Project Data Summary Sheet[165]

Project Number	JP 2008 Phase 5A
Project Name	INDIAN OCEAN REGION UHF SATCOM
First Year Reported in the MPR	2010-11
Capability Type	Upgrade
Acquisition Type	MOTS
Capability Manager	Chief of Joint Capabilities
Government 1st Pass Approval	Mar 09
Government 2nd Pass Approval	Mar 09 and Mar 10
Budget at 2nd Pass Approval	$460.9m
Total Approved Budget (Current)	$421.8m
2018–19 Budget	$14.8m
Project Stage	Detailed Design Review
Complexity	ACAT II

Section 1 – Project Summary

1.1 Project Description

This Project will provide the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with twenty 25kHz UHF SATCOM channels on a hosted payload on a commercial Intelsat Satellite (IS-22), to provide coverage of the Indian Ocean Region, and associated ground infrastructure to provide network control.

1.2 Current Status

Cost Performance

In-year

As at **June 2019**, project JP 2008 Phase 5A recorded an underspend of **$5.4m** against a planned FY 201**8**/201**9** Budget of $**14.8**m. This was due to **Prime Contractor** delays in achieving the **Contracted Milestones of Product Baseline Review,** Test Readiness Review **and Head Quarters Northern Command (HQNORCOM) Completion. Subsequently, Stop Payments in accordance with the provisions of the contract were imposed on Viasat.**

Project Financial Assurance Statement

As at **30 June 2019**, project JP 2008 Phase 5A has reviewed the approved scope and budget for those elements required to be delivered by **Defence**. Having reviewed the current financial and contractual obligations of Defence for this project, current known risks and estimated future expenditure, Defence considers, as at the reporting date, there is sufficient budget including contingency remaining for the project to complete against the agreed scope.

Contingency Statement

The project has **not** applied contingency in **this** financial year.

Schedule Performance

In November 2018, Contract Change Proposal 4 (CCP4) was executed between the Commonwealth and Viasat to re-baseline the project schedule and remediate delays caused mostly by Viasat software development. In February 2019, Viasat advised further schedule delays due to persistent software and system security integration issues. Accordingly, achievement of the Product Baseline Review was delayed from February 2019 to July 2019. Viasat forecasts indicate that Final System Acceptance will slip from August 2019 to December 2019, a further 4 months delay. This delay will have flow on impacts for the Network Control System (NCS) Final Material Release (FMR) milestone, which Defence forecasts will be achieved in March 2020. The requirement for US Government certification of the NCS is a key input for Final Operating Capability (FOC), which is forecast by December 2021.

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165 Notice to reader

Forecast dates and Sections: 1.2 (Materiel Capability Delivery Performance), 1.3 (Major Risks and Issues), 4.1 (Measures of Materiel Capability Delivery Performance), and 5 (Major Risks and Issues) are excluded from the scope of the ANAO's review of this Project Data Summary Sheet. Information on the scope of the review is provided in the *Independent Assurance Report* by the Auditor-General in **Part 3** of this report.

Materiel Capability Delivery Performance

The IS-22 satellite is currently meeting all performance measures, including:

- the hosted payload; and
- the Communications System Monitor (CSM).

The NCS contract was executed on 16 May 2012, factoring United States Government (US) requirements of Defense Information Systems Agency and Space and Naval Warfare System Command. The implementation strategy was reported to Government. The Integrated Waveform (IW) NCS is the largest remaining scope to be delivered. Issues with the modification and integration of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) software has been the cause of the delay. **Due to the scale of modification and integration, it is considered developmental for this project.** To partially mitigate the impact of the delay, IW **Phase I** was introduced **in 2016** under an Interim Capability (IC) state. **IW Phase II is forecast for delivery in December 2019**.

Note
Forecast dates and capability assessments are excluded from the scope of the review.

1.3 Project Context

Background

The JP 2008 Phase 5 project was created to provide capability originally planned for under the JP 2008 Phase 4 Next Generation SATCOM Capability project (a result of Phase 4 of the project being re-scoped to provide access to the Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) capability).

UHF SATCOM provides critical tactical radio coverage over the Middle East Area of Operations. Coverage was provided by leases on two commercial satellites and channels loaned by the US Government on an availability basis, which proved to be significantly less than the capability needed by the ADF. This project was also formed on the basis that LEASAT 5 would reach end of life in 2011.

