> AFP functions were no longer required to prepare Action Plans with effect from 2010–11.

<sup>12</sup> Protection's 2009–10 Action Plan did specify those responsible for implementing each action/strategy.

**2.9** While the indicators provide comfort that the majority of surveyed clients who responded to the survey are satisfied with the service, Protection's small client base and low response rate means that the results should be treated with caution.<sup>13</sup> A broader range of KPIs would help provide management with assurance that services are being effectively delivered and that the supporting administrative framework is operating at the desired level.

**2.10** Aware of the limitations of its indicators, in June 2010 Protection engaged the University of Queensland to help it develop a more comprehensive set of outcome-focused KPIs for 2011–12.<sup>14</sup> As a result of this work, at the time of the audit, Protection was trialling three additional KPIs for potential inclusion in the AFP's 2011–12 Portfolio Budget Statements:

- the number of avoidable incidents per 1000 CPP movements;
- the percentage of time dedicated to preventative activities; and
- the percentage of time dedicated to high-visibility UP patrolling and CPP activities.

**2.11** These indicators have the potential to strengthen Protection's performance reporting against its objective of ensuring that individuals and interests identified to be at risk by the Commonwealth are kept safe from acts of terrorism, violent protest and issues-motivated violence.

**2.12** Another potentially useful indicator for UP services would be the actual number of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff deployed across all UP stations vis-à-vis the authorised FTE numbers for those stations (discussed in Chapter 3). Such an indicator would help show the effectiveness of a number of supporting elements such as workforce planning, recruitment and training to deliver appropriately skilled staff at the right time. Protection noted this suggestion and advised that it monitors and reports on this information internally.

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<sup>13</sup> Of the 52 Protection clients surveyed, only 27 responded (52 per cent), and only 8 of those related to UP services. The response rate is similar across all functions of the AFP (49 per cent).

<sup>14</sup> The need to develop new KPIs was identified in Protection's Business Plan 2010–2011. The University of Queensland project covers the whole of the AFP's National Security program, which also includes the Aviation, Counter-terrorism and International Deployments functions.

### Lower-level indicators

**2.13** As noted in paragraph 2.4 above, Protection's Business Plan 2010–2011 identifies a range of performance indicators against each business strategy. An example of the indicators for one strategy is shown in Table 2.2. These indicators were being trialled at the time of the audit.

**Table 2.2**

### Example of performance indicators in Protection's 2010–2011 Business Plan

Goal	Strategy	Performance Information		
		Indicator	Measure	Target
1. Build human resource capacity in the Protection Portfolio	1.1 Develop and maintain a comprehensive workforce plan	Attrition & turnover rates	Percentage	<2009/2010
		Development of internal staff survey	Yes/No	80% completion
		Development of skills pathway	Yes/No	Yes
		Portfolio diversity	Percentage	>2009/2010
		Increase in training opportunities	Numbers applying	>2009/2010

Source: Protection's Business Plan 2010–2011.

**2.14** Protection's achievements against the indicators are reported to the AFP's Performance and Budget Monitoring Committee (along with other functional area's achievements) twice a year. This effectively enables AFP and Protection management to monitor whether progress is on track to meet the plan's targets.

### Management meetings

**2.15** A number of formal leadership and operational committees manage and monitor governance and operational issues within the Protection function.

**2.16** The peak management committee is the Protection Leadership Committee, which meets monthly to review planning, finance, human resource/occupational health and safety issues, learning and development, recruitment and performance issues across the function. This is underpinned by weekly and monthly meetings of the Operational Committee which is focused on more routine matters such as incident reports, prioritisation of staff for training courses and reviewing CPP Post Visit Reports. Other committees

look at specific issues relating to governance instruments, staff transfers and complaints.

**2.17** These formal committee meetings are appropriately minuted—with action items and responsibilities generally identified—and are generally effective at managing Protection’s business.

## Managing risk

**2.18** The effective identification and management of risk is important for Protection because its core business is to protect Australian and foreign dignitaries and Commonwealth establishments that are at risk.

**2.19** To this end, under the AFP National Guideline on Risk Management, Protection is required (along with other AFP functional areas) to establish and maintain a functional risk register.<sup>15</sup> Against this background, the ANAO examined Protection’s approach to identifying and managing business risks and station-related risks.

### Identifying and managing business risks

**2.20** Protection’s 2010–2011 Business Plan requires the application of risk management methods, and outlines strategies to achieve them, including the maintenance and bi-annual review of a business risk register.

**2.21** Protection maintains a business risk register for the function as a whole.<sup>16</sup> The ANAO examined the risk register and found that it reflects sound risk management practice. In particular, it involves:

- the formal and systematic identification and documentation of risks, including a *description of the risks* and their *potential sources* and *potential impacts* (if the risk materialises);
- a structured risk assessment approach, which identifies *existing controls* (measures modifying the risk), and their *ratings* (effectiveness assessment); and
- the identification of *likelihood* (probability) and *consequence*, and a resultant overall risk rating.

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<sup>15</sup> AFP National Guideline on Risk Management, November 2007.

<sup>16</sup> Protection Business Risk Register, July 2010.

**2.22** In addition, for those risks where further treatment is considered necessary, additional treatments are identified, together with the residual risk level, implementation timetable, performance measures and processes for monitoring/review.

**2.23** The risk register is regularly updated and provided to AFP Policy and Governance for review. Policy and Governance advised that Protection's risk registers are considered to demonstrate better practice within the AFP.

## **Managing station risks**

**2.24** The ANAO also reviewed the risk management approach across UP stations in light of a 2006 internal audit report that found that stations generally did not have formal risk management registers in place, contravening the National Guideline.<sup>17</sup>

**2.25** Each of the 15 UP stations now maintains a formal risk register, which essentially mirrors the attributes of the business risk register discussed above. Stations visited by the ANAO were familiar with their risk management responsibilities and requirements and generally reported that the registers helped them focus on the management of their risks. They were in the process of updating their registers at the time of the visit.


**2.26** The ANAO observed that the controls identified in respect of one key security risk were rated as inadequate by two of the stations. This risk involved a potential threat to both personnel and facilities. In response to the audit observations, Protection management advised that it had commenced a review of the risk. The review is due to be completed by 1 July 2011.

**2.27** The preparation and regular update of the station risk registers is effectively overseen and monitored by Protection in Canberra. The registers are collected and reviewed centrally, and discussed at Operational Committee meetings. They are also used to inform the preparation of the business risk register.

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<sup>17</sup> *Station Risk Management and the Governance Framework*, AFP Internal Audit, September 2006.





The Lodge, Canberra. Each Protection station is required to maintain a risk register.

Source: AFP

## Managing CPP risks

**2.28** Protection does not maintain a dedicated, high-level risk register for CPP activities, although some key CPP risks are covered in Protection's business risk register—for example, *an avoidable incident involving a Principal*. Notwithstanding this, the ANAO notes that one key risk—*inadequate surge capacity*—is not identified.

**2.29** While the need to develop a surge capacity strategy for the Protection function is identified in its Business Plan, there would be merit in also including the associated risk for both UP and CPP in the business risk register to facilitate the regular assessment and review of the likelihood and consequences of the risk materialising.

## Protection's risk control scorecard

**2.30** The AFP does not maintain an agency-wide risk register. Instead it uses a Strategic Leaders Group (SLG)<sup>18</sup> Risk Control Scorecard, and relies on the risk registers prepared by the various AFP functions. While the scorecard identifies high-level risks it does not rate them or the residual risk. Instead it

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<sup>18</sup> The Strategic Leaders Group is the AFP's peak advisory committee and assists the AFP Commissioner in making decisions and exercising his statutory responsibilities.



rates the effectiveness of existing controls/treatments and is primarily used by the SLG to monitor high-level risks and to inform AFP organisational plans. The ratings are determined through discussions at a National Managers' Workshop.

**2.31** Although outside the scope of the audit, the ANAO notes that, at the time of the audit, consideration was being given at the corporate level to developing a more strategic and rigorous AFP-wide risk management approach. In this regard, the AFP advised that the development of an AFP-wide register will be a key priority for 2011–12.

**2.32** Protection is also required, along with other AFP functions, to prepare a Risk Control Scorecard. While there is no formal documented guidance on the preparation of scorecards, Protection's scorecard reflects the same risk categories as the SLG scorecard, but with the risks and controls tailored to the Protection function. Protection actively monitors risks in its scorecard, linking them to risks in its risk registers, and reviewing them more broadly at its management meetings.

## Integration of the APS into the AFP

**2.33** As noted in Chapter 1, by 2004 the APS was fully integrated into the AFP (managed under Project Merida), bringing together the AFP's personal protection functions with the APS's guarding functions.

**2.34** Given the time that has elapsed since integration took place, the ANAO focused on identifying any residual issues that might be impacting on the day-to-day delivery of Protection's services.

## Functional integration

**2.35** As discussed elsewhere in this report, key functional elements such as planning, risk management, training, professional services, human resource management (for example, management of unplanned absences) are now being delivered, monitored and managed through common AFP-wide systems and approaches. For example:

- PSO recruitment and ongoing training was integrated into the AFP Police College from 2007, with PSO training brought more into line with police officer recruit training (discussed in Chapter 4);
- Protection's planning and risk management processes are integrated, with the latter considered to be among better practice within the AFP;

- an AFP-wide Collective Agreement was put in place in 2007 with a common classification and pay structure;
- unplanned absences by PSOs are corporately monitored and managed (discussed in Chapter 3);
- common National Guidelines apply agency-wide to all functions; and
- uniforms, badging and motor vehicles, while not identical, reflect common elements.

**2.36** In the main, the use of common AFP systems and approaches has been of benefit to both Protection staff—for example, by delivering better training and conditions of service—and to the AFP, for example, by facilitating the central monitoring and benchmarking of Protection’s outcomes against other areas of the AFP.

## **Staff views on integration**

**2.37** While the organisational integration was completed in 2004, this was the start of an ongoing process of integrating APS staff into the AFP culture. Early post-integration staff surveys indicated a lack of motivation, and disengagement from the rest of the AFP (discussed in Chapter 3) suggesting, among other things, a need for better Executive communication. The surveys also indicated that Protection staff tend to be more negative in their cultural perceptions of the AFP than other areas.

**2.38** The ANAO spoke to a wide range of senior and junior AFP staff, including both PSOs and police officers, to obtain their views on the effectiveness of the integration. While some staff commented that integration could have been better handled at the time, and that full cultural integration will take a generation to complete, overwhelmingly staff considered that the integration had been of benefit to PSOs, citing as examples: better equipment, wages, management, training and opportunities for development.

**2.39** As noted in Chapter 4, training and, in particular, the PSO Development Workshops, have helped integration, particularly for remote stations that are more removed from the AFP culture. In addition, the AFP is currently seeking to identify opportunities for greater interoperability of PSOs within Protection and more broadly within the AFP, including the use of UP staff in CPP operations (discussed in Chapter 6). As part of Project Macer,

Protection PSOs are also being given the opportunity to make the transition to sworn police.<sup>19</sup>

**2.40** A number of staff commented that while efforts were made to ‘sell’ the AFP to the APS, the reverse has not been as effective, with some Protection staff believing that many police officers do not have a good appreciation of their role and capabilities; in short, they felt undervalued by the broader AFP. This issue has been identified in staff surveys and is known to management (discussed in Chapter 3). Protection management advised that it continues to seek ways to address this concern, with one recent initiative being wider circulation of the monthly Protection Newsletter to all AFP staff.

**2.41** Overall, there was a general view among staff interviewed by the ANAO that Protection management has been active in dealing with issues—such as differences in employment conditions and career and training opportunities—as they arise. The ANAO’s review of Protection files and documents supports this view.

**2.42** A few staff believed that some standards had dropped, for example, some considered that their annual Use of Force re-qualification had become easier to obtain since it was brought into line with that undertaken by police officers. While noting these comments, the ANAO did not identify any residual issues in this regard, or more generally, that were adversely impacting on operations or outcomes. This was also the general view of staff interviewed by the ANAO.

