Policing at Australian International Airports

Australian Federal Police

Canberra ACT
13 March 2014

Dear Mr President
Dear Madam Speaker

The Australian National Audit Office has undertaken an independent performance audit in the Australian Federal Police titled *Policing at Australian International Airports.* The audit was conducted in accordance with the authority contained in the *Auditor-General Act 1997*. Pursuant to Senate Standing Order 166 relating to the presentation of documents when the Senate is not sitting, I present the report of this audit to the Parliament.

Following its presentation and receipt, the report will be placed on the Australian National Audit Office's website—http://www.anao.gov.au.

Yours sincerely

Ian McPhee
Auditor-General

The Honourable the President of the Senate
The Honourable the Speaker of the House of Representatives
Parliament House
Canberra ACT

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Contents

Tables

Figures

Abbreviations

ACAT	Airport Classification Assessment Tool
ACCS	Airport Consumer Confidence Survey
ACT	Australian Capital Territory
AFP	Australian Federal Police
AGAASC	Australian Government Agency Airport Security Committee
ANAO	Australian National Audit Office
AOCC	AFP Operations Coordination Centre
APC	Airport Police Commander
ASIO	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
ASO	Air Security Officer
ATSA	*Aviation Transport Security Act 2004*
ATSRs	*Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005*
AUP	Airport Uniformed Police
BSS	Business Satisfaction Survey
CAD	Computer Aided Dispatch (system)
CO	Commissioner's Order
COAG	Council of Australian Governments
COPAL	*Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970*
CTFR	Counter Terrorist First Response

DCNS   Deputy Commissioner National Security

FTE   Full Time Equivalent

GIF   Governance Instrument Framework

JAIG   Joint Airport Intelligence Group

JAIT   Joint Airport Investigation Team

KPI   Key Performance Indicator

NG   National Guideline

NMA   National Manager Aviation

PBMC   Portfolio Budget Management Committee

PROMIS   Police Real Time Online Management Information System

PSO   Protective Security Officer

RATP   Risk Assessment and Treatment Plan

RCS   Risk Context Statement

RLEO   Recognised Law Enforcement Officer (NSW)

SRP   Strategic Risk Profile

TSP   Transport Security Program

UPM   Unified Policing Model

Summary and Recommendations

Summary

Introduction

1.   Australia's international airports are important transport hubs and commercial centres, through which millions of Australians and foreign nationals pass every year. It has been estimated that in 2011, Australia's airports generated a total economic contribution to Australia of around $17.3 billion.[1] There are 177 'security controlled' airports in Australia[2], with the highest level of security controlled airports known as 'designated airports'. Currently, there are 10 designated airports. Table S.1 lists these airports, and the number of passengers using them in 2012−13.

Table S.1:   Current designated airports and passenger numbers, 2012−13

Airport	Domestic passengers	International passengers	Total passengers
Adelaide	6 461 228	709 469	7 170 697
Brisbane	16 622 408	4 547 234	21 169 642
Cairns	3 640 188	515 971	4 156 159
Canberra	3 013 960	0	3 013 960
Darwin	1 612 007	313 032	1 925 039
Gold Coast	4 922 763	882 536	5 805 299
Hobart	2 026 551	0	2 026 551
Melbourne	22 504 760	6 988 583	29 493 343
Perth	9 090 604	3 741 600	12 832 204
Sydney	24 984 961	12 633 127	37 618 088
Total	94 879 430	30 331 552	125 210 982

NOTE 1: Passengers includes both inbound and outbound but do not include charter or cargo-only flights.
NOTE 2: Canberra and Hobart airports are configured to handle international passengers but do not currently do so.

Source: *Monthly Airport Traffic Data*, Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics.

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1   *Connecting Australia: the economic and social contribution of Australia's airports*, Deloitte Access Economics, May 2012.

2   The Secretary of the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development may designate an airport to be a security controlled airport which requires certain specified levels of security requirements. This may include screening and explosive trace detection.

2. The *Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2004* (ATSRs) require designated airports to have a counter terrorist first response (CTFR) capability[3] and provide that members of a counter terrorist first response force must be either members of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) or the police force in the state or territory in which the airport is located. This requirement recognises that the response to a terrorist attack or incident may require the use of weapons and the power of arrest, which are only available to police officers.

3. In law enforcement terms, international airports represent a complex and evolving challenge. As the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States demonstrated, they can be the source or focus of major terrorist attacks. Airports are the point of entry into Australia for criminals, potential terrorists, illicit drugs and other prohibited imports with consequential links to serious and organised crime both internationally and domestically. Aside from their role as transport hubs, the trend towards the development of airports as major retail centres provides a vulnerability for lower-level crime such as shoplifting and theft. They may also involve the local criminal milieu, as the murder of a motorcycle gang member at Sydney Airport in March 2009 demonstrated.

4. Policing at airports is currently delivered through the AFP's Aviation function[4] which is headed by the National Manager Aviation (NMA), an officer of Assistant Commissioner rank. At 15 November 2013, there were 618 sworn officers[5] at the 10 designated airports and the Aviation function's 2012–13 budgeted expenses were $74.1 million.

History of policing at airports

5. Until 2005, policing of airports was undertaken by Australian government agencies (the Commonwealth Police, the AFP and the Australian Protective Services), with the community policing elements undertaken by state and territory police forces. Following a review of airport security and policing in 2005, a 'Unified Policing Model' (UPM) was introduced. Under the UPM, the Australian Government, through the AFP, met the cost of policing,

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3   The ATSRs define counter terrorist first response as providing 'deterrence measures designed to deny information to terrorists and deter acts of terrorism, and if an act is threatened or prospective, to deter or prevent it'.

4   The Aviation function forms part of the National Security – Policing program.

5   Appointees to uniformed components of the AFP are required to swear an oath (or make an affirmation) in terms prescribed by the *AFP Regulations 1979* before they can exercise powers conferred on them by law.

but the actual workforce comprised approximately 450 AFP Protective Service Officers[6] (PSOs) to deal with Counter Terrorist First Response and a notional 328 officers seconded[7] from state and territory police forces to deal with community policing.

6. Policing at the designated airports was reviewed again in 2009. This review (known as the Beale review) concluded that the UPM was flawed and recommended that all airport police officers should be sworn employees of the AFP and capable of undertaking both counter terrorism and community policing functions. This approach was termed the 'All In' model. The then Government accepted this recommendation and the process of moving from the 'unified' model to the 'All In' model was completed in June 2013.

7. Under the *National Counter Terrorism Plan*, agreed between the Australian and state and territory governments, state and territory governments have responsibility for the operational response to a terrorist incident in their jurisdiction. Under the 'All In' model, this responsibility is acknowledged in Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between the AFP and the state and territory police forces, with the AFP providing CTFR until the relevant police force is able to take control of the response. The MOUs also allow for state and territory police forces to provide operational support for non-terrorist incidents, to be determined on a case by case basis. In addition, should the need arise, the AFP could draw upon its own resources located in its main office in the state or territory. These arrangements provide a 'surge' capacity for the AFP airport police when responding to major incidents, whether or not they are terrorist-related.

Audit objective and criteria

8. The objective of the audit was to assess the AFP's management of policing services at Australian international airports. In order to form a conclusion against this audit objective, the ANAO examined if:

- the transition to the 'All In' model of policing at airports (Project Macer) had been delivered effectively;

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6   The role of PSOs is to keep individuals and interests identified by the Commonwealth as being at risk safe from acts of terrorism, violent protest and issues motivated violence. Their powers are more limited than those of sworn AFP officers.

7   These officers were known as Airport Uniformed Police.

- appropriate processes are in place for managing risk and operational planning;

- effective stakeholder engagement, relationship management and information sharing arrangements are in place;

- facilities at the airports are adequate and appropriate; and

- appropriate mechanisms for measuring the effectiveness of policing at airports have been developed and implemented.

Overall conclusion

9.   Australia's 10 designated airports cater to more than 125 million domestic and international passengers annually. As both transport hubs and major commercial centres, the airports present a complex and evolving law enforcement environment. Through its Aviation function, the AFP is responsible for delivering a full range of counter terrorism and community policing services at these airports. As at November 2013, 618 AFP officers were employed across the airports.

10.   Following the transition from the previous 'hybrid' model to the 'All In' model, the AFP is effectively managing the delivery of policing services at Australia's international airports. The transition process (known as Project Macer) was well managed and met its objectives.[8] As a result of the Project, 274 PSOs and 71 former state/territory police officers successfully became sworn AFP officers.[9] The Project was completed in less than the estimated five years and at a cost of $16 million, significantly less than the anticipated $32 million. The 'All In' model has delivered resource efficiencies resulting in annual savings of the order of $10 million (from $84 million in 2009−10 to $74.1 million in 2012−13).

11.   The organisational arrangements in place at airports are sound, with a clear command structure at each airport headed by an Airport Police Commander. Internal reporting mechanisms are in place and there is a clear

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8   The project's objectives were (a) transitioning the Counter Terrorist First Response workforce from PSOs to sworn AFP members to provide a highly responsive, capable and homogeneous Aviation workforce and (b) transitioning from a hybrid Commonwealth/State and Territory model of Airport Uniformed Police (AUP) officers to a sworn AFP member workforce.

9   A further 115 PSOs were redeployed to elsewhere in the AFP and 100 PSOs retired, resigned or accepted voluntary redundancy.

alignment between the AFP's strategic and functional plans and individual airport action plans. However, there is no clear linkage between the AFP's planning for its Aviation function and external assessments of the threat and risk environments across Australia's aviation sector. Although the AFP advised that a number of factors have been taken into account in determining the agency's resourcing levels at individual airports, increases or decreases in staffing levels have been largely historical and based on the funds available to the Aviation function. An explicit assessment of the inherent security risks presented by each airport and the nature and level of criminality have not formed part of that determination. The AFP advised that it is now developing a resourcing model that will take into account all relevant factors in determining staffing levels at each airport. Completion and implementation of such a model would provide the AFP with a more rigorous and transparent approach to resource allocation across airports.

12.   The AFP's Aviation function maintains a high operational tempo. On average, in each year over the last three financial years, the AFP has dealt with 21 146 incidents and made 2621 apprehensions and 312 arrests across the 10 airports. The number of arrests has increased by 42.6 per cent over the three year period from July 2010 to June 2013.[10] The offences ranged from offensive and disorderly behaviour to matters relating to aviation and aircraft security.

13.   The legislative framework applying at airports is complex, with officers required to use and apply both Commonwealth and state and territory legislation. Across the 10 airports, there are some 300 relevant pieces of state or territory legislation and more than 400 relevant provisions of Commonwealth legislation. Although state and territory police forces provide training in their respective legislation, the duration of this training varies considerably from state to state, and from zero to 10 days. There would be benefit in greater consistency in training both in terms of duration and content following an assessment of the training requirements.

14.   The Aviation function has developed and maintains good relationships with a wide range of stakeholders and the AFP is appropriately represented on a number of local and national government and aviation industry bodies. The effectiveness of these relationships was supported by the responses to annual

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10   The AFP advised that while it was not aware of any specific reason for the increase in the number of arrests, it was possibly due to its change of focus from counter terrorist first response to the whole policing continuum.

surveys commissioned by the AFP, as well as the ANAO's consultations with state and territory police forces and airport operators. However, some airport operators stated that they did not have a clear understanding of the Aviation function's strategy for policing. The AFP has now agreed that it will disseminate its Aviation Doctrine[11] to provide stakeholders with a clearer understanding of the AFP's overall aviation policing strategy.

15. The ANAO has made one recommendation aimed at securing greater consistency, both in terms of content and duration, of the training in state and territory legislation provided to AFP officers by the respective state and territory police forces.

Key findings by chapter

Transition to a new workforce model (Chapter 2)

16. At the time of the Beale review in 2009, there were 225 Airport Uniformed Police (AUP) officers (that is, officers seconded from state and territory police forces)[12] and 445 PSOs at the 10 designated airports. Under the new model, all airport police were required to be sworn police officers. The 670 officers were given three options. They could:

- transition to sworn status and remain in their current positions;

- return to their 'home' police jurisdiction (for seconded officers) or move to an available position elsewhere in the AFP (for PSOs); or

- leave the AFP through voluntary redundancy or resignation.

The AFP managed this transition through a project which was named Project Macer. The project and the related sub-project, Project Guild[13] were managed using the PRINCE2 project management methodology.

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11 The stated intent of the Aviation Doctrine is 'to clearly outline the processes by which the AFP Aviation function focuses on anticipating and preventing unlawful acts or interference to aviation safety as well as preventing and defeating crime involving elements of the air stream'.

12 As noted, states and territories had committed to providing 328 seconded officers. However, the Beale review noted that in practice, 'some States have been unwilling or unable to provide agreed policing numbers'.

13 Project Guild was used to manage the transition of protective service officers who were Air Security Officers (ASOs). ASOs are armed police officers who travel anonymously on selected domestic and international flights to provide security against any person or group who attempts to take control of an aircraft or to cause death or serious injuries to passengers or crew.

17.   A major component of these projects was providing training to those officers who wanted to make the transition to fully sworn AFP officers. AFP training is undertaken at the AFP College in Barton, ACT. In recognition of the fact that officers already had experience working in the airport environment or as officers of state or territory police forces, the AFP modified its standard recruit training program to recognise this prior learning.

18.   In total, 274 PSOs and 71 AUP officers successfully transitioned to sworn status, 115 PSOs were redeployed elsewhere in the AFP and 100 PSOs resigned, retired or took voluntary redundancy.

19.   Projects Macer and Guild had originally been expected to take between three to five years and cost an estimated $32.7 million. They were completed in a little under four years at a reported cost of $16.1 million. The projects have delivered substantial savings to the AFP with the total cost of AFP staff at the 10 designated airports falling by almost 12 per cent from $84 million in 2009–10 to $74.1 million in 2012–13.[14] Other benefits include a single command structure, improved stakeholder engagement, resource efficiencies and development of policing skills.

20.   AFP officers at airports use and apply both Commonwealth and state and territory legislation and powers. Across the 10 airports, there are more than 400 relevant provisions of Commonwealth legislation and some 300 relevant pieces of state or territory legislation. While Commonwealth legislation contains provisions to deal with the most serious types of offences (such as murder and terrorism related offences), most 'community policing' powers and offences are found in state and territory legislation.

21.   The AFP provides its officers with training in relation to Commonwealth legislation. Training in relevant state and territory legislation is provided by the police force in each jurisdiction in accordance with agreements between the AFP and each state and territory police force. There was significant variation in the duration of this training, varying from none in Queensland to 10 days in Western Australia. The duration and content of the training provided is ultimately a matter for the respective police forces. However, there is scope for the AFP to approach state and territory police forces with a view to jointly reviewing the training provided by each

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14   Notwithstanding this reduction, the Aviation function has consistently met its targets for its Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) (see paragraph 4.21)

jurisdiction in order to achieve greater consistency and better support for airport officers.

Management of AFP Airport Operations (Chapter 3)

22. At each of the 10 designated airports, AFP officers are commanded by an Airport Police Commander (APC). There are a range of internal and external committees at both the local and national levels in which the AFP is a regular participant. There are clear linkages between the national AFP Strategic Plan, the Aviation function's functional business plan and individual airport action plans, although six airports plans were incomplete[15] at the time of the audit. Similarly, the Aviation function's Risk Assessment Treatment Plan (RATP) is aligned with the overall AFP Strategic Risk Profile.[16] While there is alignment between internal AFP planning documents, there is little consideration of the assessment of broader risks and threats to Australia's aviation sector prepared every two years by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (DIRD).[17] The AFP advised that while the decision to locate the AFP at the 10 designated airports was taken by government, the AFP is responsible for resourcing each airport. Currently, there is no explicit model for determining the AFP's overall resource allocation to the Aviation function nor relative resourcing levels at the individual airports, based on an assessment of risks.

23. In the past, factors such as the need to meet specified response times, airport opening hours and the working arrangements provided for in the AFP Enterprise Agreement have been taken into account but increases or decreases in staffing levels were largely historical and based on the funding available to the Aviation function. In response to the audit, the AFP advised that it is developing a resourcing model that will also take into account risks, threats, levels of criminality, passenger and aircraft movements and airport geospatial data.[18] The completion and implementation of this model would provide a

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15   Brisbane, Cairns, Canberra, Darwin, Gold Coast and Perth.

16   Examples of the major risks to the airports include: reduced capacity to deliver CTFR and community policing functions, failure to deliver competent and qualified sworn members with the requisite knowledge, both Commonwealth and state and territory, to perform the policing at airport function and a failure to adequately deal with state-based offences.

17   The relevant division in the Department of Industry and Regional Development is the Office of Transport Security.

18   For example, Perth airport has four terminals some distance apart. The staffing required to respond to incidents at any or all of the terminals is commensurately greater than for an airport with fewer terminals.

more rigorous and transparent approach to resource allocation across airports. In this context, there would be value in the AFP drawing upon work undertaken in 2010 by DIRD to assess the threat and risk environment at each of the 10 designated airports

24.   Under the terms of the 2005 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreement, state and territory police forces agreed to provide police officers to participate in Joint Airport Intelligence Groups (JAIGs) and Joint Airport Investigation Teams (JAITs).[19] In practice, state and territory police forces have not consistently provided these resources: in 2012−13, only four of 10 state/territory police forces fully met the commitment with the equivalent number for JAITs being two of five. Given the agreements between governments on these matters, there would be benefit in the AFP continuing to work with state and territory police forces to address these shortfalls in resource commitments.

25.   The AFP's Intelligence function has intelligence analysts embedded in JAIGs at each airport and these arrangements are well established. The Intelligence function produces a range of useful strategic, operational and tactical intelligence products which relate to the AFP's counter terrorist, serious and organised crime and community policing roles at the airports. ANAO examination of the Intelligence function's fortnightly aviation significant operations reports for 2012−13 demonstrated that the work of the JAIGs leads to practical outcomes, including arrests, summonses and cautions.

The Aviation Function's Performance (Chapter 4)

26.   The AFP collects workload statistics relating to the incidents it responds to at airports and the outcome of these incidents (which may include no further action, apprehension or arrest). Over the three years between 2010−11 and 2012−13, AFP statistics show that officers attended 63 437 incidents and made 7864 apprehensions and 935 arrests at the 10 designated airports. The number of arrests made at the 10 designated airports increased by 42.6 per cent over the three year period from July 2010 to June 2013.[20]

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19   JAIGs are located at all of the designated airports: JAITs are located at Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney airports.

20   The AFP advised that while it was not aware of any specific reason for the increase in the number of arrests, it was possibly due to its change of focus from counter terrorist first response to the whole policing continuum.

Dealing with unattended items was the most common type of incident, accounting for almost 16 per cent of all incidents attended.

27.   All Australian government agencies are required to have key performance indicators (KPIs) which are intended to allow an assessment of how the agency is delivering the outcomes required of it by government. The Aviation function has three KPIs covering the level of community and business confidence, the proportion of time spent in high-visibility policing and its ability to meet specified response times. Whilst the KPIs relating to community and business confidence and response times are relevant to the AFP's role at airports, the KPIs do not, however, cover all key areas of the Aviation function (such as crime prevention). The AFP advised that it is conducting an AFP-wide Performance Framework Reform project. This project provides an opportunity for the AFP to consider the introduction of measures which better assess the Aviation function's performance.