A market survey was conducted in September 2008 to inform cost and capability options for JP 2008 Phase 5A. It revealed an opportunity for Defence to host a payload on an Intelsat commercial satellite over the region in mid-2012. A Restricted Request For Tender was subsequently let to ten companies for the capability in November 2008 and Intelsat was selected as the preferred tenderer.

Combined First and Second pass Government Approval was given in March 2009 and a contract was signed with Intelsat for eight 25 kHz channels and 15 years support in April 2009.

First pass Government approval was given for the project to pursue a Memorandum Of Understanding with the US to provide global UHF SATCOM coverage using US satellites in return for access to ten 25 kHz channels on IS-22. A subsequent Second Pass approval was given in March 2010 which allowed the project to procure the full payload on IS-22.

The IS-22 satellite was successfully launched on 25 March 2012. Materiel Release (MR) for the Indian Ocean Region was achieved on 21 December 2012.

In May 2012, a contract was signed with Viasat US to upgrade the existing NCS. In December 2013, a Contract Change Proposal (CCP1) was executed to re-baseline delivery of Final Materiel Release (FMR) for the NCS to September 2014. A second Contract Change Proposal (CCP2) was executed in December 2015 after Viasat experienced delays in software development. The delay resulted in a further slip to FMR (NCS) milestone which was subsequently rebaselined and delivery forecast for April 2018 (49 months behind schedule). Defence in an attempt to minimise the capability impacts of the JP 2008 Phase 5 project delays introduced two new milestones under CCP2; the NCS Manager Software Readiness Review (NSWRR) and Software Deployment Readiness Review (SDRR).

A third Contract Change Proposal (CCP3) was executed in March 2017 to introduce architectural enhancements to the NCS to align with increased Defence security requirements. In August 2017, delayed provision of GFM and persistent challenges in Viasat's development of the NCS triggered the need to execute a fourth Contract Change Proposal (CCP4). Technical discussions regarding capability delivery resulted in the Contractor providing a revising the schedule in April 2018. The revised schedule highlighted that Viasat was 10 months behind on its software development plan.

The parties entered into negotiations in June 2018 to implement strategies to constrain the delay and establish a new baseline for the project. CCP4 was signed in November 2018 with a forecast contract completion date of   29 August 2019. In February 2019, Viasat experienced further system integration and security issues. This additional delay slipped the contract completion forecast to December 2019.

Uniqueness

The contract with Intelsat is based on the standard ASDEFCON template; however, it required significant tailoring based on input from specialist space lawyers. There are also a number of unique aspects to a contract for a satellite, including the unusual risk profile of the Launch and the corresponding high degree of schedule uncertainty which is typical of a satellite program where product quality requires a high priority.

A UHF Channel Control system was designed and developed to meet the requirements of Australian and US forces.

Major Risks and Issues

There is a risk that further security and integration challenges during site installation may cause further schedule delays. Recent evidence suggests that the NCS is continuing to experience system integration issues which may have been caused by the implementation of security requirement improvements to the system.

There has been an ongoing risk relating to facility issues that may cause delay to project closure related to compliance with current Australian Standards, i.e. electrical distribution. If realised, this risk may cause schedule delay as time would be required to repair non-compliances. The Project Office has been working with sites to remediate non-compliances as they have been identified. Facilities works to refurbish HMAS Stirling have been assessed to no longer have a significant impact to the project delivery schedule. As a result, the severity of this risk has been reduced.

There is a risk that the Project Office may exhaust contingency before the final delivery of the program. The prolonged schedule delay has required the project to retain a contracted workforce beyond original estimates which put significant pressure on project finances. The successful outcomes negotiated under CCP4 has alleviated the pressure and the risk has been reduced to low.

There is a risk that the US Government certification of the NCS system may delay FOC as the certification is subject to US priorities and demand for the services of the test agency. Assessment of the NCS system by the Joint Interoperability and Test Command (JITC) is a US Government requirement for access to US military satellites. Defence has had positive engagements and planning with JITC and will continue to manage the certification requirements with JITC.

There is an emergent risk that Viasat will be delayed in delivering the Integrated Logistics Support products necessary to complete the Support System. The Project Office has taken action to assist Viasat in the development of products in order to mitigate likelihood of this risk occurring.

Other Related Projects and Phases

JP 2008 Phase 3E Advanced SATCOM Terrestrial Infrastructure System: This project provides the supporting ground infrastructure for Satellite Communications including UHF, X and Ka band communication services.