## Conclusion

**2.43** Protection has put in place a number of the key elements of a sound planning and performance monitoring framework. In particular, it has developed a Business Plan that identifies goals and strategies, and it reports against these internally twice a year. This provides a sound means for both the AFP and Protection management to monitor progress. Protection is aware of the limitations of its externally reported KPIs, and is currently trialling additional indicators that have the potential to strengthen its performance reporting to the public.

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<sup>19</sup> A survey commissioned by the AFP indicates that 31 per cent of Protection PSOs are considering transitioning to a sworn AFP member.

**2.44** Protection has put in place effective arrangements to systematically identify, document, assess and rate its risks, both for the Protection function as a whole and for individual UP stations. It has also established arrangements to regularly review and update those risks.

**2.45** The functional integration of the former APS was completed in 2004. Key elements such as planning, risk management, training, professional services and human resource management are now being delivered, monitored and managed through common AFP-wide systems and approaches. Overall, integration has largely been effective, with AFP management active in dealing with issues that have emerged. However, the process of integrating APS staff into the AFP culture is ongoing. Some Protection staff feel undervalued, suggesting that there is still work to be done to communicate the role and capabilities of the Protection function to the broader AFP. Protection management is aware of this issue, and is seeking to identify further opportunities for PSOs within Protection, and more broadly within the AFP.

## 3. Managing the Protection Workforce

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*This chapter examines the arrangements for managing and monitoring Protection's workforce, including arrangements for managing unplanned absences, surveying staff and monitoring professional standards. Where relevant, it compares Protection with the wider AFP workforce.*

### Introduction

**3.1** The Protection workforce needs to be well managed, both strategically and operationally, to allow it to perform its role of protecting Commonwealth establishments and high office holders both now and in the future. This requires workforce planning arrangements that enable it to have the *right people in the right place at the right time*,<sup>20</sup> and arrangements to monitor and manage unscheduled absences of staff, and staff adherence to the professional standards of the AFP.

**3.2** These arrangements are examined below.

### Workforce planning

**3.3** In December 2010, the AFP's Strategic Leaders Group approved an interim, agency-wide, workforce plan for 2010–2012.<sup>21</sup> While the plan necessarily has a high-level focus,<sup>22</sup> it foreshadows the development of resource plans by July 2011 for each functional area, including Protection. In addition, at the time of the audit, the AFP had identified an intention to develop a workforce plan for the AFP's broader National Security program, which includes Protection. These plans should assist Protection's strategic workforce planning and decision-making.

**3.4** At the operational level, Protection uses a range of lower level management and monitoring arrangements to help manage its workforce. These provide it with a wide range of information, including:

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<sup>20</sup> ANAO Better Practice Guide—*Planning for the Workforce of the Future—a better practice guide for managers*, March 2001, Canberra, p. 1.

<sup>21</sup> The *AFP Two Year Rolling Workforce Plan, 2010–2012*.

<sup>22</sup> The plan segments the AFP's workforce into sworn police, PSOs (both Protection and Aviation), and unsworn staff. Sworn police make up 44.5 per cent of the AFP workforce, compared with PSOs at 17.6 per cent. Overall, Protection staff comprise 10.4 per cent of the AFP workforce.

- PSO numbers and details by station, including resignations and leave;
- vacancies at each station and for UP as a whole;
- the expected number and placement of recruits each year; and
- transfers from stations, including transfers relating to Project Macer (discussed in Chapter 2).

3.5 The data is collected from stations by Protection through regular weekly and monthly reporting arrangements, and from other internal sources.<sup>23</sup> Staffing levels are forecast up to a year in advance and take into account planned transfers, recruitment, and attrition. The reports, which are provided to the Protection Workforce Planning Committee, identify risks from expected staffing shortages, and assist the planning for recruit courses.

3.6 Protection also monitors the actual full-time equivalent (FTE) staffing numbers at stations on a weekly basis and compares these to the authorised and FTE numbers required to run the stations.<sup>24</sup>

3.7 At September 2010, these reports showed that, while some stations were over-staffed, the overall staffing level across all UP stations was 4.8 per cent under the authorised FTE. In this regard, the ANAO noted from discussions with Station Managers that fully-staffed stations are better able to manage rosters and leave, and allow staff to undertake training, than understaffed stations.

3.8 One station was identified as having a *Very High* staffing risk (which was expected to remain the case over the next year), and two others were predicted to become *Very High* risks over the next year. The higher risk stations are more likely to be remotely located (away from capital cities), and generally find it more difficult to recruit and retain staff. The ANAO noted that across the four remote stations,<sup>25</sup> staffing numbers were 20.9 per cent below the authorised FTE for those stations.

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<sup>23</sup> Key data is collated into monthly *Station Staffing Analysis and Risk Assessment* reports which, among other things, identify the associated staffing risk (*Low, Minor, High* or *Very High*).

<sup>24</sup> These weekly reports are known as the *Protection Executive Team* (PET) reports. They take into account international deployments, PSOs on leave, and PSOs undertaking training.

<sup>25</sup> The remote stations are Exmouth, Geraldton, Pine Gap and Woomera.



Uniform Protection provides security services at four remote stations in Australia.

Source: AFP

**3.9** Shortages at remote stations are presently being managed by temporarily redeploying staff from stations in the region, or by transferring PSOs from non-regional stations ('fly-ins') for a three-month period. Where this is not possible, Protection advised that it maintains minimal staffing levels in consultation with the client.

**3.10** Protection management is seeking to address ongoing remote staffing shortages by running additional recruit courses in 2011 and, where possible, by recruiting staff locally. While this is a sound approach, the ANAO notes from its discussions with staff that some local recruits see this as a 'stepping stone' to more populated areas of Australia, which suggests this initiative may fall short of expectations.

**3.11** Taken together, the ANAO considers that the various reporting arrangements that Protection uses to forecast expected staffing levels, identify associated trends and risks, and monitor actual staffing levels provide it with a sound means to manage its workforce.

## Surge capacity

**3.12** The Beale Review noted in 2009 that a limited surge capacity for instances of increased demand for UP services could be provided from PSOs



employed within other AFP functional areas.<sup>26</sup> Protection management's view is that there is now very limited capacity available in this regard, and that the transitioning of airports to an AFP sworn police model will remove the existing source of UP surge capacity from the Aviation function.<sup>27</sup>

**3.13** Similarly, with regard to CPP activities, the Beale Review noted that while there are always officers employed elsewhere in the AFP with previous CPP experience, there is no formal structured CPP surge capacity in the event of circumstances requiring a sudden expansion.<sup>28</sup> At the time of the audit, Protection management had commenced planning for the building of the CPP surge capacity required for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Perth in October 2011. Strategies include: identifying staff who have previously undertaken CPP training with a view to requalifying them; and instituting a leave embargo for Protection and CPP qualified staff.

**3.14** More broadly, the need to develop a surge capacity strategy for the Protection portfolio as a whole is recognised in Protection's 2010–2011 Business Plan.

### **Staff rotations/transfers**

**3.15** A number of Station Managers reported benefits from rotating PSOs between stations, including improved motivation, reduced absences, broader experience and reduced complacency.

**3.16** Protection does not currently have a formal rotation policy, but staff are informally rotated between some stations in the same location (and usually with the same officer-in-charge),<sup>29</sup> and permanent transfers to other stations are organised on an ad hoc basis between Station Managers.<sup>30</sup> Staff shortages at

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<sup>26</sup> *New Realities: National Policing in the 21st Century—Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*—Independent Reviewer: Roger Beale, 30 June 2009, p. 175 and 179.

<sup>27</sup> Notwithstanding this, Protection management does expect that Project Macer (see Chapter 1) will help alleviate staff shortages as Aviation PSOs who are unable or unwilling to transition to sworn police become available for redeployment.

<sup>28</sup> *New Realities: National Policing in the 21st Century—Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*—Independent Reviewer: Roger Beale, 30 June 2009, p. 176, which noted that in view of other AFP ongoing operations, many former CPP staff would be engaged in core investigations, so any additional capacity for CPP would inevitably draw resources from what may be other high-priority activities.

<sup>29</sup> For example, in Canberra the three official establishment stations—The Lodge, Government House and the Diplomatic Protection Unit—rotate PSOs every three months. However, staff are not routinely rotated to other Canberra stations such as Parliament House and Russell Offices.

<sup>30</sup> These transfers are subject to formal endorsement by the Protection Workforce Planning Committee.



some stations mean that Station Managers may be reluctant to release staff unless replacements can be found.

**3.17** The ANAO considers that there would be merit in Protection considering the development of a formal Protection-wide rotation policy, which reflects an appropriate balance between staff and organisational needs. This would help ensure transparency of decisions and facilitate equitable treatment between PSOs. Such a policy could give appropriate weight to the particular requirements of remote stations.

**Workforce demographics**

**3.18** The AFP centrally collects workforce demographics and produces internal reports which enable comparisons to be made across AFP functions. Two key reports available to Protection management are a new Organisational Health Report (discussed at paragraphs 3.25 and 3.26 below) and a quarterly workforce demographic report. Protection management also requests ad hoc reports from time to time.

**3.19** These reports are used by Protection management in its workforce planning, for example, to target recruitment strategies and help identify likely increases in attrition due to impending retirements. These reports also provide Protection management with a range of useful demographic data that can be compared with other AFP functions. Examples of the data are set out in Table 3.1.

**Table 3.1**

**Examples of Protection demographic data**

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Gender profile</b>—Protection has the highest male to female ratio in the AFP, which in 2009 was 7.4 males to one female (the AFP average (including Protection) was 2.3 males to one female).</li><li>• <b>Age profile</b>—Protection has a relatively equal distribution of staff across most age cohorts (with the largest group being those aged 35-44). About 20 per cent of staff will be eligible for retirement within the next 10 years. The average age of Protection staff is 38, which is similar to the AFP average (including Protection) at 39.</li><li>• <b>Length of service</b>—the length of service of Protection employees is evenly distributed which will help its succession planning. The average is seven years, less than the AFP average (including Protection) of 11 years.</li></ul>
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Source: ANAO analysis of AFP Human Resources data.

## Surveying staff

**3.20** Protection staff have participated in three AFP surveys since the APS was fully integrated into the AFP in 2004 (see Table 3.2). These surveys have provided valuable information to AFP management about staff views on the organisation, and have helped identify opportunities for improving the AFP's performance.

**3.21** While changes in the methodology used for each survey limits the trend analysis possible, similar themes arise for Protection staff which indicates that they tend to be more negative in their cultural perceptions of the AFP and generally have a lower level of job satisfaction than other areas.

**Table 3.2**

### Overview of Protection findings from AFP surveys

<b>2006 Staff Opinion Analysis and Reporting Survey</b>
Findings for Protection staff were more negative than for other AFP staff, with Protection staff feeling that they were not a part of the AFP. Protection staff felt undervalued, underpaid, underutilised, unmotivated and disengaged from the rest of the organisation.
<b>2008 Culture Review</b>
The findings for the 2008 survey were more positive, with Protection staff feeling that they had lower workplace demands and pressures, and greater role clarity than the rest of the AFP.  However, on the negative side, Protection staff felt they had: lower levels of control in the workplace; less engagement with AFP culture; lower levels of support from their managers and peers; and less understanding of change in the AFP.
<b>2010 Culture Review (preliminary findings only)</b>
The preliminary findings for the 2010 survey suggest further improvements in some areas for Protection. Overall, Protection staff were mildly positive (similar to other AFP portfolios in this regard) that the AFP has a positive culture, and had similar levels of loyalty to the organisation as the rest of the AFP. However, Protection staff had the lowest level of job satisfaction across the AFP.

Source: ANAO analysis.

**3.22** While Protection staff views have tended to be more negative than other areas of the AFP, the findings across the surveys suggest that the wider initiatives the AFP has taken to address cultural issues that are noted in other

areas of this report<sup>31</sup> and improvements in knowledge sharing<sup>32</sup> are having positive effects.

## Conclusion—Workforce planning

**3.23** The ANAO concluded that Protection has put in place, or has access to, a number of key tools that enable it to adequately monitor and manage its workforce on an operational basis. In addition, there are a number of initiatives underway that should help strengthen strategic workforce planning, and help overcome staff shortages at some stations. However, this planning is being complicated by changes underway in other parts of the AFP. These changes follow the Government's December 2009 decision to implement the recommendations of the Federal Audit of Police Capabilities<sup>33</sup> and may see significant numbers of staff transfer to Protection as PSOs (offset by some Protection PSOs transitioning to sworn policing roles).