28.   Measurement of the effectiveness of the AFP's aviation function is inherently difficult.[21] However, each year, the AFP conducts a survey of the Aviation function's clients (the Business Satisfaction Survey (BSS)) and a survey of airport users (the Airport Consumer Confidence Survey (ACCS)).[22] Both surveys show consistently high levels of satisfaction with the Aviation function. The 2013 BSS found that 96 per cent of respondents were satisfied (or very satisfied) with their most recent dealings with the Aviation function. Of the respondents to the ACCS, 86 per cent said that they were satisfied (or very satisfied) with the contribution that the Aviation function makes to aviation law enforcement.

29.   Among the AFP's stakeholders, two of the most important in relation to day to day operations are the airport operators and the state/territory police forces. The ANAO wrote to all 10 airport operators and to the

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21   The Australian Institute of Criminology has commented that '…there neither exists nor can there exist a single measure of police performance. Rather, it is appropriate to select from a variety of measures those which focus upon that specific element of police activity one wishes to evaluate'. (Australian Institute of Criminology, *Efficiency and Effectiveness in Australian Policing*, Canberra, December 1988.) In the Australian Capital Territory, ACT Policing uses 33 Key Performance Indicators to report to the ACT Government on its performance. (See ANAO Audit Report No.13 2012–13, *The Provision of Policing Services to the Australian Capital Territory.)*

22   The 2013 ACCS involved a face-to-face survey of almost 2 000 domestic and international travelers. Less than 0.5 per cent of respondents refused to participate. The 2013 BCS involved a survey by email of 261 people who had had dealings with the Aviation function. The response rate was 49.4 per cent.

seven state/territory police forces and met with representatives of airport operators and police forces in New South Wales, Queensland and the Northern Territory. All seven state/territory police forces stated that they had good working relationships and did not identify any significant operational, jurisdictional, legislative or other impediments to effective policing at airports.

30. Representatives of the six airport operators who replied to the ANAO's letter (or met with the audit team) reported that they had effective working relationships with the AFP. However, representatives of three operators (50 per cent) stated that they did not have a clear understanding of the Aviation function's strategy for airport policing. In response to this feedback, the AFP has agreed to disseminate its Aviation Doctrine. Among other things, the Doctrine identifies types of criminal threats and critical points at airports and details a number of prevention, response and special operations that may be conducted.

31. During the period 2010–11 to 2012–13, a total of 140 complaints were reported as being made about AFP officers at airports.[23] The number of complaints decreased by 37 per cent from 57 in 2010–11 to 36 in 2012–13. In 2012–13, a total of 69 'conduct issues' were 'established' or substantiated. Although discourtesy accounted for seven of the established conduct issues, the largest single type of conduct issues was 'fail to comply with direction or procedure' (18 issues), where the 'complainant' was in fact another AFP officer. In 2012–13, the overall number of complaints and associated conduct issues arising at airports (36 and 62 respectively) compared favourably with ACT policing which had 229 complaints and 419 conduct issues in the same period.

32. The Commonwealth Ombudsman is empowered to conduct an annual inspection of the AFP's complaint handling procedures, including whether the AFP has adequately investigated complaints it has received. In his most recent report to Parliament covering 2012–13, the Ombudsman concluded that, of the sample of 183 investigations across the AFP that he examined, with one

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23 Complaints received are categorised into four categories with Category One being the least serious and Category Four being allegation of corruption. Category One and Two complaints are referred to a Complaint Management Team in the functional area for investigation and reporting back to the central Professional Standards unit. Category Three complaints are investigated by the Professional Standards unit and Category Four complaints are referred to the Australian Commissioner for Law Enforcement Integrity. A complaint may raise more than one issue: the 140 complaints made in the period 2010–11 to 2012–13 included 263 'conduct issues'.

exception, complaint investigations had been reasonably conducted and that the outcomes of complaints were also reasonable.

Summary of agency responses

33.   The AFP provided the following summary comment to the audit report:

> The AFP welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the ANAO Performance Audit, *Policing at Australian International* Airports and acknowledges the commentary provided within the report. The AFP agrees with the recommendation contained therein.

34.   The AFP's full response is included at Appendix 1.

35.   The ANAO provided the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development with an extract of those parts of the report which were relevant to it. The department's full response is also included at Appendix 1.

Recommendations

	To enable AFP officers to maintain appropriate knowledge of state and territory legislative requirements, the ANAO recommends that the AFP, in consultation with the relevant state and territory police force, reviews the content, duration and frequency of the legislative training courses. **AFP Response**: *Agreed.*

Audit Findings

1. Background and Context

This chapter provides the context to and recent history of policing at Australia's international airports and outlines the significant developments that led to the existing policing model.

Introduction

1.1   The Australian Federal Police is the Australian Government's primary law enforcement agency. Its responsibilities include the provision of policing services in relation to Commonwealth laws and property and safeguarding Commonwealth interests, including the provision of policing services at Australian international airports.

1.2   In law enforcement terms, international airports represent a complex challenge. As the events of September 11 2001 in the United States demonstrated, they can be the source or focus of major terrorist attacks, with the potential to kill or injure thousands of people. Airports are one of the points of entry into Australia for criminals, potential terrorists, illicit drugs and other prohibited imports with consequential links to serious and organised crime both internationally and domestically. Parents involved in child custody disputes may also seek to remove children from Australia via international airports. Also, the trend towards the development of airports as major retail centres provides a vulnerability for lower-level crime such as shoplifting and theft. They may also involve the local criminal milieu, as the murder of a motorcycle gang member at Sydney Airport in March 2009 demonstrated.

1.3   There are many factors that will influence the security risk of an airport. These include its location, the number of passengers passing through, the size of aircraft accommodated (including whether they are domestic or international) and the potential impact of a terrorist attack. The *Aviation Transport Security Act 2004* (ATSA) and *Aviation Security Regulations 2005* (ASRs) has created a regulatory framework for the prevention of unlawful interference to aviation.[24] The Secretary of the Department of Infrastructure

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24   The ATSA and ASRs, as well as other legislation, give domestic legal effect to Australia's ratification of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), to which Australia became a signatory in 1947. Annex 17 to the Convention established minimum aviation security measures with which signatories to the Convention must apply.

and Regional Development determines whether an airport is to be categorised as a security controlled airport.[25] Australia currently has 177 security controlled airports.

1.4 There are seven categories of security controlled airports.[26] The operators of these airports are required to have a Transport Security Program (TSP) approved by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. TSPs contain information such as a statement outlining the local security risk context, details of controls in relation to access to secure areas of the airport, passenger and baggage screening and security measures.[27] Category One airports require the highest levels of security screening.

1.5 The ASRs also establish certain airports as 'designated airports'. These airports are required to have a Counter Terrorist First Response (CTFR) capability.[28] Currently, there are 10 designated airports in Australia. In 2012–13, these airports accounted for 84.3 per cent of all domestic passengers and 99.9 per cent of all international passengers.[29] Table 1.1 lists these airports and the number of domestic and international passengers through the airports in 2012–13.

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25 *Aviation Transport Security Act 2004*, s28.

26 Categories One and Two comprise international airports with 50 000 or more departing passengers per year, including Adelaide, Brisbane, Cairns, Canberra, Darwin, Gold Coast, Hobart, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. Category Seven includes domestic airports which have a small number of passengers and open charter flights, and do not require screening infrastructure. There are currently no airports in Category Seven. The level of security screening required also varies between categories.

27 Details of what is required in a TSP are available at
    <http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/aviation /tsp/aircraft.aspx>.

28 The *National Counter Terrorism Plan*, agreed between the Australian and state and territory governments, recognises that state and territory governments have primary responsibility for the operational response to a terrorist incident in their jurisdiction. In the airport context, police at airports have responsibility for the first response to a terrorism incident (such as containment and evacuation of people) – known as Counter Terrorist First Response - until the relevant state or territory police force takes operational control.

29 The Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics collects passenger data from all airports servicing Regular Public Transport (RPT) flights which received more than 7 000 passengers in 2012. This accounted for 104 of the 177 security controlled airports.

Table 1.1:   Current designated airports and passenger numbers 2012−13

Airport	Domestic passengers	International passengers	Total passengers
Adelaide	6,461,228	709,469	7,170,697
Brisbane	16,622,408	4,547,234	21,169,642
Cairns	3,640,188	515,971	4,156,159
Canberra	3,013,960	0	3,013,960
Darwin	1,612,007	313,032	1,925,039
Gold Coast	4,922,763	882,536	5,805,299
Hobart	2,026,551	0	2,026,551
Melbourne	22,504,760	6,988,583	29,493,343
Perth	9,090,604	3,741,600	12,832,204
Sydney	24,984,961	12,633,127	37,618,088
Total	94,879,430	30,331,552	125,210,982

NOTE 1: Passengers include both inbound and outbound but do not include charter or cargo-only flights.

NOTE 2: Canberra and Hobart airports are configured to handle international passengers but do not currently do so.

Source: *Monthly Airport Traffic Data*, Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics.

1.6   While presenting risks, airports also make a substantial contribution to the Australian economy. A 2012 Deloitte Access Economics report[30] stated that:

- in 2011, Australia's airports generated a total economic contribution of around $17.3 billion, equivalent to 1.2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product and employed an estimated 115 200 people;

- the broader aviation industry employs a further 56 500 people;

- in 2011, $63 billion of air freight imports arrived through airports;

- by facilitating international tourism, airports contribute to a tourist industry which employs 400 000 people and contributes $34.6 billion to the economy; and

- over the next decade, major airports will invest over $9 billion in infrastructure development.

1.7   Table 1.2 shows the forecast growth at the designated airports between 2010−11 and 2030−31.

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30   *Connecting Australia: the economic and social contribution of Australia's airports*, Deloitte Access Economics, May 2012.

Table 1.2: **Forecast growth in passenger numbers (domestic and international) at the 10 designated airports 2010−11 to 2030−31**

Airport	Actual 2010−11 (millions)	Forecast 2030−31 (millions)	Total growth 2010−11 to 2030−31 (Per cent)	Average annual growth rate (Per cent)
Adelaide	7.3	13.5	84.9	3.1
Brisbane	19.9	45.1	126.6	4.2
Cairns	3.9	8.0	106.1	3.7
Canberra	3.2	6.1	90.6	3.3
Darwin	1.8	4.2	133.3	4.2
Gold Coast	5.5	13.1	138.2	4.4
Hobart	1.9	3.5	84.2	3.0
Melbourne	28.0	60.4	115.7	3.9
Perth	10.9	25.7	135.8	4.4
Sydney	35.8	72.0	101.1	3.6
Total	118.2	251.6	112.9	3.7

Source: *Air passenger movements through capital and non-capital airports to 2030−31, Research Report 133,* Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics, 2012.

1.8 Policing at airports is currently delivered through the AFP's Aviation function which is headed by the National Manager Aviation (NMA), an officer of Assistant Commissioner rank. At 15 November 2013, there were 618 sworn officers[31] at the 10 designated airports and the Aviation function's 2012−13 budgeted expenses were $74.1 million.

History of policing at designated airports

1.9 With the exception of Cairns airport[32], the land on which designated airports are situated was acquired by the Australian Government in the 1920s as part of the development of a nationwide airport network, although the land

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31 Appointees to uniformed components of the AFP are required to swear an oath (or make an affirmation) in terms prescribed by the *AFP Regulations 1979* before they can exercise powers conferred on them by law.

32 Cairns airport was owned by the Cairns Port Authority until December 2008, when it was sold to a private consortium.

is now leased to private companies.[33] Plain clothed Commonwealth Police officers policed Sydney and Melbourne airports when they opened in the 1960s and other major airports as they opened. In December 1974, the then Australian Government decided that security at the designated airports should be upgraded. Until 2005, policing of airports was undertaken by Australian government agencies (the Commonwealth Police, the AFP and Australian Protective Services), with the community policing elements undertaken by state and territory police forces.

Reviews of airport security and policing

The Wheeler Review

1.10 Between October 2004 and May 2005, a number of events led to significant community concern about reported instances of criminality and security weaknesses at major airports such as Sydney. In response, the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport commissioned Sir John Wheeler[34] to undertake an independent review of airport security and policing. The Wheeler review, which was released by the then Prime Minister in September 2005, was highly critical of security and policing arrangements at Australia's airports. Among his findings were:

- Bluntly put, in the everyday workings of airports, no one is taking overall charge of policing and security;

- Policing at major airports in Australia is often inadequate and dysfunctional, and security systems are typically uncoordinated. The roots of this include bureaucratic turf protection and unresolved Commonwealth/State conflicts over resources; and

- The present system of information sharing in and around aviation security is completely inadequate for the demands of our time.[35]

1.11 The Wheeler review made 17 recommendations, including that at each of the designated airports, a position of Airport Police Commander be

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33 The Australian Government announced in April 1994 that it would privatise all 22 airports then owned by the Australian Government by selling leases for each airport. The land on which airports (except Cairns) are situated remains in Australian Government ownership. The sales occurred between July 1997 and December 2003 and raised more than $8.5 billion.

34 Sir John Wheeler was a former UK Cabinet Minister who had undertaken a review of security arrangements at British airports.

35 The Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler DL, *An Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing for the Government of Australia*, September 2005, pp. *xi*, 40, 51.

established and that funding responsibility for all aspects of policing at these airports should rest with the AFP.

1.12 Following a meeting of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), the then Prime Minister announced on 27 September 2005 that the Australian and state governments had agreed to the Wheeler review recommendations and, in particular, the introduction of a Unified Policing Model (UPM) (also known as the hybrid model). Under the agreement, the states and territories would provide 328 police officers who would 'wear AFP uniform'. The AFP would pay the state and territory police forces for these officers, including their salary, superannuation, other overhead costs and an administration fee. As a consequence, the workforce at airports comprised AFP Protective Service Officers (PSOs)[36] and Airport Uniformed Police (AUP) officers who were sworn police officers, seconded from the local state or territory police force. The intention was that PSOs would undertake CTFR and that AUP officers would attend to other policing responsibilities. As at May 2009, there was a total of 780 police officers at the designated airports, of which 225 were AUP and 445 were PSOs.

The Beale Review

1.13 In the lead-up to the 2007 federal election, the then Opposition made a commitment that if it were successful in gaining government, it would conduct a federal audit of police capabilities. This commitment recognised that the AFP's budget had grown from $302 million in 2000−01 to $1.141 billion in 2008−09 and that it had been 'required in recent years to meet increasing demands encompassing complex whole of government, national and international issues'. In January 2009, the then Minister for Home Affairs announced that this review would be conducted by Roger Beale AO.

1.14 The Beale review was released in June 2009. It found that 'the hybrid model is flawed'.[37] In particular, some state police jurisdictions had been 'unable or unwilling' to provide the full complement of personnel as agreed by the states in the COAG context. Further, 'there are ongoing tensions between police drawn from an AFP background and those seconded from the

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36 The role of PSOs is to keep individuals and interests identified by the Commonwealth as being at risk safe from acts of terrorism, violent protest and issues motivated violence. Their powers are more limited than those of sworn AFP officers.

37 *New Realities: National Policing in the 21st Century: Federal Audit of Police Capabilities*, Roger Beale AO, June 2009, pp.11, 29, 160.

States/Territories, which threaten the overall effectiveness of the Unified Policing Model in a number of jurisdictions'. The review also found that federal and state police case management systems were incompatible, adversely affecting the ability of the states to share or transfer information and intelligence.

1.15 In the light of the finding that the hybrid UPM was flawed, the review considered that there were only two options: the 'All Out' model where state police forces assumed responsibility for all policing at airports and the 'All In' model, with the AFP providing all policing, including both CTFR and community policing.[38] On balance, the review recommended adopting the 'All In' model. The Australian Government accepted this recommendation in December 2009 and the AFP commenced 'transitioning' from the UPM to the 'All In' model.

Current model

1.16 Under the 'All In' model, the AFP's primary responsibility is similar to that of a police force in a metropolitan context: to respond to calls to particular incidents and to maintain a high−visibility deterrence function. Key activities undertaken by the AFP's Aviation function[39] at airports are:

- targeting crime in the aviation sector;

- deterring acts of terrorism;

- maintaining a community policing presence and providing high visibility patrols;

- providing the first response to acts of terrorism and emergency incidents;

- collecting and analysing aviation intelligence; and

- conducting investigations.

1.17 As at 30 June 2013, the approved staffing level for police at the 10 designated airports (not including headquarters) was 689. In 2012−13, the

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38 Under the 'All In' model, all police at airports would be sworn police officers employed by the AFP. State police could be called in to assist as necessary (such as a major emergency).

39 In this report, 'Aviation function' refers to the business area within AFP that discharges the policing function at Australia's 10 designated airports.

budgeted expenses for the AFP's Aviation function was $74.1 million. Figure 1.1 shows the current location of the 10 designated airports with an AFP presence.

1.18 Notwithstanding that under the 'All In' model, the AFP has taken primary responsibility for policing at the designated airports, under the *National Counter Terrorism Plan*, agreed between the Australian and state and territory governments, state and territory governments have responsibility for the operational response to a terrorist incident in their jurisdiction. Under the current model, this responsibility is acknowledged in Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between the AFP and the state and territory police forces, with the AFP providing CTFR until the relevant police force is able to take control of the response. The MOUs also provide for state and territory police forces to provide operational support for non-terrorist incidents, with the scale and extent of support to be determined by commanders on a case by case basis. In addition, should the need arise, the AFP can draw upon its own resources located in its main office in the state or territory. These arrangements provide a 'surge' capacity for the AFP airport police when responding to major incidents, whether or not they are terrorist-related.

Figure 1.1:   Location of AFP at Australia's 10 designated airports

Source: AFP.

Overseas airport policing models

1.19 The ANAO reviewed the models for policing at airports in several overseas countries. This review identified the different approaches taken, with each affected by local conditions. For example, in New Zealand, the single national police force provides airport policing, while in Canada and the United Kingdom, this function is provided by local police forces. In the United States, a number of federal agencies are involved with aviation security, with policing provided by a range of local and state agencies.

Audit objective, criteria and methodology

1.20 The objective of the audit was to assess the AFP's management of policing services at Australian international airports.

Audit criteria

1.21 In order to form a conclusion against this audit objective, the following high level audit criteria were used:

- the transition to the 'All In' model of policing at airports (Project Macer) has been delivered effectively;

- appropriate processes are in place for managing risk and operational planning;

- effective stakeholder engagement, relationship management and information sharing arrangements are in place;

- facilities at the airports are adequate and appropriate; and

- appropriate mechanisms for measuring the effectiveness of policing at airports have been developed and implemented.

Audit methodology

1.22 Audit fieldwork was undertaken primarily at the AFP's headquarters in Canberra. The audit team also visited Sydney, Brisbane, Gold Coast and Darwin airports and held discussions at each location with AFP officers, state police officers and airport operators. Discussions were also held with the DIRD's Office of Transport Security with respect to aviation security.