JP 2008 Phase 3F ADF SATCOM Terrestrial Enhancements: This project will provide the mature Australian anchoring capability for the WGS constellation.

JP 2008 Phase 4 Next Generation SATCOM Capability: This project provides WGS capability.

Note
Major risks and issues are excluded from the scope of the review.

Section 2 – Financial Performance

2.1 Project Budget (out-turned) and Expenditure History

Date	Description	$m		Notes
	Project Budget			
Feb 09	Original Approved	4.0		
Apr 09	**Government Initial Second Pass Approval**	269.1		
Apr 10	**Government Subsequent Second Pass Approval**	187.8		1
	Total at Second Pass Approval		**460.9**	
Jun 14	Real Variation – Real Cost Decrease	(18.0)		2
Jul 10	Price Indexation	18.0		3
Jun 19	Exchange Variation	(39.1)		
Jun 19	**Total Budget**		**421.8**	
	Project Expenditure			
Prior to Jul 18	Contract Expenditure – Intelsat	(294.4)		
	Contract Expenditure – Viasat	(28.9)		4
	Other Contract Payments / Internal Expenses	**(38.0)**		**5**
			(361.3)	
FY Jul 18 to **Jun** 19	Contract Expenditure – Viasat	(3.9)		
	Other Contract Payments / Internal Expenses	(5.5)		**6**
			(9.4)	
Jun 19	**Total Expenditure**		**(370.7)**	
Jun 19	**Remaining Budget**		**51.1**	

Notes	
1	The Initial Second Pass Approval was for eight channels and the Subsequent Second Pass Approval was for the remaining channels of the hosted payload.

2	Real Cost Decrease was a result of Project Office negotiating insurance for payload launch into the contract. Separate launch insurance is no longer needed.
3	Up until July 2010, indexation was applied to project budgets on a periodic basis. The cumulative impact of this approach was $16.5m. In addition to this amount, the impact on the project budget as a result of out-turning was a further ($19.6m) having been applied to the remaining life of the project. For this project, that process was incorrectly executed but corrected in January 2012 by returning $30.9m to the budget; $21.1m and $9.9m for impacts of price and exchange variations respectively.
4	This contract was in Stop Payment from July 2014 to December 2015 and subsequently from December 2017 **to November 2018. Stop Payments were triggered again from March 2019 pending achievement of Product Baseline Review and Stirling Completion.**
5	**Other Contract Payments / Internal Expenses of $38.0m comprise of Capital and Operating Expenditure ($19.4m) and expenditure for contracted workforce related contractor support services provided by Nova Defence (18.6m).**
6	**Other Contract Payments / Internal Expenses total $5.5m comprise of other Capital and Operating Expenditure ($0.2m) and expenditure for contracted workforce related contractor support services provided by Nova Defence ($5.3m).**

2.2A In-year Budget Estimate Variance

Estimate PBS $m	Estimate PAES $m	Estimate Final Plan $m	Explanation of Material Movements
20.3	**18.4**	**14.8**	**PBS to PAES**: **Reduction in estimates** due to delay in completing contract milestones. **PAES to Final Plan:** **Reduction in estimates** due to delay in **completing contract milestones**.
Variance $m	**(1.9)**	**(3.6)**	Total Variance ($m): **(5.5)**
Variance %	**(9.4)**	**(19.6)**	Total Variance (%): **(27.1)**

2.2B In-year Budget/Expenditure Variance

Estimate Final Plan $m	Actual $m	Variance $m	Variance Factor	Explanation
		(1.5)	Australian Industry	Figures are as per the end of **June 19**. **Current underspend is due to delay in achieving the Prime Contract milestones, Product Baseline Review**, Test Readiness Review **and Head Quarters Northern Command Completion**. These milestones have slipped to FY 19/20.
		(3.9)	Foreign Industry	
			Early Processes	
			Defence Processes	
			Foreign Government Negotiations/Payments	
			Cost Saving	
			Effort in Support of Operations	
			Additional Government Approvals	
14.8	**9.4**	**(5.4)**	**Total Variance**	
		(36.5)	**% Variance**	

2.3 Details of Project Major Contracts

Contractor	Signature Date	Price at		Type (Price Basis)	Form of Contract	Notes
		Signature $m	30 Jun 19 $m			
Intelsat	Mar 09	202.5	294.4	Firm	ASDEFCON (COMPLEX)	1, 3
Viasat	May 12	36.5	**41.5**	Firm	ASDEFCON (COMPLEX)	2, 3