## Unscheduled absences

**3.24** Reducing unscheduled absences is one of the most effective ways for agencies to improve productivity. While a certain level of employee absence is unavoidable, it has been estimated that as much as 50 per cent of sick leave may be avoidable in organisations with high levels of absence.<sup>34</sup>

**3.25** A recently developed AFP-wide tool—the Organisational Health Report—assists AFP managers to monitor the 'health' of their function and take remedial action where required.

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<sup>31</sup> The AFP has sought to address cultural issues through a number of wider initiatives, including: through a range of measures to facilitate functional and workforce integration (discussed in Chapter 2); by providing PSOs with the opportunity to transition to sworn police officers (Chapter 2); and through the integration of training into the AFP Police College; the enhancement of recruit training; and the design and delivery of PSO Development Workshops (Chapter 4).

<sup>32</sup> Protection advised that the culture review led to improvements in knowledge sharing by introducing an information management tool (known as the SharePoint Organisational Knowledge Exchange System) that simplified the way staff store, manage and share information, and the inclusion of Protection articles and information on the AFP intranet for the information of all AFP staff.


<sup>33</sup> The Government's December 2009 decision to implement the recommendations of the Federal Audit of Police Capabilities (the Beale Review) relating to airport security will see the AFP Aviation function becoming staffed by sworn police. The transition will take place over three to five years and may result in significant numbers of current Aviation staff (also PSOs) transferring to Protection Services, because they are unable or unwilling to make the transition to sworn police. At 21 December 2010, 45 Aviation PSOs had expressed an intention to transfer to Protection.

<sup>34</sup> *State of the Service Report 2008–09*, Australian Public Service Commission, p. 149.

**3.26** The report shows that Protection’s rate of unscheduled absences (days per employee per year) increased by seven per cent in 2009–10, resulting in an absence rate of 11.3, compared with the AFP overall (including Protection) with a median of 10.3. A breakdown between the various Protection groups shows that UP was the highest at 12.1, exceeding both the AFP and Australian Public Service rates (see Figure 3.1).<sup>35</sup>

**Figure 3.1**

**Breakdown of unscheduled absences for 2009–10**



Notes: AFP (overall) is the median across the whole AFP and includes Protection.

Protection (overall) is the median across the whole Protection function.

The CPP figure includes figures for Witness Protection.

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP and Australian Public Service Commission data.

<sup>35</sup> The 2008 Culture Review also found that Protection staff were more likely than other AFP areas to take days off with or without a medical certificate.

**3.27** Protection management is aware of the high absence rate and has included it in its functional risk register. The issue was recently discussed at Protection management meetings and possible causes were identified.<sup>36</sup>

## Workers' compensation

**3.28** Protection's fraud control plan identifies fraudulent claims for Comcare benefits as a risk arising from a disgruntled and poorly monitored workforce.<sup>37</sup>

**3.29** Since integration, responsibility for managing workers' compensation claims and cases has been assumed by the AFP's central Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) unit. Protection management is advised of claims through regular AFP-wide OH&S reporting and meetings.

**3.30** During the early years of integration, APS staff, which included Aviation PSOs, were significantly over-represented in workers' compensation claims. Indeed, from 2001 to 2006, workers' compensation claims for the AFP (excluding the APS) were trending down, while at the same time APS claims were trending up.

**3.31** Following integration, a range of existing and new measures were implemented to reduce the incidence of claims.<sup>38</sup> Over the last four years these measures have been effective across both Protection (which dropped by 56 per cent) and the rest of the AFP (which dropped by 39 per cent), as shown in Figure 3.2.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Unscheduled absences were discussed at two operational committee meetings in late 2010. Two possible causes were identified. The first related to a possible link between unscheduled absences and secondary employment (Protection issued revised guidelines on secondary employment to all team leaders in October 2010 to clarify its expectations in this area). The second related to staff taking time off to undertake training or deployment with the Australian Defence Force (Defence Reserve Service Leave is part of the AFP Collective Agreement).


<sup>37</sup> *Protection Fraud Control and Anti-Corruption Risk Register*, July 2010. The risk of fraudulent claims for Comcare benefits is rated 'Low'.

<sup>38</sup> Measures included: improving OH&S and risk management awareness among staff (e.g. through a new intranet-based OH&S training course), investigating practical ways to reduce claims from body stressing, introducing early rehabilitation intervention practices, meetings with Comcare to explore the best ways to deal with difficult long-term and high-cost claims, and developing an injury management system to speed up claims processing and reporting within the AFP.

<sup>39</sup> A trend analysis from 2004 when APS integration took place is not possible due to different methods of recording the incident of claims at that time. From 2004–2006, PSOs from the Aviation function were included in the total for Protection when determining the incidence of claims. It was only after 2006 that data accurately reflected the incidence of claims in the Protection function.

**Figure 3.2**

**Number of workers' compensation claims per 1000 employees**



Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

**3.32** The number of claims impact on the annual Comcare premium and in 2010-11, the AFP's Comcare premium was reduced by \$5 million (23 per cent) due to the positive trend in claims frequency and performance over the preceding four years.

## Professional standards

**3.33** All AFP employees have an individual responsibility to maintain the AFP's professional standards.<sup>40</sup> This involves upholding the AFP's core values of integrity, commitment, excellence, accountability, fairness and trust.

**3.34** Professional standards complaints against AFP staff range from minor administration matters to serious allegations of corruption. About three-quarters of all professional standards matters are minor Category 1 matters (for example, inappropriate conduct such as rudeness to a fellow employee) and Category 2 matters (for example, unauthorised absence from duty) and are managed by Complaint Management Teams in the local work

<sup>40</sup> The AFP's professional standards are determined by the AFP Commissioner and outlined in the *AFP Commissioner's Order on Professional Standards*. The standards apply to all AFP staff.

area. More serious Category 3 matters (for example, use of excessive force on a civilian) must be investigated by the AFP's Professional Standards unit, while Category 4 matters (corruption) are investigated by the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity.<sup>41</sup>

**3.35** When a professional standards complaint is made it may involve one or more AFP employees and can consist of a number of 'conduct issues'. A conduct issue is any conduct of an AFP employee that contravenes AFP professional standards or constitutes corrupt conduct. It also includes failing or refusing to engage in desired conduct.

**3.36** The AFP's Complaint Recording and Management System (CRAMS) has been used to record and manage complaints made against AFP staff since 2007.<sup>42</sup>

### **Protection conduct issues**

**3.37** The ANAO examined CRAMS data, specifically the number of 'submitted'<sup>43</sup> conduct issues, for both the Protection portfolio and for the rest of the AFP, from 2007 to 2010 (see Figure 3.3).

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
<sup>41</sup> The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity is an independent authority responsible for preventing, detecting and investigating serious and systemic corruption issues in the AFP and the Australian Crime Commission.

<sup>42</sup> The AFP advised that it does not hold data for Professional Standards issues prior to 2007.

<sup>43</sup> 'Submitted' conduct issues relate to the number of conduct issues received.

**Figure 3.3**

**Submitted conduct issues per 1000 employees**



Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

**3.38** Figure 3.3 indicates that submitted conduct issues for both Protection and for the rest of the AFP have generally trended down.<sup>44</sup> The graph also illustrates that per 1000 employees, Protection had a much lower number of submitted conduct issues when compared with the rest of the AFP. This may reflect, at least in part, the nature of Protection Services' work and its different client profile. For example, most Protection PSOs would have less interaction with the public than police officers, and would be involved in fewer arrests.

**3.39** A breakdown of the submitted conduct issues involving PSOs in Protection reveals that PSOs are more likely to be involved in Category 2 and 3 matters and are less likely to be involved in the more serious Category 4 matters than the rest of the AFP. However, Protection PSOs are more likely to have conduct issues 'established' (49 per cent, compared with 18 per cent for the rest of the AFP), and are more likely to be the subject of conduct issues while off-duty (40 per cent compared with 10 per cent for the rest of the AFP).

<sup>44</sup> The AFP cannot determine the reason for the increase in Protection conduct issues in 2010. It advised that the issues were spread evenly across the categories and months of the year.



### *Measures taken to address the issues*

**3.40** Protection management, through regular reporting from the AFP's Professional Standards unit, is aware of the over-representation of Protection PSOs in the established and off-duty conduct issues. Protection management, in association with the Professional Standards unit, has identified a range of measures to address the issues. Some are AFP-wide, while others are unique to Protection. Measures involve the inclusion of:

- training in ethics and professional standards in PSO recruit training;
- a professional standards session in the PSO Development Workshop (discussed in Chapter 4), which highlights the AFP's code of conduct, values, and the need for professionalism; and
- articles and case studies in the Protection newsletter drawing on conduct issues both AFP-wide and those specifically involving recent infractions by PSOs.

### **Conclusion—unscheduled absences and professional standards**

**3.41** Protection's rate of unscheduled absences is higher than the AFP average, however, its current approach to managing this issue—that is, inclusion on its risk register, regular reports, and regular review and discussion at management meetings—should help keep the issue in focus. Similarly, the AFP has been actively monitoring and managing workers' compensation claims for Protection staff since integration, and for other functional areas. This has resulted in fewer claims and a reduction in the AFP's Comcare premium.

**3.42** Protection, with the assistance of the Professional Standards unit, has developed strategies to monitor and manage professional standards issues for PSOs. However, while submitted conduct issues have generally trended down, the 2010 figure for Protection underlines the need to continually monitor this issue.

## 4. Uniform Protection Training and Guidance

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*This chapter discusses the training arrangements for Protective Service Officers (PSOs) delivering Uniform Protection services. It also examines staff access to up-to-date and relevant guidance.*

### Introduction

**4.1** PSOs provide protective security services across a range of Uniform Protection (UP) stations—from remote Defence stations in the Australian outback to the capital city residences of the Prime Minister and Governor-General.

**4.2** Against this background, it is important that PSOs are provided with appropriate and timely training to help them perform these diverse roles and responsibilities competently. In addition, PSOs should be supported by clear, up-to-date, relevant and user-friendly guidance.

### PSO training

**4.3** PSOs undertake a range of training during their careers. The ANAO examined the arrangements used to identify training needs for PSOs and the types of training provided, including: recruit training; general refresher training; and specific mandatory training. The systems used to identify and record training needs and achievements were also examined.

### PSO training needs analysis

**4.4** Following the integration of the APS, the AFP engaged a private provider to review the training needs of the existing PSOs and new recruits. This training needs analysis<sup>45</sup> led to changes in the PSO recruit course, including an increase in its scope and length, and its accreditation as a nationally recognised qualification.

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<sup>45</sup> Australian Federal Police Training Needs Analysis for Protective Service Officer Training, 2006.

## PSO recruit training

4.5 The recruitment process for PSOs and police officers share a number of common elements, including: an assessment centre; minimum medical and fitness standards; and aptitude screening. Some PSO requirements are less demanding—for example, educational qualifications<sup>46</sup> and aptitude testing.

4.6 The PSO recruit course is delivered over 13 weeks and is designed to provide recruits with the general skills and knowledge to perform operational duties at any UP station in Australia.<sup>47</sup> The number of recruit courses run each year depends on operational needs, staffing requirements, and the capacity of the AFP College to host the courses. Four courses are expected to be run in 2011, with 20–25 recruits on each.

4.7 Following completion of the course, PSOs are required to complete a workbook over the following six months to demonstrate their achievement of specific outcomes, such as successfully undertaking a vehicle patrol and operating AFP computer systems. While this was not assessed by the ANAO, there is a requirement that the workbooks are supervised and signed off by senior station staff.

4.8 Since 2008, PSOs have been awarded a *Certificate IV in Security and Response* after the successful completion of the recruit course and workbook.<sup>48</sup> This nationally recognised certificate may also be awarded to existing PSOs through recognition of prior learning.<sup>49</sup>

4.9 The training needs analysis also led to an increase in the length of the recruit course from eight to 13 weeks and the provision of enhanced training in a number of areas, including: Operational Safety Training (for example, batons, firearms and tactical communications); the rights of an arrested person; and traffic control. The enhanced course shares modules with the police officer

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<sup>46</sup> PSOs are required to have completed Year 10 schooling, rather than Year 12.