1.23 The audit was conducted in accordance with ANAO auditing standards at a cost of approximately $511 000.

Report structure

1.24 Figure 1.2 below outlines the structure of this Report.

Figure 1.2: Report Structure

Chapter 1 - Background and Context
- Introduction
- History of policing at designated airports
- Current model
- Overseas airport policing models
- Audit objective, criteria and methodology

Chapter 2 – Transition to a new workforce model
- Introduction
- Project Macer
- Project Guild
- Program Jupiter
- Transitional Training
- Benefits of the 'All In' Model
- Legislative framework supporting the 'All In' Model
- Conclusion

Chapter 3 – Management of AFP Airport Operations
- Introduction
- Organisational arrangements
- Strategic and operational planning
- Threat and risk assessments
- Intelligence support
- Conclusion

Chapter 4 – The Aviation Function's Performance
- Introduction
- Workload indicators and statistics
- Key Performance Indicators
- Relations with stakeholders
- Complaints against police
- Conclusion

Source: ANAO.

2. Transition to a New Workforce Model

This chapter examines the AFP's management of the projects to transition policing at Australia's designated airports to a workforce of fully sworn AFP officers. It also discusses the benefits of the move to the 'All In' model as well as the legislative framework supporting this model.

Introduction

2.1   Project Macer was established to plan, manage and implement the transition to the new 'All In' model. Project Guild was a sub-project of Project Macer with the purpose of transitioning Air Security Officers (ASOs) to a sworn police workforce. A related program, Program Jupiter, was to provide upgraded buildings at all 10 designated airports and canine facilities at nine of these airports.[40] The ANAO examined the AFP's management of these projects and program. The legislative framework supporting the AFP at designated airports was also examined.

Project Macer

Project organisation

2.2   The successful management of projects is generally based on a structured project management methodology. There are a number of such methodologies available, of which one is PRINCE2.[41] The AFP's Portfolio Management Office (PMO)[42] has adopted PRINCE2 as the mandatory methodology for managing Tier 1 ('mega-projects') and Tier 2 ('significant projects'). Project Macer was a Tier 1 project.

2.3   The stated objective of Project Macer was to facilitate the replacement of the existing UPM at the 10 designated Australian airports to the 'All In' model through transitioning:

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40   Canine facilities already existed for Canberra airport since the national canine training facility is located near Canberra airport.

41   PRINCE2 is an acronym for Projects in Controlled Environments (Version 2). It was originally developed by the United Kingdom Office of Government Commerce.

42   The PMO's stated role is 'to manage the investment process, strategic alignment, prioritisation and selection, progress monitoring, optimisation and benefits achieved by an organization's projects and programs on behalf of its senior management'. Source: AFP Better Practice Advice: Governance and Management Arrangements for Tier 1, 2 and 3 Projects and Programs.

- the CTFR workforce from PSOs to sworn AFP members to provide a highly responsive, capable and homogeneous Aviation workforce; and

- from a hybrid Commonwealth/state and territory model.

2.4 The Project was expected to be delivered in stages over a three to five year period from August 2009. The costs associated with delivering Project Macer were to be drawn from the AFP's existing budget allocations, with the budget for the Project being $32.7 million.

2.5 Consistent with PRINCE2 methodology, Project Macer had a Senior Responsible Officer (Deputy Commissioner, National Security), a Project Executive (National Manager, Aviation), a Project Sponsor, a Project Director and a Project Manager, with a Project Team of seven people. In addition, there was a Project Board comprising AFP senior executive officers[43] and a representative of the Attorney-General's Department and a Project Working Group.

2.6 The ANAO compared the Project Macer documentation with the framework suggested in the PRINCE2 methodology guide[44] and found that it included all the key documents required. Table 2.1 lists these documents.

Table 2.1: Project Macer documentation

Document	Summary of contents
Project Brief	Project definition (objectives, scope, inclusions, exclusions, deliverables); Outline Business Plan; and High level summary of risks.
Initiation Stage Plan	Specifies products to be delivered in Initiation Stage.
Project Initiation Document	Project definition; Context for project ; Project success criteria; Project organisation; Business case; Risk management plan (including risk register); and Communication plan.

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43 National Managers Aviation, Protection, Human Resources, Policy and Governance, Close Operations Support, Managers Aviation Infrastructure, Aviation Operations Support, Legal and a Financial Controller. The Board met on 23 occasions between September 2009 and April 2013.

44 *Managing Successful Projects with PRINCE2*, Office of Government Commerce, 2009.

Document	Summary of contents
Strategic Project Plan	Project objectives, benefits, outputs and outcomes; and Outlines of the stages of the project.
Project Stage Plans	Detailed plans for each of the three stages of the project.
Project End Stage Plans (three stages)	Report at the end of each stage, including: Performance against stage plan; • Events impacting stage; • Lessons learned; • Current status; and • Outlook.
Close down plan	Outline of activity required to close the project, including: • Ensure project objectives have been met; • Evaluate project; • Identify and allocate responsibility for any residual tasks required after transition to 'business as usual'.
End Project Plan	Assessment against the Project Brief and Project Initiation Document; Assessment of realisation of benefits and efficiencies; and Lessons learned.

Source: ANAO from AFP documentation.

Transition options

2.7   As previously noted, at the time of the Beale review in 2009, there were 225 AUP officers (that is, state and territory police officers who were seconded) and 445 PSOs. In relation to AUP officers, the AFP decided to offer them the opportunity to join the AFP, provided they met the necessary requirements. Those AUP officers who did not wish to take up this offer were returned to their 'home' police force. The AFP negotiated with state and territory police forces to 'stage' their return so that there were adequate police numbers at the designated airports during the transition process to continue the provision of effective policing services.

2.8   For PSOs, who were already AFP employees (but not sworn police officers), there were three options:

• transition to sworn police status and remain in their jobs at airports;

- transfer to a position at another location with available PSO[45] or unsworn positions; or

- leave the AFP (either through voluntary redundancy or resignation).

2.9 At the end of stage three of Project Macer in July 2013, the transition process was completed (with the exception of eight officers who were on long-term leave due to illness or injury). In summary, 274 PSOs and 71 AUP officers successfully transitioned to sworn AFP positions. One hundred and fifteen PSOs were redeployed to elsewhere in the AFP and 100 PSOs retired, resigned or accepted voluntary redundancy.

2.10 Figure 2.1 demonstrates the transition process over the period January 2009 to November 2013. It shows that, as the number of PSOs and AUP officers gradually decreased, the number of sworn AFP officers increased. The category 'AFP unsworn' represents administrative and support staff which were not intended to be transitioned. This number generally remained constant over time.

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45 The Protection component of the AFP comprises some 700 staff at 15 'stations' around Australia. Functions include guarding at key Commonwealth properties including Government House (Canberra), Kirribilli and Admiralty Houses (Sydney) and a number of sensitive Defence Force establishments in South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory. There are also Diplomatic Protection Units in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne and Perth.

Figure 2.1:   Categories of police at designated airports, January 2009 to November 2013

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

Agreements with state and territory police forces

2.11   The legislative framework operating at airports is complex and is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Both Commonwealth and state and territory legislation have application and AFP officers need to be able to use and apply the full range of relevant Commonwealth and state and territory legislation and powers. While the *Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970* allows AFP officers to exercise powers under state and territory legislation at all designated airports (except Cairns), there remains a need for

the AFP to be able to call upon their state or territory counterparts if necessary.[46] Consequently, as part of Project Macer, the AFP sought to negotiate 'Head Agreements' with each state and territory (except the Australian Capital Territory)[47] outlining each party's roles and responsibilities.

2.12 The AFP has secured in-principle agreement with most state and territory police forces to swear AFP officers in as special constables[48] so they may deal with offences against state and territory legislation. As at November 2013, a Head Agreement with New South Wales (NSW) had still not been reached, although AFP officers in NSW have been sworn in as Recognised Law Enforcement Officers (RLEOs) under NSW legislation. Whilst a Head Agreement with Queensland was signed in July 2013, as at November 2013, no arrangements have yet been made to swear AFP officers in as Queensland special constables although negotiations are continuing.

2.13 Overall, while it would be desirable to formalise relationships between the AFP and all state and territory police forces, the extended negotiation periods for some Head Agreements has generally had no discernable on-ground effect. In the case of Queensland, the previous absence of a Head Agreement meant that local procedures training had not been provided in some years (as outlined in Table 2.4).

Project Guild

2.14 ASOs were introduced in December 2001 following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. Their role is to travel discreetly on selected domestic and international flights to provide security against any person or group who attempts to take control of an aircraft or to cause death or serious injuries to passengers or crew. ASOs are armed, and are trained in negotiation skills and defensive tactics. The number of ASOs and the flights on which they travel are classified.

2.15 As the ASO program was staffed by PSOs and is regarded as part of the Aviation function, the AFP decided to transition the ASO program to a fully sworn police workforce in the same way as Project Macer. This became a

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46 For example, in the event of a major incident beyond the resources of the AFP at an airport to deal with or the investigation of complex or serious offences against state or territory legislation.

47 The AFP provides general and community policing in the ACT under the terms of an agreement with the ACT Government. A separate agreement was therefore not necessary.

48 In NSW, special constables are known as Recognised Law Enforcement Officers (RLEOs).

sub-project of Project Macer and was known as Project Guild. Costs for delivering Project Guild were managed within the existing Project Macer budget. Project Guild also used the PRINCE2 methodology and the same suite of project documentation (outlined in Table 2.1) was developed.

2.16 As with PSOs, ASOs could transition to a sworn police role, redeploy to an available PSO or non-sworn position or accept a voluntary redundancy. The transition process was essentially the same as for Project Macer. By February 2013, the transition of the ASO workforce to sworn police officers was complete.

Program Jupiter

2.17 The then Government's acceptance of the Wheeler review in September 2005 meant that there would be a significant increase in the number of police officers at each airport. In the 2007−08 budget, the AFP was allocated funding of $139 million over four years for the design and fitout of facilities at the 10 designated airports and canine facilities at nine of these airports. Agreement was sought and reached with the owners of airports and private developers to construct purpose-built facilities which the AFP then leased from them. The AFP administered this as a series of projects collectively named Program Jupiter. [49]

2.18 Under the terms of the decision to approve the funds, the AFP was required to obtain the agreement of the Department of Finance[50] to each lease to ensure that its commercial terms were reasonable and in line with current market conditions.

2.19 In October 2011, the AFP commissioned an independent review of Program Jupiter. The review made a number of relatively minor recommendations and concluded:

> Provided the recommendations of this report are addressed, the SRO[51] can have confidence that the Jupiter Program will deliver its project outputs and program business outcomes as required in the Business Case (updated) and Cabinet approved NPP.

49　In the AFP, a number of linked projects is termed a program.

50　The Property and Construction division of the Department of Finance oversees the Commonwealth Property Management Framework which includes legislation and policy for property leased or owned by the Commonwealth. (Source: http://www.finance.gov.au/property/property/index.html).

51　Under PRINCE2 project methodology (see paragraph 1.2), each project has a Senior Responsible Officer. For Program Jupiter, this was the Deputy Commissioner National Security.

2.20   At the time of this audit, 10 of the 19 projects had been completed[52], with the overall program anticipated to be completed during 2015. The approved budget for the 10 completed projects was $72.5 million and their final cost was $51.4 million (71 per cent).[53]

Transitional training

2.21   Policing at airports is complex and exposes officers to potentially dangerous situations, requiring operational AFP officers to have the necessary training to deal with the wide variety of situations. This particularly applies to the use of both lethal and non-lethal weapons and use of force. As previously noted, for AFP officers policing at airports, training in both the Commonwealth and state and territory legislation is also important.

2.22   Prior to being accepted for training, potential AFP recruits are required to pass through a number of 'gateways', including a security clearance, drug testing, meet minimum fitness and medical standards, and complete aptitude and psychological tests. The basic training for new recruits comprises a 26 week residential course at the AFP College[54] in Canberra. Potential recruits who have prior experience in other police forces have their training needs individually assessed and are not generally required to undergo the full 26 week course. All potential AFP recruits undergo the same basic training, and to a lesser extent receive training in specialist areas such as Aviation.

2.23   After successfully completing training, graduates are sworn in as AFP officers and are deployed. On the job training continues throughout a 12 month probation period, during which new officers are required to maintain a workbook that requires supervisor certification that they have met competency levels. After successfully completing probation[55], officers are awarded a Diploma of Public Safety (Policing), a nationally recognised qualification.

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52   The completed projects were the main facilities at Adelaide, Brisbane, Canberra, Darwin, Melbourne and Sydney and canine facilities at Adelaide, Cairns, Darwin and the Gold Coast.

53   The AFP advised that leasing costs were less than had been estimated in 2007–08.

54   The AFP College is a Registered Training Organisation with the Australian Skills Quality Authority.

55   This includes the completion of a workbook.

Operational safety training

2.24   AFP officers are required to maintain mandatory qualifications in operational safety (previously known as use of force). Initial qualification is obtained during recruit training and officers are then required to be requalified annually. The Commissioner's Order on Operational Safety states that if an officer's qualification expires, the officer must return munitions and equipment and stand down from operational duty.

2.25   Operational safety qualifications are monitored monthly by the Aviation executive through the Performance on a Page (PoP) report. The PoP report for June 2013 noted that 99 per cent of the officers complied with operational safety qualifications. Six of the 603 officers were not qualified. The AFP provided details of these six officers who were either on extended leave or were not performing operational duties for medical reasons.

Abbreviated Macer and Guild training

2.26   PSOs working at airports had previously undergone training in Protection when they first joined the AFP and many AUP officers were experienced state or territory police officers. Both groups had varying levels of experience working in the airport environment. In recognition of this previous learning and experience, the AFP developed three abbreviated training courses, which are outlined in Table 2.2. However, both PSOs and AUP officers who wished to transition were required to successfully complete the six 'gateways' before being admitted to the appropriate course.[56]

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56   The 'gateways' included testing physical fitness, prior knowledge and competency in contemporary policing.

Table 2.2:   Project Macer training requirements

Course	Audience	Duration of course
Federal Police Conversion Program	Current AUP officers or those who left the police less than 12 months previously.	Three weeks
Federal Police Lateral Program	Former AFP or AUP officers who left more than 12 months (but less than 24 months) previously.	Six weeks
Federal Police Transition Program	Serving PSOs or AUP officers who had left more than 24 months previously.	16 weeks

Source: AFP.

2.27   Between October 2010 and May 2013, when the last course was conducted, the AFP ran a total of 16 courses for a total of 383 PSOs or AUP officers wishing to transition. All AFP officers at airports have now completed the training required under Project Macer.

Benefits of the 'All In' model

2.28   The Project Initiation Document (see Table 2.1) identified a number of benefits that were expected to flow from the transition to a single fully sworn workforce, including:

- a single command structure;

- improved stakeholder engagement;

- resource efficiencies;

- development of policing skills; and

- cost savings.

Savings from the introduction of the 'All In' model

2.29   One of the reasons for the Beale review preferring the 'All In' model was the potential for cost savings. These savings arose in two ways: firstly, the AFP would not have to pay a number of administration fees previously levied by state and territory police forces under the UPM[57]; and secondly, a single

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57   For example, state and territory police forces charged the AFP an annual administration fee of up to $10 000 per seconded officer. In 2010, these fees totalled $1.7 million.

fully sworn police force at airports would have cost efficiencies since all policing responsibilities would be carried out by a single work force, rather than CTFR and community policing being carried out by two workforces.

2.30 The actual staffing and cost data from the AFP for the period 2009−10 to 2012−13 is outlined in Figure 2.2. Although staffing numbers decreased over the entire period, staffing costs increased from 2009−10 to 2010−11. The AFP advised that the reason for this increase was delays in determining and finalising administration fees (attributed under the previous UPM) to the state and territory police forces. Figure 2.2 also shows that the total cost of AFP staff at the 10 designated airports has reduced from $84 million in 2009−10 to $74.1 million in 2012−13, a reduction of almost 12 per cent. Despite this reduction in the total cost of policing at the 10 designated airports, the actual cost per officer (shown in Figure 2.3) has increased. The AFP advised that this is largely due to increases in salaries resulting from the AFP's three-yearly Enterprise Agreements.

Figure 2.2:   Aviation staffing and cost 2009−10 to 2012−13

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

Figure 2.3:   Monthly cost per officer 2009−10 to 2012−13

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

2.31   As discussed, the original projected timeframe for Project Macer was three to five years, at an estimated cost of $32.7 million. The End Project Report states that the project took three years and 10 months, with a total cost of $16.1 million.[58] The AFP advised that the total cost for Project Guild was $3.7 million. The End Project Reports for both projects state that the anticipated benefits have been achieved. As detailed in this report, analysis of AFP data, as well as interviews with key AFP personnel and airport stakeholders, supports this assessment.

Legislative framework supporting the 'All In' model

2.32   As noted at paragraph 2.11, AFP officers at designated airports can use and apply both Commonwealth and state and territory legislation and powers. The key difference between the Commonwealth and state and territory legislative regimes is that there are no 'community policing' powers (such as the power to move people on) in Commonwealth legislation. This stems from the fact that when the AFP was established in 1979, as a national policing

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58   The original estimate of $32.7 million contained four stages. The estimated cost of Stage Four, which was primarily training for new recruits, was $13.8 million and was to be completed in 2013–14 and 2014–15. In the event, Project Macer was completed by the end of 2012–13 and the originally estimated Stage Four costs were not required.

agency, it was not envisaged that it would require such powers.[59] In order to be able to carry out the full range of policing powers at designated airports, the AFP needs to be able to draw upon powers in both Commonwealth and state and territory legislation. The AFP recognises the complexity of this framework. In February 2010, prior to the transition to the 'All In' model, a document prepared for the Project Macer Board stated:

> The legislative framework underpinning the current Unified Policing Model (UPM) at the designated airports involves a complex interaction of State/Territory and Commonwealth law, varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and in some cases from airport to airport in the same State. The existing framework creates a number of issues for the AFP. A move to an 'all-in' model in which the AFP takes responsibility for airport uniform policing will only exacerbate the issues if a clearer framework is not developed.

State and territory legislation

2.33   As noted in paragraph 1.9, the land on which all of the designated airports is situated (except Cairns) was acquired by the Australian Government in the 1920s. Section 52(i) of the Constitution provides that the Australian Parliament 'shall have exclusive power…to make laws…with respect to all places acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes'. Prior to 1970, it had been assumed that both state and territory legislation and Commonwealth legislation could co-exist at 'Commonwealth places'. However, two High Court decisions in 1970[60] held that the effect of s. 52(i) was to terminate the application of state and territory laws from the date of acquisition of the land. The effect of this decision was significant because at the time, there was little Commonwealth law relating to crime and, as the then Attorney-General noted, it could be argued that 'certain state laws concerning manslaughter, forgery, theft, gross indecency, possession of drugs and the use of indecent language do not operate in Commonwealth places'.[61] In the light of

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59   As previously noted, the AFP provides community policing in the ACT under the terms of a contract with the ACT Government. However, its community policing powers are drawn from ACT legislation, not Commonwealth legislation. The AFP's provision of policing services to the ACT was examined by the ANAO in 2012–13, in *The Provision of Policing Services to the Australian Capital Territory*, Audit Report No.13 2012–13.