Notes	
1	The increase in contract price is due to a Contract Change Proposal in 2010 which included 12 additional hosted UHF payload channels and a Communications System Monitor. The contract was transferred to Sustainment in April 2014 **for support of the Communications System Monitor.**
2	CCP2, approved in December 2015, was a nil cost CCP related to the redevelopment of the NCS design. CCP3, approved in March 2017 increased the Viasat contract price. **CCP4 in November 2018, decreased Viasat's contract price due to modifications to the scope of the contract. The scope modifications were implemented to constrain and mitigate further delays to the delivery of the NCS.**
3	Contract value as at 30 June 2019 is based on actual expenditure to 30 June 2019 and remaining commitment at current exchange rates and includes adjustments for indexation (where applicable).

Contractor	Quantities as at		Scope	Notes
	Signature	30 Jun 19		
Intelsat	8	20	25kHz UHF SATCOM channels on IS-22 Hosted Payload	
Viasat	N/A	N/A	NCS comprising three channel control sites, and a Test and Training System for support.	
Major equipment received and quantities to 30 Jun 19				
All 20 channels were delivered successfully on 25 May 2012 and are now operational.				

Project Data Summary Sheets

Section 3 – Schedule Performance

3.1 Design Review Progress

Review	Major System / Platform Variant	Original Planned	Current Planned	Achieved /Forecast	Variance (Months)	Notes
System Requirements	IS-22 Hosted Payload	Jun 09	N/A	Jun 09	0	
	NCS	Aug 12	N/A	Aug 12	0	
Preliminary Design	IS-22 Hosted Payload	Nov 09	N/A	Oct 09	(1)	
	CSM	Oct 10	N/A	Nov 10	1	1
Critical Design	IS-22 Hosted Payload	Sep 10	N/A	Sep 10	0	
	CSM	Mar 11	N/A	Mar 11	0	
	NCS	Mar 13	N/A	Mar 13	0	
Product Baseline Review	NCS	May 17	**Feb 19**	**Jul** 19	**26**	2, 3

|	Notes
1	The review was conducted in October 2010 but approval by the Project Office did not occur until November 2010 due to a number of issues with requirements traceability that required rectification.
2	**This milestone was** re-scheduled under CCP3 signed in March 2017. **The previously contracted NCS Software Readiness milestone was removed as part of CCP4.**
3	**Criteria against the Software Deployment Readiness Review (SDRR) was amended, aligning delivery to a Commercial Of The Shelf (COTS) process. For this reason SDRR was renamed Product Baseline Review. The Product Baseline Review was held in June 2019 with actions forecast to be closed and milestone achieved in July 2019.**

3.2 Contractor Test and Evaluation Progress

Test and Evaluation	Major System / Platform Variant	Original Planned	Current Planned	Achieved /Forecast	Variance (Months)	Notes
System Integration	IS-22 Hosted Payload	Nov 10	N/A	Feb 11	3	1
	CSM	Sep 11	N/A	Oct 11	1	2
	NCS	Nov 13	**Jun 19**	**Nov 19**	**72**	3,**5**,**6**
Acceptance	IS-22 Hosted Payload	Jun 12	N/A	May 12	(1)	
	CSM	Jul 12	N/A	Jun 12	(1)	
	NCS	Mar 14	**Aug 19**	**Dec 19**	**69**	3,4,**5**,**6**

Notes	
1	Delay to commencement of integration was driven by a number of delays in sub system deliveries forming part of the hosted payload including C and Ku antennas (not forming part of this capability) and the UHF antenna.
2	While installation commenced in September 2011, testing to confirm that the installation met requirements was completed in October 2011.
3	In February 2014, Viasat advised the Commonwealth of software design delays affecting the NCS schedule. In February 2015 Viasat advised the Commonwealth of their decision to take on elements of work previously contracted to their sub-contractor and continue the software development in house. Variance is a result of software design delays captured in CCP2 signed in December 2015.
4	In March 2017, the Commonwealth signed CCP3 with Viasat for improvements to the network architecture **and** the inclusion of GFM into the NCS.
5	Delay to NCS System Integration and Acceptance milestones result from delay in delivery of Government Furnished Materiel and Viasat software development at August 2017.
6	**In February 2019, Viasat experienced security and system integration issues which caused further schedule delays to achievement of Final Acceptance for the NCS.**