<sup>47</sup> Information on the PSO recruit course can be found at: <http://www.afp.gov.au/jobs/current-vacancies/ps0-recruit-training.aspx> [accessed 24 February 2011].

<sup>48</sup> The 13-week course is delivered at the AFP College, Barton. The College is a registered training organisation, accredited through the ACT Government Accreditation and Registration Council in Canberra since 1994. A *Registered Training Organisation Australian Quality Training Framework Standards Audit* undertaken by a private provider in May 2010 found the *Certificate* to be compliant with national standards.

<sup>49</sup> This requires PSOs to prepare a portfolio of evidence for assessment against set criteria.

recruit course although it is shorter.<sup>50</sup> To help keep recruit training topical and contemporary, the AFP College uses Senior PSOs and Station Managers to help develop and deliver the training material.

**4.10** Stations visited by the ANAO were generally satisfied with the quality of the AFP College graduates deployed to their stations.

## **Induction training at stations**

**4.11** While recruit training equips staff to perform general PSO duties, the diversity of stations means that PSOs need timely and appropriate induction training at their station to become adept in their role.

**4.12** The ANAO examined the PSO induction process at the seven stations it visited and noted that each had developed station-specific induction training packages. Packages commonly covered: an induction checklist; a site tour; stakeholder introductions; a buddy system with Senior PSOs; and a walk-through of common forms and procedures.

**4.13** While the training packages were generally adequate there were significant variations between them. For example, one station provided new recruits with a detailed 11-page OH&S package covering: workplace hazards; emergency response procedures; arrangements for reporting injuries; and an overview of the personal protective and safety equipment at the station. However, another station did not provide an OH&S package (only briefly referring to OH&S legislation) and did not include OH&S on its induction checklist. In addition, one checklist did not require supervisor sign-off that key areas had been covered.

**4.14** While each station has its own requirements, developing and promulgating a better practice template and checklist would provide assurance that minimum requirements are being met across stations.

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<sup>50</sup> The police recruit course runs for 24 weeks and is known as the *Federal Police Development Program*. Information can be found at: <http://www.afp.gov.au/jobs/recruit-training.aspx#actpolicing> [accessed 24 February 2011]. The additional length of the police course reflects the fact that police recruits are expected to acquire the full range of policing skills such as learning how to conduct investigations.

## **Mandatory training: Use of Force and First Aid**

**4.15** Following their successful completion of recruit training, PSOs are required to maintain their Use of Force qualification.<sup>51</sup> If they do not requalify each year, they must be given non-operational duties until they do. Requalification involves a 24-hour program (conducted over two or three days) reaffirming the correct methods of using force. The program recognises the AFP's duty of care obligations towards PSOs and the general public.

**4.16** Protection has effective procedures in place to monitor PSO Use of Force qualifications. Their currency is electronically monitored (on Insight—discussed at paragraphs 4.32 to 4.33 below) with an automated email reminder sent 60 days prior to expiry. The status of PSOs who have not requalified is monitored by Protection until they do. Protection staff consider that the system works well.

**4.17** PSOs are also required to hold an up-to-date first aid certificate, with the currency of the certificate monitored by individual Protection stations rather than centrally like the Use of Force qualification. This increases the risk that first aid qualifications will not be renewed on time. Given that the certificate is mandatory, the ANAO suggests that Protection also consider the merit of its currency being electronically monitored centrally.

## **PSO Development Workshops and ongoing refresher training**

**4.18** Following the introduction of enhanced PSO recruit training in 2008, Protection sought to bring the knowledge and skills of existing PSOs into line with that of new recruits. To this end, a PSO Development Workshop was developed to refresh the skills of PSOs who had undertaken recruit training prior to 2008 and to assist them to carry out their duties in a more professional manner.

**4.19** The workshops, which have now been discontinued, were run over three years and involved 40 hours of training. They were rolled out by region and were designed to be 'roster-friendly', with the workshop being delivered in modules to accommodate different shifts. Although the workshops were not mandatory, PSOs were encouraged to attend.

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<sup>51</sup> The requirement to maintain Use of Force qualifications is set out in the *AFP Commissioner's Order on Use of Force (CO3)*. The requalification is the same for PSOs and police officers.

**4.20** The workshops have been helpful in bringing PSOs up-to-date with legislative changes and in refreshing skills rarely used—for example, preparing official statements, securing a crime scene, and giving evidence in court. The workshops were generally well regarded by both Station Managers and the attendees interviewed by the ANAO.

**4.21** However, only 63 per cent of eligible Protection PSOs attended the workshops with the attendance rate for stations varying between 10 and 100 per cent of PSOs. The AFP advised that the attendance rate for Aviation PSOs has been much higher than it has been for Protection PSOs. It also advised that the lower attendance by Protection PSOs reflected rostering constraints at some stations which prevented some staff from being released.

**4.22** Given the general usefulness of the course in updating PSO knowledge and skills, the ANAO considers that there would be merit in the AFP running further workshops for eligible PSOs who missed out, and exploring options to overcome the rostering constraints that prevented staff from attending.

**4.23** Notwithstanding the value of the workshops, skills may again become dated unless there is some capacity to provide ongoing refresher training at regular intervals. Protection advised that it is developing an annual knowledge and skills refresher and re-certification program covering PSO powers, evidence and offences. The program is to be delivered through the AFP's online training program (discussed below), and would bring PSO training and assessments into line with refresher programs available to sworn AFP members.

## **Other optional training**

**4.24** The AFP also offers a range of optional training to enable AFP staff to broaden and deepen their skills. Some of this training is identified by PSOs and their supervisors as desirable for career advancement. Other training is provided to all staff at particular stations, for example:

- *Urgent Duty Driver Training*—undertaken by Diplomatic Protection Unit staff to provide practical and theoretical knowledge of tactical driving;
- *4WD training*—trains PSOs in the correct method of handling 4WDs in the course of their duties (relevant to remote locations); and
- *Bicycle Patrol Program*—provides PSOs with the skills needed to perform bicycle security patrols.



Bicycle patrol training underway at a remote station. Training covers aspects such as basic bicycle maintenance and defensive/assertive riding principles. Source: AFP

**4.25** These courses are generally available to all PSOs, depending on their station. PSOs are also eligible to attend other courses, such as Leadership Development Programs (commonly known as Tier One and Two leadership training).<sup>52</sup> However, given the popularity of these courses across the broader AFP, PSOs can find it difficult to gain a place on them. In response, Protection has established a system to prioritise its applicants. Station Managers and staff generally advised that the leadership training provides good opportunities for PSOs, including networking with different areas of the AFP.

## **iAspire**

**4.26** iAspire is the AFP's learning management system. It is designed to make learning more accessible, interactive and flexible. It is accessed from the AFP Intranet (known as the HUB—see Figure 4.1) and offers a variety of electronically delivered training courses that staff can undertake at a convenient time. iAspire courses can be tailored to individual AFP functional areas.

<sup>52</sup> Tier One leadership training, in particular, is seen as a prerequisite for promotion to a team leader role.



**A selection of online courses is available from the AFP's iAspire system**



**4.28** Staff interviewed by the ANAO advised that they use iAspire on a regular basis and considered it to be useful for updating and refreshing knowledge, particularly during quiet shifts. The online availability of these courses also helps remotely located PSOs who may otherwise find it difficult to attend training.

**4.29** Individual performance is managed through an AFP-wide online management tool called the Performance Development Agreement, which:

- 4.30** Agreements are updated six-monthly and are generally considered by both PSOs and their supervisors to provide a useful conduit for performance



discussions and to identify future development needs. The status of Agreements is monitored through the Organisation Health Report (discussed in Chapter 3), which shows Protection with a high completion rate of 98 per cent.

## **Overseeing the delivery of training**

**4.31** The delivery of appropriate and timely training to staff is assisted by an effective working relationship between Protection management and the AFP's Learning and Development functional area. This has been achieved through: a newly developed monthly report from Learning and Development to Protection management on relevant training issues—such as attendance at recent courses and the development of new courses—and attendance by Learning and Development staff at meetings of the Protection Leadership Committee (discussed in Chapter 2). These arrangements facilitate Protection management's oversight of PSO training arrangements.

**4.32** At a lower level, an AFP-wide management tool called Insight has been developed to enable, among other things<sup>53</sup>, individuals and supervisors to record and monitor training undertaken and qualifications achieved.

**4.33** In addition to recording Use of Force qualifications (see paragraph 4.16 above), other training courses and qualifications are also intended to be recorded on Insight. However, discussions with Protection staff indicated that this does not systematically occur. The ANAO understands that when a course is not recorded, the individual may provide the AFP College with the course certificate to facilitate an update. At some UP stations, however, staff recorded training courses on their Performance Development Agreements because Insight was seen as unreliable. This practice reduces Insight's usefulness as a management tool.

## **Conclusion—PSO training**

**4.34** Since integration, the AFP has strengthened the training and skills of PSOs by reviewing and enhancing recruit training. On completion of recruit training, PSOs are now awarded a nationally recognised certificate, and stations visited by the ANAO were generally satisfied with the quality of the graduates deployed to their stations. Integration into the AFP has also brought

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<sup>53</sup> Insight also records an employee's pay, absences, time records and security clearance.

with it access to an increased range of well-regarded training courses, although some courses can be difficult to access due to high demand.

**4.35** While the AFP has developed a refresher course for PSOs, only 63 per cent of eligible Protection PSOs have attended, reducing the impact of this well-regarded initiative. There would be merit in the AFP running further workshops for those who did not attend, and exploring options to overcome rostering constraints that have hampered attendance in the past.

**4.36** The AFP's online training tool (iAspire) is an expandable and well-regarded tool that delivers training courses to the workplace and is particularly helpful for remote staff. Similarly, the AFP's Performance Development Agreements provide an effective means to identify, document, and regularly review PSOs' future development needs and performance.

**4.37** While Protection has effective arrangements to monitor Use of Force qualifications through the AFP's electronic management tool (Insight), there would be merit in putting similar arrangements in place for mandatory first aid certificates to reduce the risk of renewals being overlooked. Weaknesses in systemically recording other training on Insight reduce its reliability as a useful and up-to-date management tool. There would also be benefit in reviewing the update arrangements to increase Insight's reliability in this regard.

**4.38** The stations visited by the ANAO had developed adequate induction material but developing and promulgating a better practice template and checklist would provide assurance that minimum requirements are being met across stations.

## PSO guidance

**4.39** The AFP has established a hierarchy of guidelines that are available to relevant staff via the AFP HUB. These include Commissioner's Orders,<sup>54</sup> National Guidelines and Practical Guidelines. At a lower level, there is also guidance specifically applicable to the Protection function, some of which is only available to relevant staff, such as station specific guidance.

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<sup>54</sup> The Commissioner's Orders are guidance from the Commissioner of the AFP and have not been examined as part of this audit.

## National and Practical Guidelines

**4.40** National Guidelines and Practical Guidelines carry with them compliance obligations that apply to all AFP staff. Failure to comply may result in a misconduct matter which is referred to the Professional Standards unit (discussed in Chapter 3). At the time of the audit, there were over 110 AFP-wide National Guidelines and over 190 AFP-wide Practical Guidelines. These guidelines provide advice and instruction on issues as diverse as maintaining appropriate dress standards, through to managing risk.

**4.41** National and Practical Guidelines require biennial review.<sup>55</sup> To this end, each guideline has metadata attached to its HUB listing, which informs all staff and the document owner when review is required. When a guideline requires review, a Governance Instrument Committee is to be established, with the size and nature of the review varying depending on the nature of the document.

**4.42** While all National and Practical Guidelines potentially apply to Protection staff, at the time of the audit, there were five National and Practical Guidelines that specifically applied to Protection, including guidance on: CPP standard operating procedures (discussed in Chapter 6), operational planning, and the arrangements for requesting and carrying weapons and other equipment overseas.

**4.43** The ANAO observed that Protection's Governance Instrument Committee reviewed relevant guidelines biennially, kept minutes recording the outcomes of its meetings, and adequately recorded the status of guidelines at the different stages of the review process.