60   *Worthing v Rowell*, (1970) 123 CLR 89 and *R v Phillips* (1970) 125 CLR 93.

61   Commonwealth, Official Hansard p. 2801, House of Representatives, 27 October 1970, T Hughes, Attorney-General.

the High Court decisions, the Australian Government passed the *Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970* (the COPAL Act).

2.34 The COPAL Act was to apply as Commonwealth law the provisions of state (but not territory) legislation. This is known as applied state legislation. This means that AFP officers at Adelaide, Brisbane, Gold Coast, Hobart, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney airports are able to exercise powers and investigate offences under the relevant law of the state.[62] However, advice received by the AFP from the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS) in 1989 and reaffirmed in 2012 is that AFP officers are only able to exercise powers contained wholly within state legislation and which do not require going to another person for permission or authorisation.[63] This is known as the 'bare powers' restraint.[64]

2.35 The Commonwealth *Crimes Act 1914* (the Crimes Act) provides AFP officers with a wide range of investigative powers (such as the power to require identity information at airports). However, the COPAL Act did not permit the AFP to use these powers where they were investigating applied state offences. This was because under the previous UPM, with state police officers seconded to AUP, they had access to their own suite of investigative powers. Concurrent with the transition to a fully sworn AFP model, the COPAL Act was amended to explicitly allow the use of the Crimes Act powers in investigating state offences. At the same time, the COPAL Act was also amended to provide a formal legal basis for state and territory police to swear AFP officers in as special members (see paragraph 2.11). A further complexity for AFP officers seeking to use applied state powers is that procedures relating to the arrest, questioning, charging and bailing of offenders vary between jurisdictions.

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62   In Darwin and Canberra, the power to use Northern Territory and ACT laws is conferred by specific provisions contained in the *Australian Federal Police Act 1979.* The COPAL Act does not apply at Cairns airport because it is not a Commonwealth place.

63   For example, the NSW *Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002* allows for a 'police officer' to apply to a magistrate for a search warrant in certain circumstances. The same Act defines 'police officer' to be a member of the NSW police. An AFP officer would therefore not be able to apply for such a warrant. However, an AFP officer can seek a warrant under the Commonwealth *Crimes Act 1914.*

64   While the validity of the COPAL Act has been upheld by a number of court decisions (including the High Court in *Pinkstone v R*, 219 CLR 444), the concept of the 'bare powers' has not been subject to judicial consideration.

2.36 The AFP expects its officers to have as a minimum at least a working knowledge of the state and territory legislation relevant to policing at airports. There are currently 300 pieces of relevant legislation covering each state and territory, and the AFP has produced a compilation of this legislation on its intranet (known as the Hub).

Commonwealth legislation

2.37 In some respects, the situation in relation to Commonwealth legislation is simpler because Commonwealth criminal legislation was drafted to specifically take account of the AFP. However, as with state and territory legislation, there is a large volume of legislation with which officers need to be familiar. The AFP has produced a 'Condensed Criminal Law Guide' to provide its officers a compendium of Commonwealth legislation that relates to policing at airports, including provisions relating to offences that might be committed at airports and officers' powers.[65] Table 2.3 summarises the legislation contained in the Guide and the number of provisions in each piece of legislation which relate to policing at airports.

Table 2.3:   Aviation Condensed Criminal Law Guide 2011

Legislation	Number of provisions listed in Guide
Air Navigation Act 1920	8
Air Navigation Regulations 1947	3
Airports (Control of On-Airport Activity) Regulations 1997	54
Australian Federal Police Act 1979	20
Aviation Transport Security Act 2004	24
Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005	45
Civil Aviation Act 1988	17
Civil Aviation Regulations 1988	14
Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970	18

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65   In Australia, legislation takes two principal forms: Acts and Regulations. Acts must be passed by both Houses of Parliament and do not take effect until given Royal Assent by the Governor-General. Regulations may be made by the Governor-General (but must be authorised by an Act) but can be disallowed by Parliament. Generally, Regulations relate to simpler or less contentious matters than Acts. Since the Guide contains reference to both Acts and Regulations, the generic word 'legislation' has been used.

Legislation	Number of provisions listed in Guide
Crimes Act 1914	52
Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991	38
Criminal Code Act 1995	111
Public Order (Protection of Property and Persons) Act 1971	15
Total	**419**

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

2.38 As noted above, Cairns airport is a particular challenge because it is not a Commonwealth place and the COPAL Act therefore does not operate to allow the AFP to use Queensland legislation as applied Commonwealth legislation. Further, as noted at paragraph 2.12, AFP officers in Queensland are not presently sworn in as special constables. This means that AFP officers at Cairns airport do not have the ability to use Queensland legislation and will not be able to do so until they are sworn in as special constables (see paragraph 2.12). However, AFP officers have 'common law' powers which allow them to detain suspects and hand them over to Queensland police officers upon arrival.

Risk mitigation strategies

2.39 The AFP identified the legislative framework as an area of risk in the planning documents for Project Macer. The Project Initiation Document identified the possible consequences of a successful challenge to the exercise of special constable powers (where they are available) as 'including exclusion of evidence, costs, compensation and in the worst case criminal sanction against the member'. Accordingly, the ANAO examined the mitigation strategies that the AFP has put in place to deal with such risks.

Special constables

2.40 As already noted, the AFP secured the in-principle agreement of states and territories to swearing AFP officers as special constables of the relevant police force, although this has yet to be achieved in Queensland.

Legislative amendments

2.41 During Project Macer, the COPAL Act was amended to:

- allow its officers to use investigative powers conferred upon them by part IAA of the Crimes Act to investigate offences under applied state legislation; and

- provide a statutory basis for its officers to be sworn in as state or territory special constables.[66]

Seeking legal advice

2.42   On numerous occasions, the AFP has sought advice from the AGS on the extent of its powers under the legislative framework. For example, in March 2012, the AGS provided a summation of previous advices about AFP police powers at airports and, in the same month, it provided a separate advice about how the AFP chooses whether to use Commonwealth or state and territory powers in given situations. In addition, the AFP's internal legal section has provided advice arising from specific incidents.

Effective liaison with state and territory police

2.43   As noted above, the AFP may need to call upon state and territory police in the event of a serious incident or a serious crime under state and territory legislation. To this end, it is important that the AFP has good relationships with its state and territory counterparts. The ANAO communicated with all state and territory police forces and interviewed representatives of the police forces of NSW, Queensland and the Northern Territory. All state and territory police forces confirmed that they enjoy very good relationships with the AFP and there are regular meetings between officers at various levels.

Officer training

Commonwealth legislation

2.44   For new recruits to the AFP (and for officers who transitioned under Project Macer), training in relevant Commonwealth legislation is provided at the AFP College in Canberra (see paragraph 2.26). The ANAO reviewed the training material and established that it included all relevant legislation as shown in Table 2.3.

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66   These amendments were passed by Parliament in the *Aviation Crimes and Policing Legislation Act 2011* and came into effect on 2 March 2011.

State and territory legislation

2.45 Training in state and territory legislation (known as Local Procedures Training) is provided by the relevant police force with costs recovered from the AFP. The ANAO sought the AFP's advice as to the duration of the courses provided by state and territory police forces. This is shown in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4: **Duration of training in state and territory legislation provided by state and territory police forces**

State	Duration	Comment
NSW	8 days	RLEO training focusing on NSW legislation and procedures. AFP officers at Sydney airport must complete the training before being sworn in as RLEOs.
VIC	10 days	AFP officers at Melbourne airport must complete local procedures training with VICPOL before being sworn in as special constables.
QLD	Nil	Due to absence of a Head Agreement until late July 2013, Queensland Police have not provided training for some years. However, some experienced Queensland Police officers transitioned to the AFP under Project Macer and they have provided a limited amount of informal training. Negotiations are underway with Queensland Police to develop a course with a duration of 80 hours.
SA	3 days	AFP officers at Adelaide airport must complete local procedures training with SAPOL before being sworn in as special constables.
WA	10 days	WA Police require AFP officers to use WAPOL's Incident Management System when using state legislation.
TAS	3.5 days	AFP officers at Hobart airport take part in the Joint Policing Patrols Initiative.
NT	10 days	NT Police have not provided a course since 2010 due to other priorities.
ACT	-	Training in ACT law is undertaken by recruits during training at the AFP College.

Source: AFP.

2.46 While it has been agreed between the AFP and state and territory police forces that the latter will provide training, Table 2.4 shows that in some instances, this is not occurring. Further, there is often a delay in AFP officers new to an airport receiving training in state and territory legislation because it is not cost effective to schedule a course until there are enough new officers to make a course worthwhile. It should be recognised that at each airport, there are experienced former state and territory police officers who are now AFP officers who can provide guidance and support to new officers. However, it is of concern that the AFP estimates that 25 per cent of officers at Melbourne

airport, 20 per cent of officers at Sydney airport and 95 per cent of officers at Darwin airport have received no formal training in the relevant state and territory legislation.

Reference materials

2.47 As noted at paragraph 2.37, the AFP has produced a Condensed Criminal Law Guide (the Guide) which is provided to officers during their training and is also accessible at any time on the Hub. The Guide lists the provisions of 13 key pieces of Commonwealth legislation relevant to airports (see Table 2.3). The utility of such guidance material depends on whether it is up-to-date. The current issue of the Guide is dated July 2011. Commonwealth legislation is often updated and amended; while some amendments may be minor and have negligible practical effect, other amendments may be major and reflect the introduction of new government policy. The ANAO examined all amendments made to the 13 pieces of legislation since July 2011 (and which are consequently not reflected in the Guide). In total, there were 54 such amendments and, of these, 21 affected provisions listed in the Guide.

2.48 As noted at paragraph 2.36, the AFP has also included on the Hub a listing of state and territory legislation relevant to airports. Since this compilation is hyperlinked to each state government's legislation database, it is reasonable to assume that it is up to date.

2.49 The ANAO recognises that it is difficult to keep multiple copies of paper-based documents (such as the Guide) fully up to date. It is also unrealistic to expect AFP officers on patrol to carry around a lengthy (in excess of 300 pages) document such as the Guide. The AFP advised that it is examining whether AFP officers in the field can be provided with hand-held electronic devices to access the Hub, allowing them real-time access to up to date Commonwealth and state and territory legislation.

Alternatives to present framework

2.50 As noted in paragraph 1.15, the 2009 Beale review[67] found that the then current policing model, known as the hybrid model, where AFP PSOs had responsibility for CTFR and state and territory police[68] attended to other policing responsibilities, was 'flawed'. He reported that there was a 'common

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67 *New Realities: National Policing in the 21st Century*, Roger Beale AO, June 2009.
68 State and territory police were seconded to the AFP.

view among State/Territory and Commonwealth police chiefs that an integrated policing operation at each airport provided by one jurisdiction at each airport was preferable to the current hybrid model with separate protection and policing streams'. He considered that there were thus only two alternatives: the 'All Out' model, with state and territory police forces responsible for all policing at airports, or the 'All In' model, where the AFP performs the function. The report concluded that:

> On balance, and with an element of reluctance, the Audit has reached the view that the 'All In' model under which the Commonwealth accepts clear responsibility to fund and staff airport policing and security is more likely to be sustainable in the long run.

2.51 The recommendation that the 'All In' model be adopted was accepted by the then Government. Even if the review had recommended (and the Government accepted) adoption of the 'All Out' model, this would not have resolved the complexity of the legislative framework: rather, it would have reversed the position, with state and territory police having to apply Commonwealth legislation. Accordingly, it is reasonable to consider whether it would be possible and/or desirable to replace the current legislative framework with one in which there was only one set of laws applying at airports.

2.52 At the second meeting of the Project Macer Board in February 2010, a paper on legislative options was presented. The paper noted the complexity of the current regime, where the AFP needed to rely on applied state legislation for its community policing powers (since no such powers exist in Commonwealth criminal legislation). The paper identified four alternatives for creating a single Commonwealth policing regime for airports:

- insertion of a new Division containing specific airport policing powers in the *Crimes Act 1914*;

- creation of a whole new Act containing these powers;

- expanding the application of existing powers: for example, those available for terrorism offences in the *Crimes Act 1914* or another Commonwealth Act, so that they can be used for airport policing; or

- import state powers from a single jurisdiction into Commonwealth law, for example the powers in the ACT *Crimes Act 1900*.

2.53 The Project Macer Board considered that the most urgent legislative reforms required were the relatively minor amendments necessary to allow the

AFP to use the full range of its investigative powers and to provide a legislative basis for the swearing of AFP officers as state or territory special constables (see paragraph 2.41). Consequently, the options for developing a Commonwealth legislative framework were not considered further at that time.

2.54   In April 2012, the AFP's internal legal section prepared another paper on the legislative options. It identified three options for the Project Macer Board to consider:

- Option One: conduct a review of the present arrangements in two years' time;

- Option Two: introduce Commonwealth airport policing powers; or

- Option Three: introduce a Commonwealth airport offences regime.

2.55   The paper discussed the benefits of the second and third options which included:

- uniformity in investigation and policing of community policing powers which would 'reduce the reliance by AFP members upon state powers to perform community functions at Commonwealth place airports and reduce potential incorrect application of applied state powers. This will in turn reduce the scope for defendants to avoid prosecution by employing technical defences, such as non compliance with investigative procedures;

- more efficient use of resources since the AFP would be able to deliver a single training program for all officers deployed at designated airports; and

- increased workforce flexibility since officers could be moved from airport to airport to meet workforce needs and would not require retraining on each occasion.

2.56   However, the paper also identified a number of potential difficulties. First, adoption of either Options Two or Three could be perceived as unnecessary since the existing arrangements provided a framework covering all aspects of policing (albeit with inherent risks as already outlined in this chapter). Secondly, state and territory community policing legislation has developed over many years and is comprehensive. Any newly developed Commonwealth framework would be unlikely to be as comprehensive and the AFP might still need to rely on state or territory legislation to address any

'gaps'. Thirdly, a Commonwealth airport policing framework would not address the issue of Cairns airport, since it is not a Commonwealth place.

2.57 In addition, prosecutions of offences committed under applied state legislation at designated airports are generally conducted by state and territory Directors of Public Prosecution who may be unwilling to prosecute offences against Commonwealth legislation, creating a resource issue for the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.

2.58 On balance, the Project Macer Board decided to adopt Option One and review the situation in two years time (that is, in about April 2014). While it should be acknowledged that to date, none of the possible consequences identified by the AFP (see paragraph 2.39) have eventuated, the risks of these occurring with the present framework continue. However, the difficulties of adopting the alternative options, such as a Commonwealth airport policing regime, are not insubstantial. Any decision to pursue an alternative legislative framework would be a matter for the government in the light of advice received from the AFP and other key agencies.

Conclusion

2.59 When the then Government accepted the recommendation of the Beale review that an 'All In' model be adopted for policing at airports, it was estimated that this process would take between three to five years. In the event, the transition took a little under four years to complete at a reported cost significantly less ($16.1 million) than the $32.7 million that was estimated. Both Project Macer and Project Guild were effectively designed, managed and delivered, with their objectives of cost savings and transitioning the AFP workforce at airports to fully sworn officers being achieved. With the exception of Queensland, agreements have been reached with states and territories to allow AFP officers to be sworn in as special constables or Recognised Law Enforcement Officers (in NSW). Further, the six-year program to provide purpose built accommodation at each airport is approximately half complete. The program is on time and under budget.

2.60 The legislative framework which applies at the 10 designated airports is complex, involving the application of around 300 pieces of Commonwealth and state/territory legislation. The AFP has sought to mitigate the risks associated with officers applying a dual regime through a range of measures including training and guidance, legislative amendments and swearing AFP officers in as special constables of the relevant jurisdiction. However,

substantial residual risks remain and, as a consequence, the AFP is planning to review the legislative framework in 2014 in the light of experience and if necessary, make recommendations for reform to government.

2.61 Notwithstanding any review of the present legislative framework, the AFP will need to continue to operate under the existing framework for some time to come. The arrangements for state and territory police forces to provide formal training to AFP officers are presently less than satisfactory, with significant numbers of officers having received no formal training, even though they are using state and territory legislation on a daily basis in conducting their duties. Further, there is inconsistency between jurisdictions as to the duration of the training being provided. Responsibility for these matters rests with the various state and territory police forces. The ANAO considers there would be benefits in the AFP approaching the state and territory police forces to seek their agreement to jointly determine the appropriate content, duration and frequency of training courses, following an assessment of the training requirements.

Recommendation No.1

2.62 To enable AFP officers to maintain appropriate knowledge of state and territory legislative requirements, the ANAO recommends that the AFP, in consultation with the relevant state and territory police force, reviews the content, duration and frequency of the legislative training courses.

Agency response

2.63 *The AFP agrees and accepts the recommendation and continues to work closely with State/Territory law enforcement to develop the most comprehensive training packages for each airport, ensuring AFP members have the required knowledge to undertake the investigation of respective State/Territory offences committed in the airport environment.*

3. Management of AFP Airport Operations

This chapter examines the operational arrangements in place for the AFP's Aviation policing function at Australia's designated international airports.

Introduction

3.1 In the airport context, the AFP's primary responsibility is similar to that of a police force in a metropolitan context: to maintain a high−visibility deterrence function and to respond to calls to particular incidents. In addition, at each airport, there are Crime Prevention Liaison Officers[69], bomb appraisal, currency, drug and firearm officers, and explosive detection dog teams. ASOs are also part of the Aviation workforce, but as previously noted, their number and location are classified.

3.2 As outlined in Chapter 2, the AFP has transitioned to an 'All In' model of policing at Australia's designated airports, where all policing activity is undertaken by AFP officers. Key activities include:

- targeting crime in the aviation sector;
- deterring acts of terrorism;
- maintaining a community policing presence and high visibility patrols;
- providing the first response to acts of terrorism and emergency incidents;
- collecting and analysing aviation intelligence; and
- conducting investigations.

3.3 The AFP also provides response and investigative support to a range of other Australian and state and territory government agencies in the discharge of their functions. For example:

- where the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service detects illegal drugs being imported by a passenger, the AFP will respond and

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69   Crime Prevention Liaison Officers work with airport stakeholders on crime prevention initiatives.

take the suspect and the drugs into custody pending further investigation;

- if a serious crime against state or territory legislation (such as a serious assault) has been committed, the AFP will take control of the crime scene, take any suspects into custody and gather relevant evidence before handing the matter over to the state or territory police force for further investigation; and

- where an arriving passenger has been refused entry into Australia by officers of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection and is required to leave the country, the AFP assists as required.

3.4 The ANAO examined the management arrangements put in place by the AFP to effectively discharge its airport policing functions. Particular attention was given to the following areas:

- organisational arrangements;

- strategic and operational planning;

- threat and risk assessments; and

- intelligence support.