3.3 Progress Toward Materiel Release and Operational Capability Milestones

Item	Original Planned	Achieved /Forecast	Variance (Months)	Notes
Initial Materiel Release (IMR)	Jul 12	Jul 12	0	
Initial Operational Capability (IOC)	Jul 12	Jul 12	0	
Materiel Release (MR) # 1 (Indian Ocean)	Sep 12	Dec 12	3	1
Operational Capability (Indian Ocean)	Sep 12	**N/A**	**0**	**5**
Final Materiel Release (FMR) # 2 (Network Control System)	Mar 14	**Mar 20**	**72**	2
Final Operational Capability (FOC) (Pacific Ocean)	Jun 18	**Dec 21**	**42**	3, 4, **6**

Notes	
1	MR was claimed on 28 September 2012. Chief Information Officer Group (CIOG) requested additional information which was supplied and MR was achieved on 21 December 2012.
2	Software delays noted in Section 3.2 Note 3 impacted FOC.
3	CIOG will be in a position to acquire agreed UHF capacity from the US as their capacity builds up in the region. A review of project submission documents to Government highlighted the omission of some key milestone dates in the PDSS.
4	FOC (Pacific Ocean) is scheduled to be delayed due to FMR#2 being **re-forecast for achievement by March 2020. The requirement for US Government certification of the NCS, additional security integration and implementation issues and subsequent accreditation are the key contributors to the delay.**
5	FMR IOR was claimed on 28 September 2012. The ADF has been utilising the capability defined under the Operational Capability Indian Ocean (OC IOR) milestone since this time. The absence of an appropriate Technical Regulatory Framework (TRF) has limited the project to fully meet the Material Acquisition Agreement requirements. **FMR IOR is not expected to be declared. This is not expected to have an impact on the achievement of FOC as the project has amalgamated outstanding Operational Capabilities.**
6	**The original FOC date of June 18 did not contemplate the requirement that the Radio Frequency (RF) sub-system of the NCS requires US Government certification to be able to operate autonomously on the US military satellite in the POR. The test effort associated with the US Government certification is subject to priorities that are outside of Defence control. Defence has had positive engagements and planning with the relevant US Government agency and will continue to manage the certification requirements with the US Government. In the interim, the NCS will operate on approved waivers while the system goes through the US Government certification process. FOC is forecast for delivery by December 2021.**

Schedule Status at 30 June 2019

Note
Forecast dates in Section 3 are excluded from the scope of the review.

Section 4 – Materiel Capability Delivery Performance

4.1 Measures of Materiel Capability Delivery Performance

Pie Chart: Percentage Breakdown of Materiel Capability Delivery Performance	
100%	**Green**: The project is currently meeting overall performance requirements which are determined by the hosted payload.
	Amber: N/A
	Red: N/A

Note
This Pie Chart represents Defence's expected capability delivery. Capability assessments and forecast dates are excluded from the scope of the review.

4.2 Constitution of Initial Materiel Release and Final Materiel Release

Item	Explanation	Achievement
Initial Materiel Release (IS-22)	1. In Orbit Test of hosted payload. 2. IMR was achieved in July 2012.	Achieved.
Initial Operational Capability (IS-22)	1. UHF SATCOM services on the IS–22 hosted payload. Quantity of ten 25kHz channels.	Achieved.
Final Materiel Release (IS-22)	1. 20 channels on a UHF Hosted Payload, including Operational Support Services for life-of-type in place, telemetry feed operational and initial training for telemetry feed. 2. CSM and initial training for CSM. 3. FMR IS-22 was achieved in December 2012.	Achieved.
Final Materiel Release (NCS)	1. NCS comprising three channel control sites, and NCS/NCS Manager (IW) training package. 2. FMR NCS is forecast to be achieved in March 2020.	Not yet achieved.
Final Operational Capability	1. Capability State FOC (POR) is the commencement of Australian assured access to 200 kHz in the POR and 50 kHz for the Rest of the World coordinated through the US Government. Forecast delivery is December 2021.	Not yet achieved.