**4.44** Station Managers and PSOs interviewed by the ANAO had ready access to National and Practical Guidelines through the HUB and used them to varying degrees. Staff generally reported them easy to find, use, and understand, noting that central contacts are available when clarification is required.

## Protection specific guidance

**4.45** At a lower level, Protection has developed further guidance to assist specific staff in performing their day-to-day duties, in particular, the 'Vui Tui' and station-specific standard operating procedures.

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<sup>55</sup> AFP National Guideline on the Governance Instrument Framework.

## *Vui Tui*

**4.46** The 'Vui Tui' is a pocket-sized notebook intended to be a quick reference guide for PSOs. It provides a broad range of useful information covering key areas such as:

- acronyms and abbreviations;
- relevant legislative powers, for example, powers of arrest;
- guidelines for dealing with public protests and demonstrations; and
- protocols for dealing with white powder incidents.

**4.47** Interviews with Station Managers and PSOs revealed that the Vui Tui is well-regarded and regularly used by staff.

### *Standard operating procedures*

**4.48** Standard operating procedures (SOPs) comprise site specific guidance for station staff on operational procedures and their roles and responsibilities at the station.<sup>56</sup>

**4.49** All stations visited by the ANAO had a set of SOPs. The SOPs had generally evolved over a period of years to meet changing security considerations at the site, and were not subject to central guidance or review by Protection in Canberra.

**4.50** The ANAO examined the SOPs and noted that most provided adequate information in key areas such as: instructions for mobile patrols and static guards; procedures for dealing with stakeholders such as state and territory police; contact lists; emergency procedures; and procedures for using PSO powers (for example, making an arrest or requesting information from offenders).

**4.51** In addition, PSO roles and responsibilities were generally well articulated, with six SOPs providing clear guidance in this area. One station (HQJOC), however, had not yet developed clear guidance on its roles and responsibilities, which partly reflects the complex stakeholder relationships at the facility (discussed further in Chapter 5).

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<sup>56</sup> SOP is a generic name covering a variety of documents collected by the ANAO during station visits. SOPs were variously referred to at stations as: procedures, instructions, protocols and directions.

**4.52** Four stations usefully linked their SOPs to relevant National and Practical Guidelines. There would be merit in all stations doing so to facilitate staff access to corporate guidance on a particular matter. In addition, three stations had developed a useful contents page or index covering the sometimes lengthy and broad-ranging SOP documents. This approach could usefully be adopted by all stations to facilitate quick access to material of interest.

**4.53** To facilitate relevant and timely guidance, SOPs should be regularly reviewed. A 2008 internal audit report found that some stations had not updated their SOPs since 2000.<sup>57</sup> All stations visited by the ANAO had up-to-date SOPs, or advised that they were in the process of updating them at the time of the visit. However, updates were generally ad hoc and at the discretion of the Station Manager. In addition, some SOPs do not record the time of the last update or review.

**4.54** The ANAO recognises that each station requires its own set of SOPs to manage its unique circumstances. However, it would be sound practice to promulgate a better practice template and checklist to identify the minimum areas to be covered. It would also be better practice to periodically remind stations of the need to review and, if necessary, update their SOPs.

**4.55** In response to these findings, Protection acknowledged the inconsistent approach to SOP development, implementation and review across stations, and advised that it will commence a review of the adequacy of station guidance and procedures across a selection of stations in the first half of 2011.

## **Conclusion—PSO guidance**

**4.56** The delivery of UP services would be facilitated by up-to-date, relevant and user-friendly guidance. The AFP has adequate processes in place to monitor the currency of National and Practical Guidelines and these guidelines were generally well regarded by Protection staff. Protection itself has developed a useful aide memoire notebook for PSOs to assist them in performing their station duties.

**4.57** The stations visited by the ANAO had adequate SOPs but developing a better practice template and checklist would help to ensure that they meet minimum requirements. It would also be useful to remind stations periodically of the need to review and update these SOPs.

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<sup>57</sup> *Review of Uniform Protection Health Check*, AFP Internal Audit, 2008, p. 6.

## 5. Managing the Delivery of Uniform Protection Services

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*This chapter discusses the arrangements for supporting the delivery of Uniform Protection services, and examines whether those services are being managed well.*

### Introduction

**5.1** The effective delivery of Uniform Protection (UP) services depends on well-managed administrative arrangements for:

- coordinating protection services with stakeholders;
- managing client requirements;
- recovering costs from relevant clients; and
- managing client satisfaction.

**5.2** These arrangements were examined by the ANAO.

### Coordinating protection services with stakeholders

**5.3** A range of agencies play a role in determining which persons and what premises should receive protection and the level of protection required, including: the Attorney-General's Department (AGD), the AFP, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C).

**5.4** Needs are assessed and decisions made through a number of key committees, including the Security Coordination Committee and the Visits Assessment Group.

### Security Coordination Committee

**5.5** The Security Coordination Committee's role is to coordinate Australian Government protective security arrangements for Australian high office holders, official establishments and Commonwealth Parliamentary Offices, diplomatic missions, diplomats and visiting foreign dignitaries. Meetings are chaired by AGD, held as required (generally fortnightly), with attendees

including the AFP (UP, CPP and Protection Intelligence), DFAT, the National Threat Assessment Centre and PM&C.<sup>58</sup>

**5.6** A key focus of the committee is to review significant upcoming dignitary visits to Australia to determine the nature of protection required. Essentially, the committee considers threat assessments, reviews the associated risk, and determines who is to receive protection and the level of protection required. The AFP will make the tactical or operational decision on how to deliver its contribution to the protection services required.<sup>59</sup>

**5.7** While the deliberations of the committee are outside the scope of the audit, attendees generally described meetings as cooperative and collegiate. They reported that, while differences of opinion sometimes arise, working relations between agencies remain effective and outcomes focused. Importantly, the ANAO observed that Protection management is appropriately focused on working cooperatively with other stakeholders on the committee.

## Other meetings

**5.8** There are a number of other across-agency working groups that inform decisions on protection services. These include the:

- Visits Assessment Group—this interdepartmental committee has a similar membership to the Security Coordination Committee, but focuses on the protection of guests of the Australian Government, and considers the visitor's status, sensitivity to public criticism and the importance of the visit to Australia. It seeks to protect the visitor's dignity and establish a sensitivity rating for the visit; and
- the Prime Minister's Official Tenancies Working Group—this group includes PM&C, AGD and the AFP, and provides advice about protective security arrangements at the Prime Minister's official tenancies.

**5.9** Again, while the deliberations of these working groups are outside the scope of the audit, the ANAO observed that Protection management is focused on working cooperatively with relevant stakeholders.

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<sup>58</sup> The Terms of Reference for the Committee were being revised at the time of audit.

<sup>59</sup> State and territory police, through their dignitary protection units, provide much of the security services necessary for dignitary protection in their jurisdictions.



## Managing client requirements

**5.10** UP services involves PSOs providing highly visible static and mobile guarding services to: diplomatic missions; Commonwealth buildings and official establishments; six Australian Defence Force sites; the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO); and two Australian diplomatic missions overseas.<sup>60</sup>



Protective Service Officers from the Diplomatic Protection Unit, Canberra, provide highly visible static and mobile guarding services to diplomatic missions (United States Embassy shown). Source: AFP

**5.11** Funding for UP services comes from a mix of appropriation funding (official establishments and diplomatic premises) and cost-recovered clients (Defence, the Department of Parliamentary Services, ANSTO and DFAT).

## Memoranda of Understanding

**5.12** Where one Australian Government agency provides services to another, it is good practice to establish a formal written agreement such as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to facilitate the working relationship. Key provisions should include: the objectives of the arrangements (including

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<sup>60</sup> Protection provided UP services to DFAT in respect of the R G Casey Building in Canberra up until 30 June 2010. Limited services continue to be provided overseas at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and the Australian High Commission in Port Moresby.



desired outcomes); agreed specifications for the services or deliverables (including quality measures and timeframes); roles and responsibilities; reporting arrangements; resources and budgetary issues; and dispute resolution mechanisms.<sup>61</sup>

**5.13** At the time of the audit, Protection had MOUs in place with its three main cost-recovered clients—Defence, ANSTO and the Department of Parliamentary Services.<sup>62</sup>

**5.14** The ANAO examined these MOUs and noted that many provisions are common across the clients, including the outcomes and associated performance measurement framework. While the MOUs include basic information on each of the key provisions identified above, there is scope to improve them to better inform effective and efficient management practices (see Table 5.1).

**Table 5.1**

**Key provisions contained in Protection’s MOUs**

Key provisions and ANAO observations
<p><b>Objectives, including desired outcomes</b></p> <p>Objectives are not explicitly identified. While MOUs contain higher-level statements setting out the services to be provided, a clearer and more explicit statement of the objective would help focus the overall intention of the agreement and its expected outcomes.</p> <p>Three high-level outcomes are identified for each MOU: ‘a secure site’; ‘effective and efficient security’; and ‘a satisfied customer/client’. While these outcomes are supported by a broad range of strategies and associated activities, there would be benefit in expressing the outcomes more clearly and precisely—for example, identifying the key attributes of a ‘secure site’.</p>

<sup>61</sup> ANAO Report No.41 2009–10 *Effective Cross-Agency Agreements*, May 2010.

<sup>62</sup> The MOUs remain in force until 30 June 2011, with one having the option of being extended for a further two years, subject to the mutual agreement of the parties. The AFP also had an MOU in place with DFAT for the provision of limited cost-recovered services at the two Australian missions overseas, but these services are outside the scope of this audit.

## Key provisions and ANAO observations

### Service specification, including quality measures and timeframes

MOUs specify total target service hours to be provided in the year, together with an hourly rate and total cost for the first year. MOUs also enable additional services to be added where required.

Outcomes identify broad *strategies* and associated *activities*, (e.g., 'frequent, vigilant patrols') which are linked to *performance measures* (e.g., '100% compliance with agreed patrol schedules'). There would be merit in more clearly specifying the associated *activities* as these are described only in general terms.

Some MOUs identify hours against particular functions, e.g., 24 hours of vehicle patrols during the 12-hour night shift, while others do not. However, the MOU outcomes and their associated activities and performance measures do not identify the associated resources. Doing so would strengthen accountability and transparency.

Some performance measures are more in the nature of output or activity indicators, e.g., 'number (actual, no target) of irregularities identified', and some do not have targets, e.g., 'degree of client satisfaction, as assessed during meetings and other interaction'. There would be merit in reviewing their clarity (e.g., what is an 'irregularity'?) and usefulness, in consultation with the client.

### Roles and responsibilities

Each MOU sets these out in varying degrees of specificity. Each identifies key Protection and client personnel, and broadly defines their responsibilities. References to some positions require updating, although this was not causing problems on a day-to-day basis.

A lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities at Headquarters Joint Operations Command was causing concern during the audit and is discussed further below.

### Reporting arrangements

Each MOU provides for written monthly reports, and incident reporting. One MOU provides for quarterly summary reports. As discussed separately below, some clients were seeking to improve reporting.

### Resources and budgetary issues

Each MOU identifies the service hours, the hourly rate, the total cost for the first financial year and the hourly rate for additional services. Invoices are provided monthly, and can be adjusted for variation in actual hours. Each MOU provides for annual price increases related to the Collective Agreement, with one relying on a complex formula to calculate the cost.

There is no information on the composition of the hourly rate, in particular, the corporate overhead (discussed further below).

### Dispute resolution mechanisms

Each MOU provides for disputed matters to be escalated to more senior officers (with two, three or four levels of escalation identified, depending on the MOU). The inclusion of an agreed timeframe for resolution would be good practice.

Source: ANAO analysis of Protection's MOUs.

**5.15** The ANAO discussed the MOUs with the three current cost-recovered clients and with one former client. Generally, those discussions confirmed the ANAO's observations noted above. Clients were either actively seeking to revise their current MOUs with Protection or considered that there is scope to more clearly specify a number of key aspects.

**5.16** Two of the three current clients were seeking to better define the objective of the security services being provided, with a stronger focus on identifying outcomes, and a reduced focus on outputs. Better performance information and greater accountability and transparency for funding were key objectives.