Organisational arrangements

3.5 Overall control and responsibility for the AFP is exercised by the Commissioner, who is supported by three Deputy Commissioners and the Chief Operating Officer. The National Manager Aviation (NMA) is an SES Band 2 officer reporting to the Deputy Commissioner, National Security. Routine tasking and direction is delegated to the Manager Aviation.

3.6 The AFP uses a decentralised command structure for policing at designated airports, whereby APCs are given significant autonomy with regard to policing of airports and regions, guided by the overall strategic direction that is determined by Aviation headquarters. APCs at the four largest airports (Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney) are SES Band 1 officers. APCs at five of the six smaller airports (Adelaide, Cairns, Canberra, Darwin, and Gold Coast) are AFP Band 9 officers while Hobart has a Band 8 APC. The APCs at the smaller airports report to the NMA through APCs at the four larger airports. The operational command structure is shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1:   Aviation function operational command structure

National Manager
Aviation
(SES 2)

Manager Aviation
(SES 1)

Airports

Cairns APC
(AFP Band 9)

Gold Coast APC
(AFP Band 9)

Brisbane APC
(SES 1)

Adelaide APC
(AFP Band 9)

Hobart APC
(AFP Band 8)

Melbourne APC
(SES 1)

Darwin APC
(AFP Band 9)

Perth APC
(SES 1)

Sydney APC
(SES 1)

Canberra APC
(AFP Band 9)

**Aviation
Headquarters**

National Coordinator
Aviation
(AFP Band 9)

National Coordinator Air
Security Officers
(AFP Band 9)

National Coordinator
Canine Operations
(AFP Band 9)

Coordinator Aviation
Support
(AFP Band 9)

National Coordinator
Logistics and
Infrastructure
(AFP Band 9)

Source: ANAO representation of AFP information.

Management Reporting

3.7 The NMA is responsible for achieving the operational outcomes required of airport policing. As a senior AFP officer, the NMA is a member of several strategic AFP Committees, including:

- Aviation Executive Committee (Chair);

- Finance Committee;

- National Managers' forum;

- National Security Portfolio meeting;

- Strategic Investment Committee; and

- Strategic Leaders' Group.

3.8 The NMA reports to the AFP Executive through the Deputy Commissioner National Security (DCNS). In addition to scheduled fortnightly meetings, the NMA provides the DCNS with oral briefings, written executive briefings and responses to action items arising from committee meetings as required.

3.9 The APCs report to Aviation headquarters through monthly reports. These reports cover various strategic, operational and security issues, including: incidents; canine and bomb appraisal officer activity; time attribution; drug seizures; apprehensions; Regional Rapid Deployment Team (RRDT) activity; investigations and intelligence team activity; and crime analysis.[70] The reports also contain data from the AFP's Operations Coordination Centre (AOCC), the Internal Audit and Business Analysis team, and individual airports. The airports provide other information relevant to each individual airport.

3.10 Monthly reports are also compiled relating to human resource issues. These are known as 'Performance on a Page' reports and they provide information on compliance with aspects such as operational safety (use of force) qualifications, performance development agreements, and time recording. Performance on a Page reports include information on the number

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70 RRDTs deploy from the 10 designated airports from time to time to larger regional domestic airports. The function of RRDTs is to liaise with local state and territory police and the airport owner. Activities which may occur during a deployment include high visibility patrols, firearm and explosives detection checks on passenger luggage or targeted sweeps of airport areas to search for improvised explosive devices.

of staff at each designated airport, annual leave balances and workplace incidents.

Resourcing airport operations

3.11 The AFP's primary resource at designated airports is its staff. The current approved staffing levels for each of the 10 airports is shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Aviation approved staffing levels, June 2013

Airport	Approved staffing level 30 June 2013
Adelaide	48
Brisbane	103
Cairns	45
Canberra	39.5
Darwin	40.5
Gold Coast	45
Hobart	27
Melbourne	104
Perth	83
Sydney	154
Total	**689**

Source: AFP.

3.12 As for other Australian government agencies, the AFP receives an annual appropriation from government in the Budget each year. Within the AFP, the Portfolio Budget Management Committee (PBMC) decides on the allocations to individual business areas and each area is expected to 'live within its means'. This requires forecasting how many Full Time Equivalent (FTE) staff the Aviation function can support for the forthcoming year. At the beginning of Project Macer in July 2010, the Aviation function had calculated that it could afford 782 FTE at the designated airports (across the then 11 airports but not including head office). In August 2011, following PBMC's decision on 2011−12 financial allocations, this figure was revised downwards to 704. In December 2011, the then Government decided to withdraw AFP staff from the Alice Springs airport. As a consequence, the staffing allocation was

further reduced to 689. At November 2013, the Aviation function had 651 staff based at the airports.[71].

3.13   There is presently no resourcing model for objectively determining the relative resourcing levels at individual airports. The AFP advised that, in the past, a number of drivers have been taken into account in determining airport staffing numbers, including the requirement to meet specified response times, airport opening hours and the provisions of the AFP Enterprise Agreement.[72] However, increases or decreases in staffing levels have been largely historical and based on the funds available to the Aviation function.

3.14   Another consideration is responding to incidents within a certain period of time. When a call for AFP assistance is made, it is routed in the first instance to the AOCC.[73] The AOCC triages the call and assigns it a priority, where Priority 1 is an urgent or serious matter (for which the target response time is five to 10 minutes for 90 per cent of incidents), and Priority 4 is non-urgent (which has a target response time of 24 hours).[74] Within this context, an airport's physical and geospatial layout also has an influence on the number of officers required. For example, at Perth airport, there are four terminals located some kilometres apart. If the Priority 1 response time is to be met, it is necessary to have a team (generally two officers) at each terminal. Conversely, at a small airport such as Hobart, with a single terminal, only one team is needed to meet the Priority 1 response time.

3.15   As previously mentioned, during the audit, the AFP advised that it is developing a resourcing model that takes into account relevant factors such as: risk; threat; levels of criminality; passenger movements; aircraft movements and the origin of aircraft; hours of operation as well as airport geospatial data. The implementation of such a model would provide for a more rigorous and transparent approach when allocating resources across airports.

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71   Not including headquarters staff.

72   The AFP's 2012−2016 Enterprise Agreement also sets out the terms of employment and working conditions of all employees. It governs issues such as how long officers can be required to work and minimum rest periods between duty periods.

73   The AOCC is based in Canberra and provides national and international AFP teams with a 24 hour/ seven days a week monitoring, initial response, coordination and communications support service.

74   Target response times for priority incidents are outlined in Table 4.2.

Rostering staff at individual airports

3.16   Due to their proximity to populated areas, three[75] of the 10 airports have a curfew and are effectively closed during that period. Nonetheless, the AFP advised that it maintains a 24 hour presence at all airports except Hobart[76] because of the possibility of undetected intrusion if the airport was completely unattended. Each airport has its own roster designed to accommodate local factors but generally, there are three shifts each of 10 hours duration.

3.17   The AFP advised that one of the factors taken into account in designing its rosters is the number of passengers passing through the airport at various times of the day. Since the number of passengers broadly[77] correlates with the number of aircraft movements, the ANAO obtained details of the policing roster at each airport for a selected day (Monday 2 December 2013) and compared it with publicly available information showing the international and domestic flight arrivals and departures for the same day. The comparison for Sydney airport is shown at Figure 3.2.

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75   Curfews at Sydney, Adelaide and Gold Coast airports are between 11.00pm and 6.00am.

76   Due to the small size of the airport, the AFP have an arrangement with the Tasmania Police who perform regular patrols during periods when there are no flights.

77   It should be remembered that the passenger capacities of aeroplanes varies widely: for example, a Bombardier Dash 8 200 Series as operated by Qantas has a seating capacity of 36, while an Airbus A380 operated by the same airline seats 484.

Figure 3.2: AFP staff on duty compared with flight arrivals and departures, Sydney airport, 2 December 2013

Source: Number of flights: Flightstats.com.au; roster details: AFP.

3.18 Figure 3.2 demonstrates a reasonably close correlation between the number of flights arriving and the number of officers on duty. There are three shifts at Sydney airport (day, afternoon and night), each of 10 hours duration. The two spikes at 05.00 and 14.00 are caused by a one hour handover period between shifts which allows for briefings between shifts and for officers going off duty to have time to complete administrative work (such as filing incident reports). The afternoon and night shifts have an overlap of four hours which results in a relatively high number of officers on duty from 20.00 to 24.00. As noted, the AFP maintains a 24 hour presence at all airports (except Hobart) and the complement of five officers on duty between midnight and 05.00 reflects a small number of officers to provide coverage across the three terminals at Sydney.

3.19 The ANAO's examination of the same information for the other nine airports also showed a clear correlation between police numbers and flight arrivals and departures. The AFP advised that rosters are set for a period of 12 weeks in advance and that it will 'fine tune' the number of officers as necessary based on its analysis of workload as indicated by the numbers of incidents occurring on each shift.

Guidance supporting policing at airports

3.20   In a highly operational environment such as policing, AFP officers require training which is underpinned and supported by appropriate organisational policy and guidance to carry out their duties. Such guidance ranges from orders with which officers are required to comply, such as Commissioner's Orders, to more general guidance materials, such as Practical Guides. Collectively, this guidance is known in the AFP as the Governance Instrument Framework (GIF). The GIF is maintained on an electronic system accessible to all AFP staff and is located on the AFP's intranet, referred to as the Hub. Components of the GIF are summarised in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3.2:   Components of the GIF

Instrument	Comment	Examples of subject matter
Commissioner's Orders (COs)	Made by the Commissioner in accordance with s.39 of the *Australian Federal Police Act 1979*Non-compliance may result in action by Professional Standards. Applies to all AFP appointees.	CO on Professional Standards CO on Operational Safety (previously known as CO on Use of Force)
National Guidelines (NGs)	Applies to all areas of the AFP (where relevant). May contain a compliance obligation but are subordinate to COs.	Managing records Uniform and standards of dress Recruitment and selection Procurement and contracting
Practical Guides (PGs)	Applies to specific areas of the AFP (such as Aviation) and may contain a compliance obligation.	PG on drug handling and storage PG on deaths in aviation PG on Air Security Officer operations
External Agreements	Memoranda of Understanding, Head Agreements, etc between the AFP and an external organisation.	Collaborative working arrangements between state/ territory police and AFP Airport corporations and the AFP for policing at airports

Instrument	Comment	Examples of subject matter
Determinations	Issued by the Commissioner to vary or extend duties and conditions of AFP employment.	Overseas conditions of employment Competency or qualification requirements for members
AFP Policies	Authorised by the Commissioner as high-level business planning statements. AFP Policies set general parameters and directions for other GIF instruments.	Security policy Human Resources Policy Professional standards policy
Commander's Orders	Issued by overseas mission Commanders for international deployments.	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands code of conduct

Source: ANAO analysis.

3.21   The Aviation Governance Team and Aviation Operations decided in March 2013 to improve the AFP's information management and governance framework. Proposed strategies included:

- reviewing the information management policy;

- establishing its own guidance for the use of information management tools, including the Hub, SPOKES[78], the Investigator's Toolkit and PROMIS[79];

- including in non-GIF documents[80] a statement outlining the document's compliance requirements; and

- establishing a working group to ensure currency and accuracy of Aviation-specific information on the Hub.

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78   SPOKES is the AFP's SharePoint Organisational Knowledge Exchange System and is the primary system for sharing information across the agency.

79   PROMIS is the AFP's Police Real-time Online Management Information System and is the primary system for recording and managing operational activity and outcomes.

80   Non-GIF documents (such as aides memoire) have a governance role, but do not form part of the GIF. These documents are intended to provide guidance for officers where the more prescriptive nature of GIF instruments may be less appropriate. Non-GIF documents include Administrative Advices, Station Protocols, and Aides Memoire.

3.22 The AFP advised in November 2013 that it had made progress on this project, but that its completion was dependent upon some changes to IT systems which were underway.

Reviewing GIF Instruments

3.23 GIF instruments are to be reviewed every two years, or sooner if the need arises. The Governance Coordination and Review team sets a regular review cycle, and it is the responsibility of the instrument owner (generally the relevant National Manager) and business area governance teams to review GIF instruments.

3.24 The ANAO reviewed 555 GIF instruments from 22 functions across the AFP.[81] As at May 2013, 254 instruments (45.8 per cent) were overdue for review, with the majority (63.4 per cent) being overdue for review by almost 12 months. These included two Commissioner's Orders. The AFP's National Guideline on the Governance Instrument Framework had been due for review for five months.

Aviation GIF Instruments

3.25 Within the Aviation function, four out of eight Practical Guides and both National Guidelines were up to date.[82] As at August 2013, 13 out of a total 44 external agreements within the Aviation function were overdue for review, including Head Agreements with four state and territory police forces.[83] Of the 55 GIF instruments relating to the Aviation function, 30.9 per cent (17 instruments) were overdue for review.[84] There is scope for the Aviation function to improve the currency of its GIF instruments, as required by the National Guideline on the GIF.

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81   The ANAO examined 12 AFP Policies, 100 National Guidelines, 104 Practical Guides, seven Commissioner's Orders, 21 Determinations, 307 external agreements, and two Commander's Orders.

82   The four Practical Guides overdue for review include two Practical Guides on Project Macer redeployment and lateral recruitment which are now redundant following the completion of Project Macer.

83   The four Head Agreements overdue for review are with the Northern Territory, South Australian, Victorian and Western Australia police forces. Queensland signed a Head Agreement on 24 July 2013. New South Wales has not yet signed a Head Agreement with the AFP.

84   However, the AFP advised that 13 of these instruments were awaiting feedback from, or agreement with, another agency.

Operational committees

3.26 The AFP's operational command structure is supported by a number of internal and external committees. Internal committees comprise senior AFP members who meet regularly to discuss both strategic and operational issues relevant to the AFP's policing function at airports. External committees comprise a range of stakeholders from the aviation community, including industry and government agency representatives, and provide a more general forum to discuss aviation security, policy and operational matters.

Internal committees

3.27 The AFP holds regular formal committee meetings to discuss both strategic and operational issues impacting on the Aviation function. The key meetings are the Aviation Executive Committee, the Aviation Operations Committee and the Aviation Risk Management Committee.[85] The Aviation Executive Committee and the Aviation Operations Committee are held monthly, while the Aviation Risk Management Committee is held at least twice per year. An overview of the role and membership of these committees is outlined in Appendix 3.

3.28 The ANAO examined the minutes of these committees for the 2012–13 year. The Aviation Executive Committee and Aviation Operations Committee were operating as intended, with the minutes for both committees showing that the discussions held were consistent with the role of the committee. For example, key issues covered by the Aviation Executive Committee included Project Macer and Program Jupiter, as well as discussion of policing strategies at airports to manage upcoming events such as the G20 meeting in Brisbane in 2014. Key issues covered in the Aviation Operations Committee included briefings on ongoing investigations and intelligence reports from each of the 10 designated airports. The minutes for each Committee meeting also showed that AFP attendance was as expected and that the meetings were held per the required schedule (monthly).

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85   The Aviation Executive Committee has been held since September 2012. During the Executive Committee meeting on 6 September 2012, it was decided to amalgamate parts of the Aviation Monitoring and Oversight Committee with the Aviation Operations Committee. The Aviation Operations Committee has been in its current format since November 2012.

National aviation security committees

3.29   There are a number of external aviation security forums for airport stakeholders that occur at both a national level (strategic) and local airport level (operational). The Australian Government Transport Security Policy Committee is the key Federal Government committee focused on aviation security. This committee, together with the Aviation Security Advisory Forum, provide relevant government and industry stakeholders with the opportunity to discuss aviation security matters at a national level. The roles of the committees are outlined in Appendix 3.

Airport security committees

3.30   Stakeholders at the local airport level[86] are able to discuss local security issues through the Australian Government Agency Airport Security Committee (AGAASC); the Airport Security Committee; and the Airport Security Consultative Group, which are held at each of the 10 designated airports. These committees provide a forum for information sharing. They also assist in identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities and threats. Discussions focusing on future known events (such as VIP movements or terminal refurbishments) allows resourcing issues to be adjusted. Finally, these committees provide a forum to debrief incidents that have occurred and provide an opportunity to learn lessons and, if necessary, revise standing operating procedures and/or emergency plans and responses. The specified roles of these committees are also outlined in Appendix 3.

3.31   The ANAO examined the 2012–13 minutes from the AGAASC for nine of the designated airports.[87] The AGAASC, chaired by the AFP, is operating as intended, with minutes showing that:

- the discussions held were consistent with the role of the committee and Terms of Reference;

- AFP attends these meetings; and

- the meetings were generally held per the required schedule (quarterly), with two airports not holding regular meetings.[88]

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86   With the exception of Hobart, where there are no other Australian government agencies present.

87   The Australian Government Agency Airport Security Committee is not held at Hobart airport due to the absence of other Commonwealth Government agencies.

3.32 The key issues covered in these committee meetings focused on national aviation security matters, such as laser light interference or media coverage at airports. Government agencies present at AGAASC meetings, such as the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, and DIRD provided high-level briefings on relevant national security and border control issues.

3.33 The ANAO also examined a sample of minutes for 2012–13 for the Airport Security Committee and Airport Security Consultative Group, which are both chaired by the airport owners.[89] For the meeting minutes reviewed, the AFP was well represented and participated in each meeting. Issues discussed at these committee meetings ranged from the AFP reporting on the number of preventative operations and incidents attended, to high-level briefings from airline representatives on changes to the aviation environment. Committee minutes showed that meetings provided a forum for the AFP and external stakeholders to discuss relevant aviation security issues.

Strategic and operational planning

3.34 The AFP undertakes strategic and operational planning agency-wide and for each individual business area within the AFP. At a strategic level, the AFP has a high-level corporate Strategic Plan, while each business area, including Aviation, is required to have a Business Plan. At an operational level, each individual airport is required to have an Airport Action Plan, a Business Continuity Plan, and an Emergency Plan.

Strategic planning

3.35 The AFP's 2012–2015 Strategic Plan is the high level plan which sets the AFP's strategic direction over a three-year period. It broadly outlines the AFP's vision, mission, and core values under the following seven strategic principles:

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88 Darwin airport advised the ANAO that an AGAASC meeting was not held between May 2012 and January 2013 due to the re-alignment of the timing of the AGAASC to be consistent with that of the Australian Government Transport Security Policy Committee. However, this re-alignment was advised in July 2012 and other airports were able to re-align their meetings starting from August 2012. Darwin did not hold an AGAASC in May 2013.

Canberra airport had a gap in AGAASC meetings due to a stakeholder withdrawing and uncertainty over the continuation of the committee. A decision was made in late 2012 to continue to hold the AGAASC at Canberra airport.

89 The sample of minutes for the Airport Security Committee and Airport Security Consultative Group included minutes from Adelaide, Brisbane, Cairns, Gold Coast, Hobart, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney.