Section 5 – Major Risks and Issues

5.1 Major Project Risks

Identified Risks (risk identified by standard project risk management processes)	
Description	Remedial Action
There is a risk that the Final Capability installations will be delayed at Defence Communication Station – Perth as it has been identified the building's roof is damaged and requires replacement. This may result in delay in delivering the UHF NCS.	The timeframe on which remedial works are required has not been established. However, the severity of the impact to the project has decreased. The Project Office is monitoring the risk.
There is a risk that current facilities are not fit for purpose or do not comply with Building Safety Regulations.	The Project Office established a project safety case report that identified a series of risks for remediation. Activities are progressing to remediate current risks through existing maintenance support Contracts available within Defence.
There is a risk that the project may exhaust contingency funding before delivery of FOC. The prolonged schedule delays has put significant pressure on project finances.	The risk is now assessed as very low post-mitigation. The successful outcomes of CCP4 mean exhausting Contingency funding is unlikely. The project is anticipated to be delivered within the approved budget.
Emergent Risks (risk not previously identified but has emerged during 2018-19)	
There is a risk that the US Government certification of the NCS system may delay FOC as the certification is subject to US Government priorities and demand for the services of the test agency. Assessment of the NCS system by the Joint Interoperability and Test Command is a US Government requirement for access to US military satellites.	The risk has become the focus of the relevant working groups between Defence and the US Government. The risk is being managed by a campaign test plan that has been agreed by all stakeholders and is reviewed monthly.
There is a risk that further security and integration issues may materialise during site installation which may cause further schedule delays.	Viasat has deployed additional engineering resources onto the project in the last seven months. Additionally, Viasat has undertaken testing of the final capability offsite in its Carlsbad facility to further mitigate site installations risks.
There is a risk that there may be delay in Viasat delivering products necessary to complete the Support System. The risk is a consequence of Viasat's workforce limitations and commercial focus to complete Mission System installations.	The Project Office is managing the risk by undertaking some of the supporting works required to develop artefacts to support training. The Project Office will monitor the risk through ongoing reviews.

5.2 Major Project Issues

| Description	Remedial Action
The project has and continues to suffer significant schedule slippage related to the development of NCS software.	Viasat has applied more resources to resolve the issue. Viasat has also been working closely with the Commonwealth to identify ways to recover schedule, i.e. sharing risks in the test and acceptance program. There are also Senior Leadership engagement between Chief Joint Capabilities, Deputy Secretary CASG and Viasat President to ensure Viasat is delivering against the final capability schedule forecasts.
Note	
Major risks and issues in Section 5 are excluded from the scope of the review.	

Section 6 – Project Maturity

6.1 Project Maturity Score and Benchmark

Maturity Score		Attributes							
		Schedule	Cost	Requirement	Technical Understanding	Technical Difficulty	Commercial	Operations and Support	Total
Project Stage	Benchmark	7	7	7	8	7	7	7	50
Detailed Design Review	Project Status	7	9	8	7	8	8	7	54
	Explanation	Project Maturity Scores reflect delivery of the NCS outcomes only. The IS-22 Hosted Payload (Materiel Release 1) was achieved in 2012 and has been supporting UHF SATCOM operations since this time. • **FOC Schedule:** The schedule for the NCS has slipped **42** months. **The confidence level of the latest forecast is high.** • **Cost:** IS-22 and the NCS are on firm fixed price contracts**.** Overall costs **for the NCS have gradually** increased due to additional work required by the Project Office following signing of CCP2 and CCP3. **However, CCP4 has resulted a contract price reduction and increases in project costs are being offset through recovery of compensation from Viasat for the prolonged project delays.** • **Requirement:** IS-22 has been **in operation since 2012. The NCS Interim Capability has been delivered and supporting operations since November 2016. The only remaining project scope is the NCS final capability.** • **Technical Understanding:** Support of the **IS-22** capability has been established with a long term Through Life Support contract established. **Viasat is supporting the NCS Interim Capability until the NCS final capability is delivered.** • **Technical Difficulty: In the last 12 months, the** core software product **has matured significantly. Viasat is vigorously undertaking integration tests in their Carlsbad facility to prove the maturity of the final capability before undertaking site installations.** • **Commercial:** Services are being delivered as contracted.

2017-18 MPR Status - - - -	2018-19 MPR Status - - - -

Section 7 – Lessons Learned

7.1 Key Lessons Learned

Project Lesson	Categories of Systemic Lessons
N/A	N/A

Section 8 – Project Line Management

8.1 Project Line Management as at 30 June 2019

Position	Name
Division Head	Mr Ivan Zlabur
Branch Head	Ms Myra Sefton
Project Director	Ms Michelle Liu-Aves
Project Manager	**Mr Kasey Jordan**

Part 3. Project Data Summary Sheets