**5.17** In response to these findings, Protection advised the ANAO that it recognises the need to place a stronger focus on an outcome-based model to enhance accountability and transparency, while maintaining a level of operational independence with its UP services.

**5.18** At the time of the audit, the three MOUs were being reviewed by Protection, in consultation with the clients, with a view to their renewal. The ANAO considers that there would be merit in Protection taking the above observations into account as part of the review process.

## **Providing UP services at Headquarters Joint Operations Command**

**5.19** Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), located near Bungendore, New South Wales, was officially opened in March 2009, with Protection providing UP security services from November of that year.

**5.20** Protection of the facility is particularly complex because a number of organisations play a role in delivering security services. These include: the facility occupant (Defence); the facility owner (a private company that constructed the buildings on Commonwealth land under a Public Private Partnership arrangement);<sup>63</sup> the facility owner's private security contractor; and Protection.

**5.21** The ANAO visited the facility during audit fieldwork and discussed security issues with Defence, the facility owner and Protection staff. Essentially, Protection provides armed protective security at HQJOC, including vehicle searches, bomb appraisal officers, and firearms and explosives detection dogs. The private security contractor is responsible for access control, bag searches, detection patrols and closed-circuit television monitoring, with support from Protection as required.

**5.22** The complexity of these arrangements is resulting in the security arrangements taking time to bed down, and while the three parties generally cooperate on a day-to-day operational basis, there is some friction over a number of unresolved issues. These are briefly discussed below.

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<sup>63</sup> ANAO Audit Report No.32 2008–09, *Management of the Tendering Process for the Construction of the Joint Operation Headquarters*.

## *Protection's roles and responsibilities at HQJOC*

**5.23** At the time of the audit, there were differing views on the ground about the scope of Protection's roles and responsibilities. Defence considered Protection's role to be limited to providing an armed presence on the gate and undertaking vehicle searches. Protection considered its remit to be wider. For example, Protection considered it had a need to undertake counter-surveillance patrols to manage the threat of an 'active shooter'. It also considered that it had broader responsibilities relating to potential criminal activity at the facility (for example, theft of equipment) to which it had a legal duty to respond.

**5.24** One area of particular concern was a lack of agreement and documentation on the ground relating to responsibilities for controlling security incidents. This was highlighted by a recent desktop exercise which revealed some significant deficiencies in each agency's understanding of its roles and responsibilities in an incident or emergency and, in particular, who should assume control as the incident commander. In this context, the ANAO noted that a range of security plans and guidance had been developed by the various parties to cover their own operations, but there was no single, overarching security and emergency management plan in place at the time of the audit.

**5.25** The lack of clarity about Protection's roles and responsibilities and the lack of an overarching security plan creates a risk that should a major security incident occur, there will be confusion or disagreement about the appropriate response.

**5.26** These issues had been acknowledged by Protection, and by Defence and facility owner staff at the local level and, at the time of the audit, were the subject of review and discussion. The AFP and Defence expect that Protection's roles and responsibilities will be clarified in the context of the MOU renegotiation underway.<sup>64</sup> Defence anticipates that whole-of-base security and emergency management plans will be signed by 30 June 2011.

**5.27** Given the passage of time since the opening of HQJOC, there would be merit in Protection management keeping these issues under active review to

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<sup>64</sup> The current MOU lapses on 30 June 2011. Stakeholders expect that the new MOU will cover the period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2014.

facilitate a timely resolution, in consultation with stakeholders and before the new MOU commences.

## Reporting to clients

**5.28** The MOUs require Protection to provide monthly reports to clients on outcomes and performance measures set out in the MOUs. (The Defence MOU also provides for a summary quarterly report to be provided covering all six stations.) The detail and format of the reports are not specified in the MOUs.

**5.29** The ANAO examined a cross-section of recent reports and noted that the quality and detail varied between stations and over time. The standard monthly report format provides a limited range of information. For example:

- reporting against performance measures is generally limited to noting that each had been achieved, without supporting detail or documentation;
- information on vehicle searches is generally limited to the number of searches conducted—targets are not specified, nor is it clear whether the number of searches is a good result or not;
- there is limited qualitative information in the reports, which makes it difficult to assess whether services are being effectively delivered; and
- there is limited comparative data, for example, to indicate whether activities are up or down on preceding months.<sup>65</sup>

**5.30** The ANAO's meetings with clients and Station Managers revealed a similar range of concerns. Some noted that reports were sometimes missed, and sometimes contained errors. While some clients were generally satisfied with the reports, most were seeking improvements in their quality and, in particular, to the performance information. Some described this as an ongoing iterative process, and most reported Protection to be responsive to their requests.

**5.31** Two stations were developing improved reporting in response to client requests (Parliament House and ANSTO) and were working with the clients in a cooperative manner in this regard. At the time of the audit, Protection

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<sup>65</sup> At the time of audit, Protection was developing new monthly report formats that provided, among other things, comparative data for the preceding two months.

management acknowledged the need to improve reporting and recognised that this issue had been outstanding for too long. There would be merit in Protection management keeping this matter under active review to facilitate a timely resolution, in consultation with clients.

## Recovering costs from certain clients

**5.32** UP's cost-recovered clients are unable to obtain the same services from the private sector, and in some cases, are not permitted to do so. This was formally recognised in December 2009 when the Minister for Home Affairs decided to exempt the AFP from applying the Commonwealth's competitive neutrality policy to its services.<sup>66</sup>

**5.33** The Beale Review found that UP offers significant non-cost advantages over any other comparable guarding or security entity because PSOs are highly trained in use of force options, subject to a stringent integrity regime, possess legislative powers, have access to AFP intelligence and technological resources, and can draw upon additional surge capacity. The review noted that no other security agency, public or private, could replicate these features, but that this results in higher unit pricing.<sup>67</sup>

**5.34** The higher cost of the service, together with the captive client base, emphasises the need for costs to be transparent. Transparency is a key aspect of accountability; it facilitates review and helps clients understand their cost drivers as well as providing a basis for them to assess whether they are receiving value for money.

## Cost recovery methodology and annual cost increases

**5.35** As noted in Table 5.1, MOUs identify the service hours to be provided, the hourly rate for the service (and an hourly rate for additional services), and the total annual cost. The total annual cost relates to the first year of service, with the MOUs providing for the renegotiation of subsequent years' amounts.

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<sup>66</sup> The Australian Government's competitive neutrality policy aims to ensure that significant government businesses do not enjoy net competitive advantages over competitors simply by virtue of their public ownership. Businesses that are subject to the policy are required to set prices that take into account all relevant costs that would apply to private sector competitors.

<sup>67</sup> *New Realities: National Policing in the 21st Century—Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*—Independent Reviewer: Roger Beale, 30 June 2009, p 177.

**5.36** In practice, Protection writes to its clients each year advising of a price increase which reflects the expected cost of providing the service for the client in the next year. Under the cost recovery methodology, Protection seeks only to recover the actual cost of providing the service.

**5.37** The cost recovery methodology used has been examined on a number of occasions in recent years by AFP internal audit.<sup>68</sup> The most recent audit found that:

- while the cost allocation methodology used to recover direct costs is sound and transparent, it is not formally documented;<sup>69</sup> and
- there is no methodology to support the recovery of indirect costs (corporate overhead charge) of 22.6 per cent.

**5.38** In addition, recent internal audits have found the methodology to be complex and time-consuming to administer, which makes it difficult for Protection to explain to clients how costs have been determined. This was confirmed by the ANAO in discussion with clients, with one noting, for example, that while it understood the derivation of hours worked, it did not understand the calculation of the hourly rate. Some cost-recovered clients are particularly concerned about annual cost increases, and the transparency of Protection's indirect (overhead) costs.

**5.39** The cost increase issue came to a head in mid-2009<sup>70</sup> when the Department of Parliamentary Services (DPS) became aware of a potential cost increase of some 16 per cent for 2009–10.<sup>71</sup> While a lower increase was subsequently determined,<sup>72</sup> the Government decided in April 2010 that the DPS costing model should be reviewed by the Department of Finance and

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<sup>68</sup> The most recent internal audit reviews have been the *Review of Unit Pricing of Protection Services*, February 2008, and *Protection Cost Recovery*, July 2010.

<sup>69</sup> The lack of documentation was also highlighted in a 2008 internal audit report—*Review of Unit Pricing of Protection Services*, February 2008. Following the 2010 report, Protection Services agreed to document the methodology.

<sup>70</sup> See Hansard, *Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Estimates*, 26 May 2009, Canberra, pages 8-9 and 31.

<sup>71</sup> The proposed increase reflected a number of cost pressures, including: a 4 per cent increase in base salaries from 1 July 2009 under the AFP's Collective Agreement, incremental advances of 3-4 per cent for staff who had not reached their maximum band level, and a 4 per cent increase in the night shift allowance.

<sup>72</sup> The AFP advised that the actual cost increase for 2009–10 was less than 1 per cent. However, this reflected a number of unrelated changes, including a reduction in PSO numbers and a removal of the competitive neutrality component.



Deregulation and the AFP, in consultation with DPS. This review was underway at the time of the audit<sup>73</sup> and is expected to examine both direct and indirect costs. While it was not clear whether any revised model will be applied more broadly, the use of a consistent and transparent pricing model for all clients would facilitate equity across clients and help simplify administrative arrangements.

**5.40** In addition to this interagency review, at the time of the audit the AFP was undertaking its own internal review to develop a transparent corporate overhead charge. Work on this review was awaiting the outcome of the interagency review.

**5.41** The external and internal reviews underway should improve the transparency of both the direct and indirect costs. However, given that costs are passed onto the clients, there would be merit in Protection considering how any new arrangements can promote efficiencies in the delivery of its services, and developing performance indicators that inform management and clients of its outcomes in this regard.



Protective Service Officers undertaking external patrolling at Parliament House, Canberra. Source: AFP

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<sup>73</sup> The timing of the review was not specified. However, the Department of Finance and Deregulation expects that it will be completed during 2010–11.



## Appropriated funding

**5.42** UP services for official establishments and diplomatic premises are funded by annual appropriations to the AFP.

**5.43** Since 2005, additional funding of \$30.2 million a year has been provided to UP for diplomatic guarding.<sup>74</sup> Protection advised that the internal allocation of this funding between UP (\$17.5 million a year) and other areas of the AFP (\$12.7 million) has led to a funding shortfall within UP of some \$5 million in recent years.<sup>75</sup> While the shortfalls have been addressed through internal reallocations at the end of each financial year, they are placing cost pressures on UP services.

**5.44** These cost pressures have resulted in Protection management reducing UP staff numbers and putting forward other proposals internally to reduce services and costs. Although these proposals have not been pursued within the AFP, the AFP's Performance and Budget Monitoring Committee decided in March 2010 to undertake a review to identify a more sustainable Protection business model, which may result in additional funding being sought from Government. However, the scope and terms of reference for the review had not been identified at the time of the audit.

**5.45** The internal cost pressures are counterbalanced by the fact that decisions to provide services for official establishments and diplomatic premises are made interdepartmentally (see paragraphs 5.3–5.4 above) and are not at the sole discretion of Protection.

**5.46** In this regard, the Beale Review<sup>76</sup> noted in 2009 in its discussion of UP services that separating financial responsibility from those demanding the service often leads to excessive demand. It therefore recommended that funding be provided to other agencies such as AGD, PM&C and DFAT, and that these agencies, in effect, purchase services from the AFP.

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<sup>74</sup> The additional funding was provided by the Government following the *Review of Protective Security Strategies for Holders of High Office and Diplomatic and Consular Missions*, David Sadleir and Associates, September 2003.

<sup>75</sup> In 2010–11, the cost of providing appropriated UP services is estimated to be \$23.3 million, compared with the internal allocation of \$17.5 million.

<sup>76</sup> *New Realities: National Policing in the 21st Century—Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*—Independent Reviewer: Roger Beale, 30 June 2009.

**5.47** Although this recommendation was rejected by the Attorney-General,<sup>77</sup> funding for official establishments and diplomatic guarding was consolidated into the AFP's base funding in 2009–10 as a result of other recommendations. While the AFP considers that the funding has not kept pace with the demands and requirements of its clients, the consolidation of funding should facilitate the AFP's internal management of under and over expenditures in UP services. Nevertheless, there would be merit in AFP management expediting the internal review of the business model to identify a more sustainable model.