- reinvigorate AFP investigations;

- intelligence led, and risk based;

- strengthen stakeholder relationships;

- flexible deployment;

- One AFP, One Corporate;

- eliminate duplication; and

- reduce supplier costs.

3.36   The Strategic Plan is an umbrella document which links to a number of other specific plans and strategies, as shown in Figure 3.3. The ANAO reviewed these documents with respect to the Aviation function.[90]

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90   Figure 3.3 also refers to charters of performance and performance development agreements. These relate to performance agreements and assessments at individual officer level. The ANAO did not examine these agreements.

Figure 3.3:   AFP Strategic Plan 2012–2015

Source: AFP.

Functional Business Plan

3.37   Aviation's Functional Business Plan covers the period 2011–14, but it is reviewed annually. The most recent review took place in July 2013. The Business Plan lists three main goals and four 'additional goals', each with a number of associated strategies. The main goals are:

•   contribute to a safe and secure aviation environment;

- continue to adopt a more coordinated and collaborative approach with the aviation industry, government and community stakeholders to better counter security and criminal threats to the aviation environment; and

- to negotiate, support and assist Commercial Support[91] to formalise leasing agreements with airport owners and developers for long term office and canine accommodation.

3.38 Each goal is linked to one or more of the seven strategic principles in the Strategic Plan as well as to the specific risks outlined in Aviation's Risk Assessment and Treatment Plan (see paragraph 3.61). The Business Plan also assigns responsibility for each goal to specific individuals (such as APCs) or functional areas (such as the Operations Committee).

Operational Planning

Airport Action Plans

3.39 Individual Airport Action Plans reflect the same goals and strategies outlined in the overall Aviation Functional Business Plan. Of the 29 strategies listed in the Functional Business Plan, APCs are responsible for 16. The Airport Action Plans provide an opportunity for APCs to specify 'actions' to achieve the strategies for which they are responsible, although it does not appear mandatory for them to do so (and most[92] had not).

3.40 The Airport Action Plans are used by the APCs to report on their performance against targets set for each of the 16 strategies for which they are responsible. The ANAO's analysis showed that only one airport (Hobart) had failed to provide any performance data against one strategy, although Brisbane, Cairns and Perth airports reported that they were 'on track' to reach their targets for a number of measures without providing any data to support this assertion.

Business continuity planning

3.41 The AFP's approach to business continuity management is outlined in the National Guideline on Business Continuity Management, which forms part of the AFP's overall risk management framework. Under the National

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91 The Commercial Support area of the AFP is responsible for the property operations of the AFP.

92 Brisbane, Cairns, Canberra, Darwin, Gold Coast and Perth.

Guideline, business continuity plans (BCPs) are required to be reviewed, exercised and updated at least every twelve months. The guideline also specifies the minimum requirements for a BCP.[93]

3.42 The ANAO examined the BCPs in place for the 10 designated airports and Aviation headquarters. Overall, the plans meet better practice guidelines and the requirements set out in the National Guideline on Business Continuity Management. At the time of fieldwork, all BCPs were current and had been reviewed at least annually, with 10 of the plans having been reviewed more frequently. The AFP tests the BCPs every six months by conducting hypothetical 'desktop' exercises to test officers' awareness of the plans and to assess how they would respond in a genuine emergency (such as a major gas leak or an aeroplane crash). The ANAO reviewed copies of the post exercise reports for each airport which indicated that officers were aware of their responsibilities in an emergency.

Emergency planning

3.43 As part of the aviation community, the AFP also has a role in the airport owners' emergency plans. Under the *Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998*, aerodromes that are certified by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority are required to establish an aerodrome emergency committee[94] (on which the AFP is represented) and have an emergency plan in place.[95] The emergency plans are activated during an emergency event such as an aircraft crash, sabotage or bomb threat, unlawful seizure, fire, or natural disaster. Each airport has an emergency plan and has established an Airport Emergency Committee, with the committee responsible for establishing, reviewing and maintaining the airport emergency plans.

3.44 The ANAO reviewed the 10 designated airports' emergency plans developed by the airport owners. The plans clearly outline the AFP's role in relation to aviation emergency management and show that the AFP is represented on the Airport Emergency Committees.

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93 Minimum requirements include listing critical business activities, maximum tolerable periods of disruption, minimum staffing requirements, communication approach with stakeholders and recovery checklists.

94 *Aviation Security Regulation* 139.205.

95 *Aviation Security Regulation* 139.210.

Threat and risk assessments

3.45 Threat and risk assessments are particularly important within the aviation context, as the methods employed by criminals, including terrorists, are constantly evolving. From both a global and national perspective, airport security remains a primary concern for Australia, so it is important that threats and risks to airports are regularly assessed. The ANAO examined the AFP's approach to assessing and managing risk in its Aviation function, and the alignment of this approach with threat assessments that have been completed in the aviation security environment more generally.

Threat assessment of airports

3.46 The 10 designated airports are the largest airports in terms of both domestic, international and total passenger numbers. Policing at non-designated security controlled airports is the responsibility of the local state or territory police force (who do not have a permanent presence at these airports but respond on an as needs basis). However, as noted in Chapter 1, neither Canberra nor Hobart airports receive international passengers.[96]

Evolving risk environment

3.47 As the level and type of threat at airports is constantly evolving, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) issues a highly classified Aviation Threat Assessment every two years. DIRD, which has policy responsibility for aviation security, draws upon this assessment to produce an *Aviation Security Risk Context Statement* (RCS).[97] The stated purpose of the RCS is to:

> Provide threat information for aviation and air cargo supply chain industry participants to consider when they are undertaking security planning, risk assessments and subsequently developing transport security programs for their operations in accordance with the *Aviation Transport Security Act 2004*.

3.48 The most recent RCS identifies one of the more likely risk events to be an improvised explosive device or armed assault against the front of house (FoH) area of an airport.[98] The Statement also noted that 'FoH areas are often

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96 Canberra last received international passengers in August 2004; Hobart in October 1998.

97 *Aviation Security Risk Context Statements* were produced in December 2005, February 2009, December 2010 and February 2013.

98 'Front of house' refers to non-screened, publicly accessible areas of airport terminals and their surrounds.

crowded with travellers, airport employees and members of the public, and unlike aircraft and airside areas, are accessible without screening and without the need to purchase a ticket, making them particularly vulnerable to a terrorist attack with catastrophic consequences.'[99]

3.49   In December 2009, the then Government released a White Paper on National Aviation Policy.[100] The Paper also highlighted the risks associated with the publicly accessible FoH airport areas.

3.50   The RCS and the White Paper noted that receiving international passengers may not be the only factor affecting an airport's attractiveness as a potential terrorist target. Larger domestic airports often have crowded FoH areas and could potentially be attractive as a terrorist target. In this context, the ANAO examined the extent to which the assessment of risks had been taken into account in decisions to locate, and maintain, an AFP presence at particular Australian airports.

Designating airports

3.51   The explanatory memorandum to the *Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005*, which define which airports are designated airports, stated that they were to be 'Alice Springs, Cairns, Coolangatta[101] and the capital cities of each State and Territory'[102], but did not explain the basis on which those airports were selected.

3.52   On 21 September 2005, the then Prime Minister issued a press statement advising that the Government had considered the recommendations of the [Wheeler] report and accepted the thrust of all the recommendations. Recommendation V of the review was that:

> …criteria be established to determine under what conditions an airport should become or cease to be a Counter-Terrorist First Response airport[103], and that the Department of Transport and Regional Services be required to review CTFR airports and the major non-CTFR airports on a regular basis and at least

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99 The Statement refers to terrorist attacks against front of house areas at Domodedovo (2011), Glasgow (2007), Soekarno-Hatta (2003), Los Angeles (2002), Rome (1988) and Vienna (1988).

100 *Flight Path to the Future: National Aviation Policy White Paper,* December 2009.

101 Coolangatta airport is now known as Gold Coast airport.

102 A decision was made in December 2011 by the then Government to withdraw the AFP from Alice Springs airport.

103 The Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler DL, *An Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing for the Government of Australia*, September 2005, pp xvii and 58.

once every three years so as to determine whether their classification is appropriate.

3.53   During the audit, DIRD advised the ANAO that development of the criteria envisaged in the Wheeler review had proved difficult and that 'no-one has been able to come up with a definitive set of criteria'. In April 2006, the then Minister for Justice and Customs proposed that the location of police resources should be informed by a risk assessment rather than static criteria. The then Government agreed and decided that:

- the determination of which airports require AFP resources be informed by a risk assessment by DIRD, to be reviewed in the light of the biennial ASIO aviation threat assessment;

- that if the assessment indicated a need for a change in the location of police resources, the transport and customs Ministers would jointly bring forward a proposal in the annual budget context; and

- that at that time, there was no requirement to increase the AFP presence at any additional airports.

3.54   DIRD advised the ANAO that it considers that the RCSs constitute the type of risk assessment contemplated by the then Government in April 2006. However, the RCSs do not address the issue of which airports require AFP resources. DIRD further advised that it had considered all available material and concluded that there was no basis upon which to bring forward a submission to government to recommend a change to where AFP resources are located. However, the agency could not provide any documentation to support this analysis or the basis for the RCSs. DIRD also advised that 'the monitoring of changing patterns in aviation services [such as the establishment of a new major airport] is ongoing work for this department'.

3.55   Notwithstanding the then Government's April 2006 decision that the location of police resources should be 'informed by a risk assessment rather than static criteria', DIRD proceeded with the development of an Airport Classification Assessment Tool (ACAT) in parallel with the RCS. The ACAT is a spreadsheet-based assessment tool[104] which assessed each of Australia's top 30 airports based on passenger movements. Each airport was assessed for

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104   The original tool was developed in 2006 by a firm of consultants.

vulnerability to a number of forms of terrorist attack[105] against various aspects of each airport's layout and drew upon intelligence reporting provided by ASIO.

3.56 The work to prepare the ACAT, which involved both the AFP and DIRD, was substantial. The AFP and DIRD provided assistance to each of the 30 airports in the preparation of a questionnaire and detailed analysis by DIRD using the purpose-designed tool. Using a weighting system, an 'Airport Inherent Threat Rating' was calculated for each airport. The Project Completion Report confirmed that seven of the 10 airports at which the AFP was located were assessed as posing the highest inherent risk. However, the report identified some anomalies in relation to certain smaller domestic airports with two 'key implications for the current airport policing arrangements':

- there is no risk-based justification for the exclusion of Townsville from current airport policing arrangements, given that its threat score is comparable to that of Cairns and Darwin; and

- if Hobart is to continue to host a policing presence based on its risk profile then Newcastle, Avalon and Rockhampton airports should also be considered for inclusion in these arrangements, given that they received significantly higher threat scores.

3.57 The ACAT was the subject of high level correspondence between the AFP and DIRD and its finalisation was anticipated in discussions with central government agencies. Ultimately, in January 2011, the Executive Director of the Office of Transport Security within DIRD wrote to the NMA at the AFP enclosing a copy of the Project Completion Report, noting that:

> I expect this report could play an important part in discussions between our two agencies regarding any future Government decisions related to security regulated airports that may require a policing presence.

3.58 In September 2013, DIRD advised that the ACAT was now considered to have 'no official status'. In any case, since 2011, DIRD has not sought to incorporate the ACAT in decision making processes relating to which airports should, on a risk basis, have an AFP presence. The AFP advised that in the absence of advice from DIRD that the ACAT had official status, the AFP did

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105 Vehicle-based improvised explosive device, person-borne improvised explosive device, armed assault, stand-off attack, chemical, biological and radiological attack, hijack and sabotage.

not consider that it could use the ACAT to assist with decisions about the allocation of staff at the 10 currently designated airports. The ANAO considers that the ACAT could, subject to further refinement and finalisation, have provided a useful internal management tool by which to assess the inherent risk of individual airports, as a complement to the higher level RCS. It would also assist as an input to the resourcing model which the AFP is developing.

The AFP's Risk Management Framework

3.59 There are a number of documents which outline the AFP's risk management framework and provide guidance and assistance. These include:

- the Commissioner's Risk Management Policy Statement;

- the National Guideline on Risk Management (which is currently under review);

- the AFP Risk Assessment and Treatment Plan template—which provides for a consistent approach to risk assessments across the agency;

- the AFP Risk Management User Guide—which provides step-by-step guidance to staff on undertaking the risk management process.

3.60 Within the AFP, risk management is undertaken at a number of levels. At the organisational level, there is a Strategic Risk Profile (SRP), endorsed by the Strategic Leaders Group. The SRP is an assessment of the AFP's high level strategic risks and includes existing risk controls and identifies further treatments to reduce the strategic risk levels. The SRP, which was last reviewed in April 2013, outlines risks under five categories: safety and wellbeing of AFP employees; operational outcomes; support capability; reputation; and business continuity.

3.61 Each business area within the AFP is required to have its own Risk Assessment and Treatment Plan (RATP). The Aviation function's RATP, which was last updated in October 2012:

- identifies 14 separate risks and their sources[106];

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106 Examples of risks include a reduced capacity to deliver a proactive counter terrorist first response and community policing capability, a failure to contribute to safety aboard aircraft and a failure to adequately deal with state based offences and public order responses.

- describes the possible impact of the risks;

- lists existing controls over the identified risks; and

- outlines proposed treatment of the risk.

3.62   The RATP cross references its identified risks with the higher level risks in the SRP. The responsibility for treatment of the risks outlined in the RATP rests with the Aviation Risk Management Committee, which is chaired by the Manager, Aviation and includes the APCs from the four largest airports. The Committee monitors and reviews alignment between the Aviation function's RATP, Business Plan and the AFP's SRP. The Committee reports quarterly to the NMA on risk management. The major risks to the 10 designated airports identified by the AFP's Aviation function include:

- reduced capacity to deliver CTFR and community policing functions;

- failure to deliver competent and qualified sworn members with the requisite knowledge, both Commonwealth and state and territory, to perform the policing at airport function;

- failure to adequately deal with state-based offences and public order notices; and

- inability to coordinate the Joint Airport Investigations Teams at a national level.

Transport Security Program risk context statements

3.63   As noted in paragraph 1.4, operators of security controlled airports (including the 10 designated airports) are required to prepare and submit a Transport Security Program (TSP) to the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development for approval. ASR 2.09(a) requires operators to include in the TSP a 'statement outlining the local security risk context of the airport, including consideration of its location and seasonal and operational factors'. The ANAO obtained a copy of these statements for each airport from DIRD and confirmed that they had been submitted as required by ASR 2.09(a).

Intelligence support

3.64 The Wheeler and Beale reviews identified intelligence and information sharing as critical in the aviation context. In particular, the Wheeler review stated:

> The present system of information sharing in and around aviation security is completely inadequate for the demands of our time.

3.65 Since the Wheeler and Beale reviews were completed in 2005 and 2009 respectively, potential threats within the aviation context have further evolved. Acts of terrorism have become de-territorialised, making it difficult to predict when or where a terrorist attack may occur.[107] As previously noted, airports can also be focal points for non-terrorist illegal activity, such as the importation of illicit drugs and other prohibited items, with consequential links to serious and organised crime both internationally and domestically. Further, retailers at airports are vulnerable to lower-level crime, such as theft and shoplifting. It is important in this context that intelligence informs internal and external decision making, and improves aviation security. Consequently, the ANAO examined the intelligence support available to the Aviation function and the information sharing arrangements with state and territory police forces.

Aviation Intelligence

3.66 The AFP has defined intelligence as 'a product derived from adding value to information to provide insight and influence decision making'. The Intelligence function within the AFP provides intelligence support to all operational areas, including the Aviation function. It also provides intelligence products to a range of external agencies such as other law enforcement bodies.

3.67 The Aviation Intelligence group located in AFP headquarters provides strategic, operational and tactical intelligence support on issues relating to national security, organised crime and community crime in the aviation sector. Intelligence is also provided by intelligence staff who are outposted to Joint Airport Intelligence Groups (JAIGs) located at each of the 10 designated airports. The functions of the JAIGs are further discussed in paragraphs 3.70 to 3.77.

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107   *Counter Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia, Protecting Our Community,* Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010 p. 7.

3.68 Within the AFP, there are three categories of intelligence and intelligence products. A summary of these categories and the number of each type of report produced in 2012−13 is shown in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3:   AFP aviation intelligence report categories and number 2012−13

Category	Product	Number produced in 2012−13
Strategic	**Strategic Intelligence Report:** a product that influences high level decision making and can be both informative and predictive. Strategic intelligence also provides a contextual framework for operational activities.	0
Operational	**Operational Intelligence Report:** a product that influences operational managers in making effective decisions regarding resource allocation and prioritisation. It provides targeting opportunities and identifies convergences between operations. Operational intelligence also supports strategic intelligence by identifying criminal trends.	41
Tactical	**Tactical Intelligence Report**: a product that influences case−specific decision making at the team level.	43

Source: AFP.

3.69 The ANAO examined a sample of reports from each of the three categories. The reports covered a range of topics such as a strategic crime assessment of the designated airports and a specific security vulnerability identified at one airport which was circulated to ascertain if the same vulnerability existed at other airports. In the ANAO's view, the content was topical and timely.

Joint Airport Intelligence Groups

3.70 The function of the JAIGs is to provide:

- operational intelligence support to Joint Airport Investigations Teams (JAITs)[108] through target development and assessments of high level criminality at airports;

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108   Joint Airport Investigations Teams (JAITs) complement the functions of JAIGs by providing a specific investigations capacity targeting serious and organised crime in the aviation sector.

- collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of tactical level security and crime information and intelligence products as they affect the Aviation function, the aviation sector, airports and their environs (including their surrounds and the airstream connecting the airport); and

- tactical intelligence support to airport uniformed operational police and security intelligence support to the CTFR function.

3.71 JAIGs (and JAITs) were originally established in 2005 following the Wheeler review.[109] It was intended that, in addition to AFP intelligence staff, they would include permanent representatives from the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service and the local state or territory police force.[110] The purpose for having state and territory police represented on the JAIGs and JAITs was that those officers would be able to access their police databases and allow 'fusion' of intelligence from both the Commonwealth and the states and territories. Pursuant to the 2005 agreement of the Council of Australian Governments (see paragraph 1.12), state and territory police forces would provide two officers for each of the five JAITS and one officer for each of the 10 JAIGs.

3.72 In 2009, the Beale review found that JAITs and JAIGs were 'highly valuable' and were 'important facilitators of State−Commonwealth law enforcement coordination in the airport environment'. However, during this audit, the ANAO was advised that not all state and territory police forces had maintained a consistent presence on the JAIT and JAIG in their state. The ANAO sought information on the actual number of state/territory police supplied during 2012−13. This is shown in Table 3.4.

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109   JAITs are located at the five biggest airports (Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney): JAIGs are at all airports.

110   Representatives from the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, the Australian Crime Commission, the Department of Agriculture (responsible for quarantine matters), the Department of Immigration and Border Protection and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation also provide representatives as necessary.