## Managing client satisfaction

**5.48** A range of stakeholder and client agencies have an interest in the effective management and delivery of UP services. Therefore, it is important for Protection, as a monopoly provider of these services, to have arrangements in place to monitor stakeholder and client satisfaction with its services.

### Client service charter

**5.49** During the audit, Protection finalised a client service charter, which is recognised good practice for all agencies.<sup>78</sup> The Protection Client Charter of Service identifies Protection's objectives, its clients and stakeholders, and sets out its values. It also sets out Protection's commitments to its clients and its clients' responsibilities in helping Protection to deliver the services. Avenues for client feedback, including the business satisfaction surveys (discussed in Chapter 2),<sup>79</sup> are also identified.

### Management focus on client satisfaction

**5.50** The Charter and key Protection planning documents, such as the 2010–2011 Business Plan, emphasise the importance of client satisfaction and engagement and the need to maintain collaborative working relationships with stakeholders.

**5.51** The ANAO observed that a client and stakeholder focus is being actively promoted and practised by Protection management, and that this

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<sup>77</sup> Attorney-General for Australia, Media Release, *Reforms to Enhance Police Capability*, 18 December 2009.

<sup>78</sup> Australian Public Service Commission, *Commonwealth Government Service Charters*, see: <http://www.apsc.gov.au/charters/index.html> [accessed 24 March 2011].

<sup>79</sup> The ANAO notes in Chapter 2 that the AFP conducts an annual business satisfaction survey, but that the small client base and low response rate limits its usefulness as a KPI for Protection.

approach was also displayed by the Protection staff and Station Managers that the ANAO met.

## Stakeholder and client views on UP services

**5.52** As noted in Chapter 1, the ANAO met with a wide range of stakeholders and clients during the audit. These stakeholders and clients expressed their views on key areas such as responsiveness, relationship management, service delivery and professionalism. In the main, their comments were positive. A summary of findings is set out in Table 5.2.

**Table 5.2**

### ANAO findings from discussions with stakeholders and clients

Key area	ANAO findings
Responsiveness to stakeholders and clients	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stakeholders consider that Protection management is responsive.</li> <li>As noted at paragraphs 5.7 and 5.9, there is an appropriate focus on working cooperatively with other coordinating stakeholders.</li> <li>Station management and staff are considered to be client-focused, generally responsive, and accommodating of requests.</li> </ul>
Relationship management and communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Protection management has developed good relations with stakeholders and is seen as accessible.</li> <li>Relations between Station Managers and clients are sound, with regular meetings, and a shared focus on resolving issues that arise.</li> <li>As noted at paragraph 5.22, there was some friction over a number of unresolved issues at HQJOC.</li> </ul>
Service delivery and professionalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Services at the stations are well managed on a day-to-day basis.</li> <li>Service provision at the stations is considered to be professional, with PSOs well trained and providing a superior service to that obtainable elsewhere.</li> </ul>

Source: ANAO analysis of discussions with a range of Protection's stakeholders and clients.

## Conclusion

**5.53** The effective delivery of UP services across a diverse range of sites relies on coordination with stakeholders, clear agreements with clients on the services to be delivered, reporting to those clients on the outcomes being achieved, transparent cost recovery, and an appropriate focus on client satisfaction.

**5.54** Protection either has in place, or is actively seeking to strengthen, important elements for the effective management of UP services. While the UP service is expensive, it cannot easily be replicated by the private sector, and is generally well regarded by its clients. Overall, a strong client focus underpins

the delivery of Protection Services at both the management level and the station level. Protection management is seen as responsive, and Station Managers and PSOs are seen as being client-focused and professional.

**5.55** Protection management and other agencies have work underway that should help to improve transparency and accountability in the delivery of UP services. However, there are a number of unresolved issues relating to the specification of roles and responsibilities and services in MOUs, cost-recovery arrangements and associated reporting to clients that require an appropriate management focus to draw matters to a conclusion.

## 6. Managing Close Personal Protection Services

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*This chapter discusses the arrangements for supporting the delivery of Close Personal Protection (CPP) services, and examines whether those services are being well managed. Given the security considerations surrounding CPP operations, the chapter focuses on higher-level administrative support arrangements rather than operational aspects.*

### Introduction

**6.1** The physical protection of high office holders seeks to maintain the personal safety of the individual, the dignity of the offices they occupy and the reputation of Australia in the international community. In the case of non-Australian high office holders and visiting dignitaries, it also seeks to fulfil Australia's obligations under various laws and international agreements.<sup>80</sup>

**6.2** The number of high office holders receiving protection in Australia has increased since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America, and varies from time to time, depending on the assessed threat to individuals. At the time of the audit, Protection was providing CPP to eight full-time Australian and non-Australian high office holders (known as 'Principals'), including the Australian Prime Minister and the Governor-General. During 2009–10, protection was provided to Principals during 12 130 travel movements.

**6.3** Decisions on who should be protected and the nature of the protection provided are matters for consideration and decision by interdepartmental committees (discussed in Chapter 5).

**6.4** CPP teams are based in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne and Perth. By far the largest team is located in Canberra, and this is split between the Foreign Dignitary Protection Team and the Australian Dignitary Protection Team.

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<sup>80</sup> *New Realities: National Policing in the 21st Century—Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*—Independent Reviewer: Roger Beale, 30 June 2009, pp. 173–4, which notes that Australia's international obligations are outlined in the *Commonwealth Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976* and the *United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 1973*.

6.5 A CPP officer's function is clearly documented. The Officer must:

- protect the Principal from personal harm or embarrassment resulting from intentional attack or other hazard;
- plan and execute CPP operations which minimise the risk of personal harm or embarrassment to the Principal; and
- interact with the Principal in a professional manner which enhances the AFP's reputation.<sup>81</sup>



Close Personal Protection is provided to certain international visitors to Australia.

Photo: AFP

## CPP training

6.6 Given the key role performed by CPP officers, it is important that they are provided with appropriate and timely training to help them perform their duties confidently and competently. CPP is considered a specialist role within the AFP and, as such, requires specialist skills and training.

### Initial close protection training

6.7 CPP recruits are selected from sworn AFP members (PSOs are not eligible), with preference given to those with four or more years experience as

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<sup>81</sup> AFP National Guideline on CPP Standard Operating Procedures (2010).

a police officer. Applicants must meet certain criteria, including the successful completion of CPP-related:

- psychological testing;
- physical and swimming competency assessments; and
- urgent duty driver training.

**6.8** Successful applicants undertake a special six-week off-the-job Close Protection Training Course at the AFP College to develop the necessary skills to plan, prepare and facilitate close protection operations.

**6.9** Following the successful completion of this course, CPP officers undertake a mandatory six-month deployment to a CPP team to consolidate their skills. This requires the completion of a workbook to demonstrate their achievement of specific outcomes, including the ability to perform the full range of CPP team roles while protecting a Principal. After completing the training, workbook and six-month consolidation deployment, the CPP officer is awarded a nationally recognised tertiary qualification—the *Advanced Diploma of Public Safety (Police Close Personal Protection)*.

**6.10** The training course and Diploma were internally reviewed in early 2010 and subsequently audited by an external authority. The internal review, undertaken in February 2010, found that upon deployment to operational teams the trainees have the necessary skills to be effective CPP team members. More generally, the CPP training program is meeting the needs of the AFP. The external audit, conducted in May 2010, found the CPP recruitment course to be ‘best practice’.<sup>82</sup>

## Recertification training

**6.11** CPP officers are required to undergo an annual five-day recertification to keep their skills and knowledge up-to-date, including driver, scenario, and firearms training. Recertification also includes mandatory Use of Force and first aid training.

**6.12** As a specialist role, and unlike most police officers and PSOs, CPP officers are required to undergo biannual fitness testing to ensure they meet the minimum standards required for the job. To help meet this level of fitness,

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<sup>82</sup> The *Registered Training Organisation Australian Quality Training Framework Standards Audit* was conducted in May 2010 by a private provider.



CPP officers are allowed three hours of fitness training per week as part of their working hours, dependent on operational and administrative requirements.

**6.13** CPP officers who fail to maintain their qualifications are moved to non-operational roles until they requalify.

## **CPP guidance—standard operating procedures**

**6.14** The AFP has developed a *National Guideline on CPP Standard Operating Procedures* (SOPs) that assists CPP officers to discharge their operational and administrative duties, and facilitates the delivery of consistent ‘packages’ of protection to Principals. The SOPs were current at the time of the audit, with an update being completed during the audit. The SOPs have limited circulation, reflecting their security classification, and therefore are only outlined here at a high level.

**6.15** The ANAO’s review indicates that the SOPs provide relevant guidance on operational procedures, including the various packages of protection available to Principals and motorcade options. They also usefully outline administrative procedures, including training requirements and the completion of Post Visit Reports (discussed below), and provide useful links to standard templates and other documents that are regularly used—such as Post Visit Reports and Standard Tactical Plans (also discussed below). CPP officers confirmed the SOPs reflected CPP procedures.

**6.16** The SOPs require new Principals to be met and briefed, and for the ongoing arrangements and respective responsibilities to be set out in a follow-up letter. The ANAO reviewed the arrangements for a recently arrived Principal and found that these requirements had been adequately met.

## **Delivery of CPP services**

**6.17** The effective delivery of close protection services is fundamental to the safety and dignity of high office holders. This requires:

- the use of an appropriate package of protection for each movement;
- suitable planning and review arrangements for CPP operations; and
- sufficient staff to provide the services.



## Packages of protection

**6.18** CPP provides two basic packages of protection—full-time CPP and public events based protection. Full-time CPP involves a team of CPP officers guarding the Principal 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Public events based protection is provided in situations where the threat to the Principal does not warrant full-time protection, and generally includes protection to and from a specific place or event identified to constitute a risk. For example, public events based protection is employed when the presence of issue motivated groups at a particular event poses a possible threat to the safety and dignity of the Principal.

**6.19** The packages of protection vary depending on the threat level and/or the need to preserve a Principal's dignity. While the relationship between the threat level and the standard package is outlined in the SOPs and other planning documents, the SOPs provide for CPP Team Leaders to exercise judgement and discretion in the resources deployed. Among other things, this may depend on the level of protection provided by state and territory police.<sup>83</sup>

## Planning and reviewing CPP operations

**6.20** Operations should be carefully planned to reduce the scope for uncertainty and subsequently reviewed to assist in learning lessons for the future. However, forward CPP planning can be difficult as it is not always possible to predict the needs and changing schedules of Principals.

### *Standard Tactical Plans*

**6.21** In certain circumstances the SOPs require the preparation of formal plans—known as Standard Tactical Plans (STPs)—to cover CPP operations.<sup>84</sup> STPs set out a range of key information including an outline of the visit (for

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<sup>83</sup> The *National Counter-Terrorism Plan*, National Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2005, section 43, states: *The AFP and State and Territory police services share responsibility for the security of Australian high office holders, diplomatic and consular officials, visiting dignitaries, internationally protected persons and other individuals assessed to be at risk. The AFP provides close personal protection teams to the Prime Minister, Governor-General, diplomats and other individuals as required, supported by State and Territory resources. State and Territory police also have responsibility for protecting resident members of the consular corps and those foreign dignitaries and resident members of the consular corps assessed as being at threat, assisted as required by AFP Security Liaison Officers.*

<sup>84</sup> The preparation of a formal STP is only required in the following circumstances: for all overseas travel and overnight domestic travel; for all foreign dignitary visits where CPP resources are being allocated; and for major domestic movements requiring additional CPP resources and planning.

example, its timing and accommodation), risks and intelligence, resources, key contacts and use of weapons.

**6.22** To this end, Protection has developed electronic and easy-to-complete STP templates for staff when planning international and domestic visits. The templates facilitate the insertion of relevant information and contain guidance on the completion of each mandatory field. They also provide attachments for identifying the travelling party, intelligence briefings, and travel itinerary. Completed STPs must be submitted to the Team Leader for approval and be uploaded into the Police Real-time Online Management Information System (PROMIS)<sup>85</sup> before the operation starts.