Table 3.4:   **JAIGs and JAITs: number of state/territory officers seconded (full time equivalent), 2012−13**

Airport	JAIG (commitment: one officer)	JAIT (commitment: two officers)
Adelaide	1	0
Brisbane	0.5[1]	2
Cairns	0	Not applicable
Canberra	Not applicable	Not applicable
Darwin	0.9[2]	Not applicable
Gold Coast	1	Not applicable
Hobart	1	Not applicable
Melbourne	1	2
Perth	0.1[3]	0
Sydney	0	0
NOTE 1: Queensland Police supplied one officer for six of the 12 months. NOTE 2: Northern Territory Police supplied one officer for 11 of the 12 months. NOTE 3: Western Australia Police supplied one officer for one of the 12 months.		

Source: AFP

3.73   Table 3.4 shows that with respect to JAIGS, only four of 10 state/territory police forces have fully met the commitment and with respect to JAITS, only two state/territory police forces have met their commitment. Of note is that Sydney airport, the largest airport, has not been represented on either the JAIT or the JAIG during 2012−13. The AFP advised that there were a number of reasons that had been given by state/territory police forces for not providing officers. In some cases, previous written agreements had lapsed when state/territory officers returned to their 'home' police forces during Project Macer and new arrangements had not been made. The AFP advised that APCs at those airports that did not have a consistent state/territory police representation from time to time raised the issue with their counterparts. In one case, the state police force had advised that it could not provide officers due to staff shortages. The absence of state/territory police officers from JAITs and JAIGs impedes access to real-time information from state and territory police databases and reduces opportunities for law enforcement collaboration in the airport environment.

Joint Aviation Intelligence Groups' support to aviation operations

3.74   Every two weeks, the Aviation Intelligence group in AFP headquarters compiles a Fortnightly Capacity and Significant Operations (FCSO) report.

This report summarises the current activity and staffing levels of all 10 JAIGs and recent significant achievements. For the forthcoming fortnight, the report summarises expected operational support, target development and major intelligence projects on hand, current operational priorities and intelligence products due for release. The ANAO reviewed these reports for the period 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013 in order to assess the range and types of intelligence support that the JAIGs provide to aviation operations.

3.75 The reports showed a wide range of intelligence support to the Aviation function. Examples included:

• an analysis of information from an airport owner about owners of vehicles observed in non-public areas of airport;

• an investigation into an aviation industry employee who received multiple substantial funds transfers from overseas;

• assistance to state police through examination of CCTV of arriving Persons of Interest in state police investigation of a serious crime;

• research into individual names and addresses which were found in the baggage of a person arrested for importing illicit drugs; and

• liaison with Customs to arrange for examination of six passengers whose tickets were purchased with a stolen credit card.

3.76 The ANAO's analysis of the 2012–13 Fortnightly Capacity and Significant Operations reports showed that there were 49 instances where intelligence activity led directly to police action, including either an arrest or the issue of a summons or caution.

3.77 A range of other documents are also produced by Aviation Intelligence. These include:

• intelligence briefs prepared for the Aviation Security Advisory Forum, the Australian Government Agency Airport Security Committee meeting and the Airport Security Committee;

• photographs of persons of interest which are distributed to all airports;

• the Aviation function's contribution to the 2013 AFP Annual Intelligence Assessment; and

• briefs on possible emerging aviation crime and/or security issues (such as, for example, images of a folding knife resembling a credit card which was found in a passenger's wallet).

Client satisfaction with Intelligence

3.78 Aviation Intelligence supplies its products to both internal AFP clients and to a number of external agencies, including state and territory police forces, other law enforcement agencies (such as the Australian Crime Commission) and airport owners and operators. All strategic, operational and tactical intelligence reports contain an evaluation sheet which readers of the reports are requested to complete and return to Intelligence. The AFP advised that in practice, it receives very few completed evaluation sheets but this practice does provide a mechanism for clients to provide feedback about the value of the reports.

3.79 Each year, the AFP also commissions a market research organisation to survey some 800 of the AFP's external clients to assess their level of satisfaction with a range of the AFP's services, including Intelligence. In the 2013 survey, 91 per cent of the 34 entities that responded to the survey stated that they were either satisfied or very satisfied with the services provided to them by Aviation Intelligence. This was the same result as for the Intelligence function as a whole.

Crime mapping

3.80 Aviation Intelligence is presently developing a crime mapping initiative for airports. This initiative uses advanced interactive mapping software to map all policing incidents which occur at airports on a geospatial map of the airport. Related software, Crime Profiler, allows information on crime patterns at airports to be analysed to assist in the more effective deployment of resources and identification of crime 'hotspots'.

Conclusion

3.81 The organisational arrangements underpinning airport policing are sound, with the decentralised approach providing APCs with autonomy for the policing of airports and regions. The AFP's regular involvement in a number of external aviation committees provides the AFP with stakeholder views and a broader perspective on aviation security issues. Internal reporting structures are in place, with formal monthly internal management committee meetings allowing the Aviation Executive to have an understanding of the issues arising in the aviation environment and across all airports. The AFP Strategic Plan, the Functional Business Plan and Airport Action Plans are broadly aligned, although some airport plans were incomplete in some

respects at the time of audit. Similarly, the risk management framework within the AFP is well documented.

3.82   The 10 airports at which the AFP maintains a presence were initially designated by government in 2005. DIRD considers that, notwithstanding the evolution in the aviation risk environment, the overall threat level has not changed and there is no basis to seek a change to the location of AFP resources. However, the basis of these decisions, which were made in the context of the preparation of the agency's *Aviation Security Risk Context Statements*, have not been documented. Further, despite developing a detailed threat assessment tool for individual airports, neither DIRD nor the AFP has sought to use this tool as a complement to the higher level RCS to inform internal decision making processes about which airports, on a risk basis, should have an AFP presence and the resources deployed at those airports.

3.83   There are currently 689 officers deployed to the 10 designated airports. Although a number of factors are considered when determining the resourcing at each airport, the inherent risks presented by each airport, including passenger and aircraft movements and the level of criminality, are not explicitly taken into account. It is timely that the AFP completes and implements its proposed resourcing model that takes these factors, as well as threat levels, origin of aircraft, hours of airport operation and airport geospatial data into account, providing a more disciplined approach to the allocation of resources across airports.

3.84   The role of Intelligence in airport policing is well articulated and intelligence staff are embedded in JAIGs at each airport. The Intelligence function produces a range of useful strategic, operational and tactical intelligence products which relate to the AFP's counter terrorism, serious and organised crime and community policing roles at the airports. There is evidence that the work of the JAIGs leads to practical outcomes, including arrests, summonses and cautions.

4. The Aviation Function's Performance

This chapter examines the measurement and reporting of the AFP's performance in policing Australia's designated airports. Workload indicators, complaints, incidents, apprehensions and arrests are discussed as well as the key performance indicators used to measure the AFP's performance.

Introduction

4.1   Australian government agencies, including the AFP, have reported on their performance since at least the mid 1980s. Performance reporting requirements have evolved over time, but the purpose remains the same: to allow the Parliament, the public and agency stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of an agency's operations and how public funds are being used to achieve legislative requirements and government policy objectives. Within the AFP, the Aviation function's objective is that it 'will prevent and respond to crime at major airports by providing an AFP sworn police capability to perform a Counter Terrorist First Response and community policing role'.

4.2   A key part of the Aviation function's community policing role is to respond to incidents as and when they occur at airports. While an incident may not always lead to a specific outcome, more serious incidents may result in a person being apprehended or arrested. The AFP records incidents and their outcomes and the analysis of this information serves to provide a picture of the AFP's operational tempo at the 10 designated airports.

4.3   The ANAO examined trends in the Aviation function's workload indicators and statistics and its performance against existing KPIs. The views of key stakeholders were also canvassed and the complaints received about AFP officers at airports examined.

Workload indicators and statistics

4.4 An incident generally occurs when a call has been made to the AOCC[111] and an officer is tasked to respond.[112] Incidents can vary from relatively minor matters to the most serious matters such as assault or a death. An incident may have a variety of different outcomes, one of which is apprehension, where the person or persons involved are interviewed to establish the circumstances of the incident. An apprehension can also have a variety of outcomes, ranging from no further action being taken, to arrest where an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has occurred.[113]

4.5 As with all areas of the AFP, the Aviation function records all incidents, apprehensions and arrests occurring at airports. Table 4.1 summarises the number of incidents, apprehensions and arrests for each of the 10 airports for the three years from 2010–11 to 2012–13.

Table 4.1: **Incidents, apprehensions and arrests at designated airports for the period July 2010 to June 2013**

Airport	Incidents	Apprehensions	Arrests
Adelaide	3 911	647	83
Brisbane	9 248	911	173
Cairns	1 813	578	38
Canberra	3 435	150	14
Darwin	2 942	494	63
Gold Coast	2 092	264	41
Hobart	1 233	796	19
Melbourne	17 213	1 077	217
Perth	6 687	526	81

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111 When the AOCC (located in Canberra) receives a report of an incident, the time of the call is automatically recorded. The AOCC operator refers the nature and location of the incident (and its priority rating from 1 (most urgent) to 4 (least urgent)) by radio to an officer at the airport. When the officer arrives 'on scene', he or she reports this to the AOCC where the time is again automatically recorded. This allows the time taken for every incident to be accurately recorded.

112 Officers may also encounter incidents in the course of patrolling. If such an incident requires recording in PROMIS, officers will make contemporaneous notes and are then required to make an entry into PROMIS. Officers can exercise discretion as to whether a matter requires recording.

113 Although the AFP has temporary holding facilities at each airport, these are not suitable for use for more than a limited period of time. Under arrangements with each state and territory, the AFP will transfer arrested persons to a watch house in the local jurisdiction for detention while decisions are made about charging and bail.

| Airport	Incidents	Apprehensions	Arrests
Sydney	14 863	2 421	206
Total	**63 437**	**7 864**	**935**

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

Incidents

Incident types

4.6   Each incident recorded in PROMIS is classified according to one of 71 pre-determined incident types. These can vary from the most serious, such as a death (of which there were 29 recorded for the 10 airports for the three year period) to relatively trivial, such as assisting a member of the public with directions. Figure 4.1 shows the 10 most common incident types at the airports between 2010–11 and 2012–13.

**Figure 4.1:   Top 10 incident types at designated airports for the period July 2010 to June 2013**

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

4.7   The 45 406 'top 10' incidents shown in Figure 4.1 account for almost 72 per cent of all recorded incidents for the three year period July 2010 to June 2013. 'Unattended item' and 'assist police/agency/public' were the top two incident types at seven of the 10 airports.[114]

Incident priorities

4.8   As noted earlier, when a call requiring a police response is received by AOCC, it is assigned a priority rating, with Priority One requiring an urgent response. Figure 4.2 shows the proportions of Priority One, Two, Three and Four incidents at each airport.

Figure 4.2:   Proportion of incidents by priority rating at designated airports for the period July 2010 to June 2013

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

4.9   As might be expected, Priority One incidents comprise a relatively smaller proportion than less urgent incidents. The proportion of Priority One incidents was broadly consistent across the 10 airports, with the exception of Cairns (14.3 per cent), where they were markedly higher than the national

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114   The top two incident types at Canberra, Perth and Sydney airports were 'prohibited item' and 'assist police'.

average of 5.6 per cent.[115] The ANAO also examined the top 10 incident types for Priority One incidents (Figure 4.3).

4.10 The types of Priority One incidents are generally consistent with being of a more serious nature, with 91.4 per cent of the top 10 Priority One alerts involving a response to an alarm. The AFP advised that alarms generally are triggered by private security contractors who operate the screening points and may involve a possible detection of a prohibited item or a passenger who has caused a disturbance.

Figure 4.3:   Top 10 Priority One incidents at designated airports for the period July 2010 to June 2013

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

NOTE: 1. A masterminder alarm is a computer generated alarm monitoring system located in the AOCC.
   2. CBR means chemical, biological or radioactive material.

Incident trends

4.11 Figure 4.4 shows the trend in the number of incidents at the 10 airports over the period. There is a noticeable peak in the December/January period each year which coincides with increased passenger numbers at that time of

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115 The AFP advised that since AFP officers at Cairns airport cannot apply Queensland state legislation, there is a larger number of incidents relating to matters covered by Commonwealth legislation, such as breaches of sterile areas, which are typically accorded a higher priority.

year. Overall, the number of incidents has increased slightly from 21 023 in 2010–11 to 22 378 in 2012–13.

Figure 4.4:   Monthly trend in the number of incidents at designated airports for the period July 2010 to June 2013

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

4.12   There has been significantly more variation in the trend in incident numbers at individual airports. The number of incidents increased at five of the 10 airports (Brisbane, Cairns, Darwin, Gold Coast and Sydney) and decreased at the remainder. The most significant change was at the Gold Coast airport, where the number of incidents increased by 113.9 per cent from 452 in 2010–11 to 967 in 2012–13.[116] The AFP was unable to explain this increase.

Apprehensions

4.13   There were 7377 apprehensions at the 10 designated airports during the period 2010–11 to 2012–13. People are generally apprehended for further questioning where an officer believes that an offence has been committed and, as previously noted, an apprehension may have a variety of outcomes,

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116   At the Gold Coast, the largest increases in incident types were 'Assist police/agency/public' (which increased 214.6 per cent from 82 in 2010–11 to 258 in 2012–13) and 'Disturbance – minor' (which increased from 239.3 per cent from 28 in 2010–11 to 95 in 2012–13).

including arrest or no further action being taken. Across the 10 airports, there were 7864 apprehension outcomes.[117]

4.14 As discussed, nationally, there has been a small increase in the number of incidents over the three years 2010–11 to 2012–13. In relation to apprehensions, however, there has been a small decrease over the same period (from 2928 in 2010–11 to 2441 in 2012–13). This trend is shown in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5: Monthly trend in the number of apprehensions at designated 10 airports for the period July 2010 to June 2013

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

Arrests

4.15 In the period 2010–11 to 2012–13, 935 people were arrested for a total of 1422 offences (reflecting the fact that a person may be arrested for a number of offences). Of these arrests, 329 (35.4 per cent) were made under Commonwealth legislation and 599 (64.6 per cent) were made under state/territory legislation.[118] Of the arrests under Commonwealth legislation,

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117 The most common apprehensions were cautions (2860), arrest (1422), infringement notice (1243) and summons to appear in court (920). These four outcomes accounted for 78.6 per cent of all apprehension outcomes.

118 Seven arrests included in the AFP data did not specify whether they were made under Commonwealth or state/territory legislation.

126 (38.3 per cent) were for matters relating to aviation or aircraft security[119] and 118 (35.9 per cent) were for matters relating to prohibited imports or exports.[120] Of the 599 arrests made under state and territory legislation, the most common types of offences for which arrests were made were for theft (109 (18.2 per cent)) and intoxication (82 (13.7 per cent)).

Arrest trends

4.16 Figure 4.6 shows the number of arrests at the 10 airports for the period 2010–11 to 2012–13. There is significant variability from month to month in the number of arrests at the 10 airports. However, over the three year period, the number of arrests increased by 42.6 per cent from 272 in 2010–11 to 388 in 2012–13.[121]

Figure 4.6:   Monthly trend in the number of arrests at designated airports for the period July 2010 to June 2013

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

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119   These included 20 arrests for 'offensive/disorderly behaviour in an aircraft', 16 arrests for 'assaulting crew', 16 arrests for 'obstruct/hinder/intimidate/resist Commonwealth official', 10 arrests for 'enter airside area without permission' and 10 arrests for 'threat/statement to commit act of unlawful interference with aviation'.

120   One hundred and twelve of these arrests related to drugs or drug precursors.

121   The AFP reports the numbers of incidents and arrests in its annual reports. There are small variations between the data contained in those reports and the data reported here, primarily due to the fact that data contained in PROMIS may be updated and revised. However, the AFP advised that as a result of the audit, it had identified an error in the number of arrests reported in its 2010–11 annual report (the figure reported was 471 but should have been 293). In accordance with requirements for annual reports, the AFP advised that it will issue an erratum in its next annual report.

4.17 In summary, the AFP collects a large range of workload indicators and statistics. Detailed analysis of this information (such as incident, apprehension and arrest types and frequency) could be used by the AFP to guide decisions on staffing allocations at and between airports and to refine strategies or develop new approaches to address emerging issues.

Key Performance Indicators

4.18 Since the mid 1980s, the Australian Government has introduced budgetary and reporting mechanisms designed to, among other things, allow key stakeholders to better understand government operations and how public funds are being used to achieve government policy objectives. These models use Key Performance Indicators as a way of measuring how well the deliverables have contributed to an outcome.

The Aviation function's KPIs

4.19 As previously discussed in Chapter 1, prior to the government's acceptance of the Wheeler review in 2005, the AFP's involvement in airport policing was limited to providing CTFR, as part of the Protection function. Aviation was established as a separate functional unit in 2005−06. Between 2005−06 and 2008−09, the Aviation function's KPIs varied from year to year, making analysis of performance across this period difficult.[122]

4.20 Table 4.2 outlines the Aviation function's current KPIs, targets and results for the years 2009−10 to 2012−13.

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122   For example, in 2006–07, the number of 'new cases' was reported but was not reported in 2007–08. The 'number of resource hours delivered' was reported in 2007–08 but was not reported in following years. In any event, measures such as these are either a measure of resource input or a simple activity measurement and were not linked to a specific target.

Table 4.2:   Aviation function KPIs, targets and results 2009−10 to 2012−13

Key Performance Indicator	2009−10 Target/result	2010−11 Target/result	2011−12 Target/result	2012−13 Target/result
1. Level of community confidence in the contribution of the AFP to aviation law enforcement and security (per cent)	70/76	75/77	75/82	75/86
2. Proportion of resources used to undertake proactive and intelligence-led counter-terrorism, crime management, public order and first response operations (per cent)	70/84	70/93	70/95	70/90
3. Response to aviation law enforcement and/or security incidents in accordance with priority response times (per cent):				
Priority One: within five minutes	75/81	75/83	75/82	75/85
within 10 minutes	90/95	90/97	90/97	90/97
Priority Two: within 15 minutes	75/91	75/92	75/94	75/92
within 20 minutes	90/96	90/96	90/97	90/95
Priority Three: within 90 minutes	75/99	75/99	75/100	75/99
within 120 minutes	90/100	90/99	90/100	90/100
Priority Four: within 24 hours	90/100	90/100	90/100	90/100
NOTE 1. Shaded numbers indicate where result was less than previous year.				

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data.

4.21   Table 4.2 shows that for a number of KPIs, the result achieved has shown a small decrease over the previous year. However, the result has consistently exceeded the target for all KPIs for each of the four years shown. These figures would suggest that, despite the reduction in airport staffing levels following the introduction of the 'All In' model, the Aviation function has been able to meet its KPIs.

4.22 In the ANAO's assessment, KPIs One and Three are appropriate.[123] However, KPI Two is not readily understandable. The AFP advised that this KPI measures the proportion of time devoted to patrol activity as opposed to responding to specific incidents. While this information may be of use to the AFP as a work flow management tool, it is more a measure of activity rather than a measure of police effectiveness.