**6.23** The ANAO reviewed all 14 completed operations that required an STP during a six-month period<sup>86</sup> and found that an STP had been prepared, and uploaded into the relevant PROMIS case, for each. All mandatory fields had been completed, providing detailed information on the operation concerned.

**6.24** Protection has also developed other useful tools to help staff plan CPP operations, including: a comprehensive checklist to help plan international and domestic travel and a Decision Making Matrix<sup>87</sup> to help guide the deployment of CPP resources. Both documents are to be uploaded into the relevant PROMIS case.

**6.25** The ANAO sought to examine a sample of checklists and matrices over the same six-month period, but found that they had either not been prepared or uploaded as required. This creates a risk that a relevant matter will be overlooked in the planning process. In response to this finding, the AFP advised the ANAO that it had reminded CPP officers of the need to comply with the SOPs in this regard. It also advised that it had reminded Team Leaders to ensure that all required documentation is prepared before finalising PROMIS cases.

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<sup>85</sup> PROMIS is the AFP's primary management information system for recording investigations and operational information.

<sup>86</sup> The period was 1 March to 1 September 2010.

<sup>87</sup> The Matrix is only used for domestic movements where an STP is not required, and in other cases where there is a change from the STP. It is not necessary to prepare a Matrix for each standard, recurring movement such as escorting Principals from their place of work to their residence, provided that a generic Matrix covering this movement has previously been prepared.

## *Post Visit Reports*

**6.26** The SOPs require the preparation of Post Visit Reports (PVRs) for certain operations as soon as practicable after the conclusion of the operation.<sup>88</sup> PVRs are template-based reports that seek to identify any issues and incidents that arise during the operation (for example, relating to security, transport and accommodation) and any recommendations for similar operations in the future. The ANAO reviewed all completed operations during the same six-month period noted in paragraph 6.23 and found that PVRs had been completed for all 14, and uploaded into the relevant PROMIS case as required.<sup>89</sup>

**6.27** While there is no time limit specified for the completion of PVRs, 80 per cent had been completed within one month—with the longest taking 51 days to complete. In addition, the ANAO found that two PVRs (12 per cent) had not been cleared by the Team Leader as required by the SOPs. While these findings are acceptable given the tempo of CPP operations and current staff shortages (discussed below), there would be merit in Protection management periodically reviewing a sample of PVRs to check their compliance with the SOPs.

**6.28** PVRs are provided to the Operational Committee (discussed in Chapter 2) for consideration of any recommendations and possible refinement of practices. PVR recommendations were recently collated into a searchable PVR library that should facilitate research for future operations. CPP officers generally confirmed their usefulness as a research tool.

## **Staff numbers**

**6.29** Protection needs access to a sufficient pool of qualified CPP officers to be able to provide ongoing protection to high office holders and visiting dignitaries on what can amount to a 24-hour, 7-day a week operation.

**6.30** Protection monitors the actual full-time equivalent (FTE) staffing number across CPP operations and compares this to the authorised FTE number. At the time of the audit, the actual staffing level was 13 per cent below the authorised level.

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<sup>88</sup> PVRs are required for all Australian and foreign high office holders receiving close protection where they travel overseas or interstate if that travel extends overnight.

<sup>89</sup> In total, there were 16 PVRs completed for the 14 operations. One of the operations covered three distinct trips and therefore three PVRs were completed.

**6.31** The ANAO's interviews with AFP staff and document reviews revealed a number of reasons for the shortage. These included:

- an increasing difficulty in recruiting police officers to CPP roles due to more attractive opportunities elsewhere in the AFP;
- the impact of the AFP Collective Agreement which has increased CPP team sizes since 2007<sup>90</sup>;
- a concern that CPP work can lead to staff de-skilling; and
- a concern about a lack of opportunities for promotion and development.

**6.32** Protection management, CPP Coordinators and Team Leaders advised the ANAO that CPP was managing existing resources to provide the required day-to-day protection to all Principals. However, they also acknowledged that events such as the 2010 Federal Election do place a strain on available CPP resources. The ANAO noted that staff shortages have been managed through a number of means, including:

- temporarily moving CPP officers from one city to another;
- using PSOs to undertake certain support duties in CPP operations (see paragraph 6.37 below); and
- restructuring the Canberra operation from Principal-based teams into two pools of CPP officers (Foreign and Australian Dignitary Protection) to provide greater resource flexibility.

**6.33** In addition, CPP management advised that it is seeking to re-certify AFP police officers in the states and territories who have prior CPP experience and who may be able to undertake small operations when the need arises.

**6.34** While these measures may overcome short-term staffing problems, there is likely to be a limit to which some of them can be effective in the long-term. In addition, the development of a Protection-wide surge capacity strategy (discussed in Chapter 3) may identify further options to manage short-term staffing issues.

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<sup>90</sup> The 2007 Collective Agreement introduced safety net provisions that limit the number of hours CPP officers can work over a certain period of time.

## Interaction and interoperability with Uniform Protection

**6.35** CPP and UP interact at a number of levels and their roles can overlap. For example, the Prime Minister's official residences are protected by PSOs and the Prime Minister receives CPP while on the move to and from those residences. It is therefore important that there is effective coordination and cooperation between these staff.

**6.36** The ANAO interviewed management and staff from both CPP and UP and observed, in the main, a sound and collegiate relationship between the two areas. This is evidenced by their attendance at common management meetings and a good understanding at the management level of issues and concerns that affect operations across the function. Protection staff commented that the interaction between CPP and UP is generally professional and works well.

**6.37** The ANAO observed that, partly in response to CPP staffing shortages, Protection management is seeking to increase the interoperability of CPP and UP. This is highlighted in Protection's 2010–2011 Business Plan.<sup>91</sup> For example, during the 2010 Federal Election, PSOs successfully provided certain support functions for travelling Principals. This effectively supplied the surge capacity required to manage the additional workload that arose during that period.

**6.38** Further opportunities for interoperability have been identified by Protection management and were being considered or implemented at the time of the audit, including:

- establishing a working group to identify interoperability options;
- using PSOs for certain CPP driving roles;
- using PSO Bomb Appraisal Officers<sup>92</sup> to support CPP operations; and
- assigning two PSOs to CPP from January 2011 to perform certain support duties for a six-month trial.

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<sup>91</sup> Protection's 2010–2011 Business Plan notes that: 'In 2010–11 Protection will be placing a strong emphasis on the progression of interoperability within its own core business activities of close protection and uniform protection.'

<sup>92</sup> Bomb Appraisal Officers receive specialised training to help them assess suspected explosive devices.

## Managing client satisfaction

**6.39** Principals receiving protection and stakeholder agencies have an interest in the effective management and delivery of CPP services. It is therefore appropriate for Protection to monitor client and stakeholder satisfaction with its services.

**6.40** The AFP's Annual Report identifies the following performance measures for CPP:

- resources directed to high and very high impact cases;
- avoidable incidents per 1000 movements; and
- client satisfaction.

**6.41** Table 6.1 sets out these performance measures, their associated targets and their reported outcomes over the last four years.

**Table 6.1**

### CPP performance measures from 2006–07 to 2009–10

Year	Resources directed to high/very high impact cases (%)		Avoidable incidents (per 1000 movements)		Client satisfaction (%)	
	Target	Outcome	Target	Outcome	Target	Outcome
2009–10	90	100	5	0.1	90	81
2008–09	90	99	5	0.1	90	92
2007–08	85	99.5	5	0.08	90	92
2006–07	85	95	5	0.4	90	81 <sup>(1)</sup>

Source: ANAO analysis.

Note (1): The combined UP and CPP total is shown for 2006–07 as individual outcomes were not recorded.

**6.42** Over the last four years two measures—*resources directed to high and very high impact cases* and the *number of avoidable incidents per 1000 movements*—have easily met their respective targets. In light of this, Protection could reassess or recalibrate the indicators to better measure performance.

**6.43** The third measure—*client satisfaction*—has fluctuated, with the target met twice in the last four years. The figures need to be interpreted in the context of Protection's small client base, sample size, and the limited number of survey responses received from the annual AFP Business Satisfaction

Survey. It is also relevant to note that the optional written comments from the survey were largely positive.<sup>93</sup>

**6.44** Protection is aware that its small client base, sample size, and low response rate can result in variations in the survey outcome from year to year. At the time of the audit, it advised the ANAO of steps it was taking to address the issues, including: allowing for easier inclusion and updating of potential survey recipients and greater Protection management liaison with stakeholders. It was also seeking to develop a more comprehensive set of high-level outcome-focused indicators for 2011–12 (discussed in Chapter 2).

## Conclusion

**6.45** Protection has put in place the key elements required to effectively deliver CPP services. In particular, it has developed a nationally recognised CPP training course and an ongoing skills maintenance regime that provides CPP officers with the necessary skills to perform their duties.

**6.46** The standard packages of protection are also well-established and well-understood and the SOPs provide sufficient discretion to enable the packages to be tailored to particular threat levels and circumstances.

**6.47** Protection has developed useful documents and templates for planning and reviewing CPP operations. Completion of the key STP and PVR documents is generally sound, however, some supporting documentation in the planning phase is not being routinely completed. This creates a risk that a relevant matter will be overlooked in the planning process. In response to this finding, the AFP has reminded Team Leaders and CPP officers of its requirements in this regard.

**6.48** While CPP staff numbers are below the authorised level, CPP has put in place measures to manage this on a day-to-day basis. However, there is likely to be a limit to which these measures can be effective in the longer-term. At the time of the audit, Protection management was seeking to identify other longer-term solutions, including expanding the interoperability of UP and CPP and developing a surge capacity, which should, if actively pursued, help to alleviate staffing shortages.

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<sup>93</sup> Of the five optional written comments received for 2009–10, three were positive, one mixed and one negative.

**6.49** Protection's performance indicators have largely been positive, but its small client base means that client satisfaction results need to be treated with caution. Protection is seeking to develop a more comprehensive set of outcome-focused indicators for 2011–12.

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Auditor-General

Canberra ACT  
25 May 2011



# Appendices



## Appendix 1: Agency response

### Australian Federal Police

The AFP welcomes the ANAO audit report on the Australian Federal Police Protection Services and it is noted that no recommendations have been made by the ANAO. The findings in the report are accepted and, as acknowledged throughout the report, AFP management had already instigated strategies for improvement in these areas.

The AFP will take into consideration each of the ANAO findings and incorporate these into the forward program of work within Protection Services, in order to continue the provision of high quality protection services for and on behalf of the Commonwealth government.

# Index

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## A

AFP response, 23, 99

Audit,

conclusion, 14

methodology, 32

objective, 13, 31

report structure, 32–33

## C

Clients,

cost recovery from, 70, 78–79, 83

reporting to, 77

satisfaction of, 82–83, 94

## F

Federal Audit of Police Capabilities, 13, 17, 31,  
47–48, 51, 78, 81, 85

## G

Guidance,

CPP staff, 88

PSOs, 66–69

## H

Headquarters Joint Operations Command, 20,  
28, 32, 68, 74–76, 83

## I

Integration of Australian Protective Service, 11,  
14–16, 18, 29–30, 34, 41–44, 51, 53,  
57–58, 65

Interoperability of CPP and UP staff, 22, 42, 93,  
95

## M

Memoranda of Understanding, 20, 72–78, 84

## P

Performance information, 15–16, 20, 22,  
34–35, 37, 39, 74, 77, 80, 82, 94, 96

Post Visit Reports, 22, 37, 88, 91

Professional standards, 18, 45, 54–57, 67

## R

Risk management, 14, 16, 38–41, 44, 53

## S

Security Coordination Committee, 70–71

Staff,

location, 12, 27, 29

surveys, 50–52

unscheduled absences, 18, 45, 51–53, 57

Standard Tactical Plans, 88–90

Strategic planning, 15, 34

Surge capacity, 17, 22, 40, 47–48, 78, 92–93, 95

## T

Training,

Close Personal Protection, 17, 21, 48,  
86–88, 95

Uniform Protection, 18–19, 41–42, 51,  
58–66

## V

Visits Assessment Group, 70–71

## W

Workforce,

demographics, 49

planning, 17–18, 27, 36–37, 45–51

Workers' compensation, 18, 53–54, 57

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---

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