4.23 When assessed overall, KPIs should allow for the assessment of a program. The ANAO considers that the Aviation function's KPIs do not fully meet this expectation. For example, while KPIs One and Three include a measure of the AFP's response to crime, none of the measures assess the AFP's crime prevention initiatives, which forms part of the overall program objective.

Review of KPIs

4.24 The AFP advised in September 2013 that the Aviation function's KPIs have not been reviewed since 2008. However, during the course of the audit, the AFP's Policy and Governance area commenced an AFP-wide Performance Framework Reform project aimed at identifying 'a suite of KPIs that measure contemporary and emerging organisational outcomes to government, business area contributions to AFP deliverables and sustainable, effective and efficient service delivery'. This review is to be conducted in three stages between July 2013 and May 2015, with the first stage, revising current KPIs, to be completed by April 2014.

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123 This assessment is based on an assessment of the relevance, reliability and completeness of the KPIs. These criteria were developed by the ANAO to assist in its statutory power to undertake audits of the appropriateness of agencies' KPIs and their reporting against those indicators.

Relationships with stakeholders

4.25 In discharging its functions at airports, the AFP is required to interact with a wide range of stakeholders. The Aviation function's ability to develop and maintain effective relationships, particularly with key stakeholders, is also seen as an indicator of its effectiveness. Key stakeholders include: Australian, state and territory government agencies; aviation services providers, retail outlets, airlines, airport owners/operators and the general public.

Surveys of stakeholders

4.26 Each year, the AFP commissions market research organisations to undertake surveys of its stakeholders. One survey, the Business Satisfaction Survey, covers all areas of the AFP (including the Aviation function). The other, the Airport Consumer Confidence Survey, surveys members of the travelling public.

Business Satisfaction Survey

4.27 The 2013 Business Satisfaction Survey included the Aviation function's clients from each of the 10 airports as well as an assessment of the performance of the Aviation function as a whole. The AFP provided the market research organisation with a list of 261 potential respondents out of a total of 83 organisations.[124] In relation to airport-specific respondents, there were 116 respondents across the 10 airports. Of those respondents, 96 per cent stated that they were satisfied or very satisfied with their dealings with the AFP. In relation to the Aviation function as a whole, 95 per cent of 133 respondents stated that they were satisfied or very satisfied.

Airport Consumer Confidence Survey

4.28 The Airport Consumer Confidence Survey involves interviewing approximately 2000 domestic or international travellers at the six largest airports.[125] The 'headline' overall satisfaction indicator has increased in each of the last three years (from 77 per cent in 2011 to 86 per cent in 2013). Of the

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124 These included Australian and state/territory government agencies (including all police forces), all airport operators, a number of airlines, airport security screening companies and a number of other companies involved in the aviation industry.

125 Adelaide, Brisbane, Canberra, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney.

remaining measures[126], there were slight decreases in two for 2012, although all figures have been consistently high over the 2011 to 2013 period.

ANAO consultations with key stakeholders

4.29 Among the AFP's stakeholders, two of the most important in relation to day to day operations are the airport operators and the state/territory police forces. The ANAO wrote to seven state/territory police forces[127] and the operators of the 10 airports seeking their views and comments on the effectiveness of their relationships with the AFP. During the fieldwork phase of the audit, the ANAO also interviewed representatives of the airport operators in Sydney, Canberra, Brisbane, Melbourne, the Gold Coast and Darwin and state/territory police forces in New South Wales, Queensland and the Northern Territory.

4.30 All seven state/territory police forces stated that they had good working relationships and did not identify any significant operational, jurisdictional, legislative or other impediments to effective policing at airports.

4.31 Similarly, the six airport operators with whom the ANAO met reported that they had effective working relationships with the AFP. However, three operators stated that they did not have a clear understanding of the Aviation function's strategy for airport policing. For example, two airport operators stated that they had on occasion observed AFP officers conducting roadworthiness checks on vehicles in airport car parks or conducting random breath tests on airport access roads and did not understand how this was relevant to airport security.

4.32 The AFP has developed an 'Australian Federal Police Aviation Doctrine' which contains a section entitled 'Strategies for enhancing aviation security and preventing and defeating crime'. This section identifies the types of criminal threats and critical points at airports and sets out a number of prevention, response and special operations that may be conducted. The Doctrine was originally produced for internal use within the AFP. In the light of the feedback provided by airport operators, the ANAO considers that

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126 These were the percentage who: were aware that the AFP are present at all international airports; saw an AFP officer on the day of the survey or on a previous visit; felt that their safety and security is being looked after; felt that the AFP presence deters crime; and believed that the AFP is doing a professional job.

127 Not including the Australian Capital Territory, where the AFP provides policing services.

circulation of this document among key stakeholders would assist them to better understand how the AFP's activities at airports contribute to both aviation security and to detection and prevention of various types of crime. The AFP advised that it would update the doctrine to reflect the 'All In' model and circulate it to appropriate stakeholders.

Potential impact of the proposed cost recovery on relationships with stakeholders

4.33 In the 2012–13 Budget, the then Government announced its intention to recover costs associated with community policing at the designated airports. The measure was estimated to generate revenue of $118.1 million over the period 2013–14 to 2015–16 and it was anticipated that the method of recovery would be from the 10 airport operators based on the number of passenger movements through each airport. In the event, legislation giving effect to the measure was not introduced before the Parliament was prorogued on 5 August 2013 prior to the 2013 election.[128]

4.34 A number of airport operators advised the ANAO that they strongly opposed the proposed cost recovery measure and the ANAO also received correspondence on airport operators' behalf from the Australian Airports Association (AAA).[129] The AAA advised that if airport operators are to be expected to contribute to the cost of airport policing, they would expect to have some input into issues such as the level of police resources at airports and the types of activities officers undertake. Through the AAA, airport operators expressed the view that they would wish to enter into a service level agreement (including how AFP functions are performed and measured) with the AFP to address these issues. The AFP advised the ANAO that it was aware of these views, but 'does not see the need for service level agreements to be implemented as our performance is measured by Government and relates to the entire security footprint at the airport not just the community policing facet'.

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128 At the time of audit, the new Government has not announced whether it intends to proceed with the measure.

129 The AAA's website states that 'The Australian Airports Association (AAA) is the national voice for Australian Airports that represents the interests of over 250 airports and aerodromes across Australia, from regional landing strips to major international gateway airports'.

4.35 Any decision to adopt a cost recovery approach for community policing at designated airports would be a matter for government and the Parliament.

Complaints against police

4.36 Part V of the *AFP Act 1979* (the Act) deals with AFP professional standards and AFP conduct and practices issues. The Act provides for four categories of conduct issues: Category One (the least serious) to Category 4 (corruption). Categories One to Three are investigated by the AFP while Category 4 issues are referred to the Australian Commissioner for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI).[130]

4.37 All complaints received by the AFP are referred initially to a unit within the AFP known as Professional Standards (PRS).[131] Category One and Two conduct issues are referred to a Complaint Management Team (CMT) within the functional area from which the complaint arose. The CMT is required to 'investigate, resolve and apply outcomes' of complaints and report the result back to PRS. Category Three issues are investigated by the PRS.

4.38 A single complaint may include more than one conduct issue. The AFP provided the ANAO with data about the number of complaints and conduct issues relating to the Aviation function for the last three financial years (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3: **Complaints and conduct issues, 10 airports 2010−11 to 2012−13**

Year	Complaints	Conduct issues
2010−11	57	118
2011−12	47	83
2012−13	36	62
Total	**140**	**263**

Source: AFP.

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130   The ACLEI may investigate Category 4 issues itself or refer them back to the AFP for investigation.

131   Complaints received from members of the public make up approximately half of complaints received. However, AFP officers are required to report other officers who they believe may have contravened the AFP's professional standards and these make up the balance of complaints received.

4.39 Table 4.3 shows that from 2010−11 to 2012−13, there has been a significant drop in the number of both complaints (36.8 per cent) and conduct issues (47.5 per cent). The number of complaints in 2012−13 equates to approximately one complaint per 900 000 passengers.[132]

4.40 For the 69 established conduct issues finalised in 2012−13, the AFP provided details about the nature of these issues where there was more than one issue during the 2012−13 year. These are shown in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4: Most common established conduct issues of finalised complaints 2012−13

Conduct issue	Number established
Fail to comply with direction or procedure[1]	18
Information misuse	8
Discourtesy	7
Inappropriate behaviour/conduct	6
Property accounting failure	5
Fail to record or report	5
Inappropriate behaviour/conduct (serious in nature)	3
Driving misconduct	3
Criminal conduct	2
Total	**57[2]**

NOTE
1. 'Fail to comply with direction or procedure' is one where the 'complainant' is another AFP officer, since a member of the public is not able to give a police officer a direction nor require him or her to comply with a procedure.
2. Twelve instances where there was only one conduct issue established are not included here.

Source: AFP.

4.41 In 2012−13, the overall number of complaints and associated conduct issues arising at airports (36 and 62 respectively) compares favourably with ACT Policing which had 229 complaints and 419 conduct issues in the same year. Considering the type of incidents encountered by the AFP at airports

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132 Under certain circumstances, the AFP may use its discretion not to proceed to investigate certain complaints. These circumstances are set out in section 40TF of the *Australian Federal Police Act 1979* and include where the matter is more than twelve months old, where appropriate action has already been taken or where the complaints is frivolous or vexatious. The delegation not to proceed to investigate is limited to a very small number of senior AFP officers.

(such as intoxicated people or people who are fatigued or under stress), the number of established conduct issues is small.

Ombudsman Review

4.42   Part V of the Act also provides a statutory role for the Commonwealth Ombudsman (who is also the Law Enforcement Ombudsman) to conduct an annual inspection of PRS records. The Ombudsman is required to prepare a report of his review for the Parliament, including his comments as to the comprehensiveness and adequacy of PRS' handling of complaints, to assess whether PRS uses a fair and reasonable complaints process and whether the outcomes of complaints were reasonable.

4.43   The Ombudsman's most recent report covered the period 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013. The Ombudsman reviewed 183 complaints out of 564 (32 per cent) that were finalised during the period. In his report to the Parliament, the Ombudsman reported that:

- there had been an improvement in the number of complaints finalised within timeliness benchmarks compared with previous reviews;

- with one exception, the investigation of Category One, Two and Three complaints were reasonably conducted; and

- the outcomes of all Category One, Two and Three complaints examined were reasonable.

Conclusion

4.44   The AFP collects a wide variety of workload statistics. These show that over the period 2010–11 to 2012–13, the number of incidents at airports each year has increased slightly, while the number of apprehensions has shown a small decrease. However, the number of arrests has increased by 42.6 per cent from 272 in 2010–11 to 388 in 2012–13. There is scope for the AFP to undertake routine analysis of its workload indicator data to assist with decisions about the allocation of resources across airports.

4.45   The AFP's PBSs contain three KPIs for the Aviation function. The Aviation function has consistently met and exceeded the targets for these KPIs. Two of the KPIs (level of community confidence (as measured by an annual survey) and the time taken to respond to incidents of varying urgency) are indicative of Aviation's performance. However, the third (proportion of resources used for patrol activity as distinct from responding to incidents) is

essentially a measurement of activity and is not a measure of effectiveness. The KPIs have not been reviewed since 2008 and the AFP's current Performance Framework Reform project provides an opportunity to review the Aviation function's KPIs and to consider the introduction of measures which better assess the Aviation function's performance (such as its crime prevention activities).

4.46   The Aviation function enjoys generally good relationships with its stakeholders, as demonstrated by the annual surveys it conducts and feedback provided to the ANAO. However, some stakeholders would value a clearer articulation of the AFP's airport policing strategy.

4.47   There has been a reduction in the number of complaints made against AFP officers at airports since the introduction of the 'All In' model. The Law Enforcement Ombudsman's most recent annual review of the AFP's handling of complaints and conduct issues reported that the AFP's investigation of the 183 complaints reviewed had been reasonably conducted and that the outcome of complaints that the Ombudsman examined was reasonable.

Ian McPhee   Canberra ACT

Auditor-General   13 March 2014

Appendices

Appendix 1: Agency Response to the proposed report

AFP
AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

COMMISSIONER

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27 February 2014

Mr Ian McPhee PSM
Auditor-General
Australian National Audit Office
GPO Box 707
CANBERRA ACT 2601

Dear Ian

AUDIT REPORT – POLICING AT AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS

I refer to correspondence from the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) of 29 January 2014 on the proposed audit report on *Policing at Australian International Airports.* The proposed audit report has been provided to the AFP pursuant to sub-section 19(1) of the *Auditor-General Act 1997.*

As highlighted in the report, Australia's airports make a significant contribution to the Australian economy through enabling tourism, freight, commerce and passenger movements, in addition to generating employment across the aviation sector and beyond. With growth in passenger movements forecast to continue, this audit has been timely in ensuring that the AFP's management and delivery of policing services across Australian international airports is efficient and effective.

The AFP welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the ANAO Performance Audit, *Policing at Australian International Airports* and acknowledges the commentary provided within the report. The AFP agrees with the recommendation contained therein and makes the following comment:

> **Recommendation No. 1** – To enable AFP officers to maintain appropriate knowledge of state and territory legislative requirements, the ANAO recommends that the AFP, in consultation with the relevant state and territory police force, reviews the content, duration and frequency of the legislative training courses.
>
> *The AFP agrees and accepts the recommendation and continues to work closely with State / Territory law enforcement to develop the most comprehensive and contemporary training packages for each airport, ensuring AFP members have the required knowledge to undertake the investigation of respective State / Territory related offences committed in the airport environment.*

Should your office require any further assistance in relation to this matter, please contact Commander Michael Chew, Manager Aviation (6131 5764) or Mr Jason Cresswell, Manager Internal Audit and Business Analysis (6131 5719).

Yours sincerely

T. W. Negus APM
Commissioner

2

Sensitive

Australian Government

Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development

Secretary

File Reference: 13/145
Contact: Peter Robertson

Ms Barbara Cass
Group Executive Director
Performance Audit Services Group
Australian National Audit Office
GPO Box 707
CANBERRA ACT 2601

Dear Ms Cass

Comments on the proposed audit report on Policing at Australian International Airports

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft audit report *Policing at Australian International Airports*.

I wish to thank your officers in particular for their assistance during the audit and for taking into account comments provided by Mr Wilson in his letter of 5 November 2013.

I only have one further request – that the report references the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development in place of references to the Office of Transport Security.

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment.

Yours sincerely

Mike Mrdak

27 February 2014

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Website: www.infrastructure.gov.au • ABN 86 267 354 017

This material may contain 'protected information' as defined in Aviation Transport Security Act 2004

Appendix 2: Aviation function committees: role and membership

Table A.1: AFP internal aviation committees

Committee	Role	Membership
Aviation Executive Committee	Reviews and guides strategic direction of the aviation business. Addresses issues from an aviation perspective, not an individual airport perspective. Makes decisions on behalf of the aviation function and is responsible for implementing the decisions. Takes a 'whole of business' approach, including deliberations on operations; staffing numbers; and structure.	National Manager Aviation Manager Aviation (Chair) APCs Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney
Aviation Operations Committee	Coordinates and manages the transactional, administrative, policy, operational and investigative workflows, priorities and resources to assist the Aviation function to meet its operational and strategic business plan outcomes. Provides the chair with relevant advice to support the Chair's accountability to the Aviation Executive Committee.	Manager Aviation (Chair) At a minimum, attendees will be the Chair, two National Coordinators and representation from each airport.
Aviation Risk Management Committee	Identifies strategic and environmental risk management issues. Manages identified and emerging risks. Monitors compliance with AFP National Guideline on Risk Management and reviews risk management processes.	Manager Aviation (Chair) Coordinator Business Support National Coordinator Aviation APCs Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney Team Leader Incident Preparedness Team

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP documentation.

Table A.2:   Aviation security committees and forums—national level

Committee/Forum	Role	Meeting frequency	Membership
Australian Government Transport Security Policy Committee	• Coordinates a whole-of-government approach to development and implementation of transport security policy. • Provides a forum to coordinate consistency and communication in the application of transport security policy. • Considers crime management and policing at airports in developing and implementing transport security policy. • Provides whole-of-government coordination and direction as necessary to the Australian Government Agency Airport Security Committees.	Quarterly	Representatives from various Commonwealth Government Agencies, including AFP.
Aviation Security Advisory Forum	• Shares and discusses views on aviation security matters of an operational, legal, policy and regulatory nature. • Oversees a series of working groups that consider issues relating to identity, cargo, training, technology, legislation and other matters relevant to aviation security.	Quarterly	Senior representatives from industry and government.

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP documentation.

Table A.3:   Aviation security committees and forums—local airport level

Committee/Forum	Role	Meeting frequency	Membership
Australian Government Agency Airport Security Committee (AGAASC) (Chaired by AFP APC)	• Identifies and resolves issues impacting on the local operating environment. • Facilitates information sharing and cooperation amongst local agencies. • Coordinates government agency efforts at designated airports. • Facilitates a clear and consistent understanding of government security policy and cross-portfolio issues.	Quarterly	AFP; Air Services Australia; Australian Security Intelligence Organisation; Customs; Department of Agriculture; Department of Immigration and Border Protection; and Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development.
Airport Security Committee (Chaired by airport corporation)	Discusses threat and risk areas in security and decides upon strategies and actions to address such issues and monitor their implementation.	Quarterly	Members of Australian Government Agency Airport Security Committee and representatives from designated airport operators including airlines, air cargo agents. Members must be security cleared.
Airport Security Consultative Group (Chaired by airport corporation)	Facilitates wide dissemination of airport security information that comes out of the Airport Security Committee.	Quarterly	Members of the Airport Security Committee and other key stakeholders.

Source: ANAO analysis of AFP documentation.

Index

A

Apprehensions, 94, 98
Arrests, 94, 99
Audit criteria, 37
Audit methodology, 37
Aviation Security Regulations 2005, 29
Aviation Transport Security Act 2004, 8, 29, 30, 53, 80

B

Beale Review, 34

C

Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970, 8, 43, 52, 53
Complaints, 23, 107
Counter Terrorist First Response, 8, 15, 16, 30, 93
Crimes Act 1914, 52, 54, 58

G

Governance Instrument Framework, 9, 70, 72

I

Incidents, 94, 95
Intelligence, 8, 9, 21, 80, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 118

J

Joint Airport Intelligence Groups, 86

K

Key Performance Indicators, 19, 22, 101

L

Legislative framework, 50

M

Management Reporting, 65

O

Organisational arrangements, 63

P

planning, 16, 17, 20, 37, 54, 61, 63, 71, 75, 78, 79, 80
PRINCE2, 18, 39, 40, 45
Program Jupiter, 39, 45, 73
Project Guild, 18, 39, 44, 45, 50, 60
Project Macer, 15, 16, 18, 37, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 66, 72, 73, 89

R

Report Structure, 38
risk management, 78, 84, 85, 92, 116

S

stakeholders, 17, 22, 50, 62, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79, 93, 101, 104, 105, 106, 110, 118

T

Threat assessment, 80
training, 17, 18, 19, 25, 39, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 70, 117
Transport Security Program, 9, 30, 85

W

Wheeler Review, 33

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