The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of DEWR's administration of the JSKA in ensuring its optimal usage in achieving job seeker outcomes. The ANAO examined the following aspects of the JSKA: guidance provided to Job Network Members on its operation; identification and assessment of contract risks; management of contract risks and Job Network Member performance; claims and payments; encouraging economy; and performance information.

Summary

Background

The Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) contributes to the Australian Government's employment outcome of providing efficient and effective labour market assistance. DEWR performs this function by administering programmes to help unemployed people into work or to prepare them for employment.

The Job Network, a national network of non-government organisations, provides services to job seekers under contract to DEWR. The Job Network programme is now in its ninth year of operation. At the time of the audit there were 113 Job Network organisations at 1 154 sites across Australia. In 2005–06, DEWR paid $1 250 million to Job Network Members under Employment Services Contracts for Job Network services.

Evaluation of the Job Network as operating prior to 2003 supported the view that Job Network Members were not investing sufficient funds on goods and services to assist job seekers, especially the most disadvantaged, into work.1 Accordingly, in July 2003, the government introduced a new model of operation for the Job Network, the Active Participation Model.

Consistent with the Active Participation Model, DEWR made changes to the fee structure for Job Network services and introduced a new element, the Job Seeker Account (JSKA). A clear focus of the initial design of the JSKA was to assist the most disadvantaged job seekers.2

Job Seeker Account

Under the JSKA arrangements, Job Network Members are reimbursed by DEWR for goods and services purchased for individual job seekers to help them secure or maintain employment.

Operation of the notional account

DEWR established a notional account for each Job Network site that attracts credits as registered job seekers commence various stages of employment assistance. The amount credited at any stage varies according to the job seeker's level of labour market or locational disadvantage. Individual credits range from $11 for a job seeker registered as unemployed for three months and not considered disadvantaged, through to $1 575 for a job seeker entering Intensive Support customised assistance who is considered to be both Highly Disadvantaged3 and locationally disadvantaged.

Spending of JSKA funds

While credits accumulate to a Job Network site's notional account based on each job seeker's length of unemployment and level of disadvantage, spending of JSKA funds is largely at the discretion of Job Network Members. That is, Job Network Members choose which job seekers they will help using the JSKA, and how much they will spend, up to the limit of the balance of their notional account, irrespective of the amounts credited to the notional account in respect of each job seeker.

In making decisions relating to JSKA expenditure, Job Network Members are guided by DEWR principles and guidelines. These include that JSKA expenditure must reflect a job seeker's individual needs and must be directly related to a job seeker securing an employment outcome or placement in the labour market.

Job Network Members claim reimbursement from DEWR for payments for goods and services through DEWR's computer system, thereby reducing the balance of credits in their notional accounts.

Figure 1 illustrates the process through which a Job Network Member receives reimbursement from DEWR for assistance provided to job seekers.

Figure 1 Accessing JSKA funds

Source: ANAO

JSKA expenditure

From July 2003 to June 2006, DEWR's total JSKA expenditure was $648 million. The five largest JSKA expenditure categories were:

  • employer incentives (29 per cent)—the majority of expenditure in this category was for wage subsidies. Wage subsidies are generally paid to an employer to facilitate the employment of an eligible job seeker. These payments (averaging $2 611 for an individual job seeker) are commonly made at 13 weeks and 26 weeks of employment to align with the periods required to trigger outcome payments from DEWR to Job Network Members;
  • job seeker training (24 per cent)—this may include costs for enrolment in training courses that result in the job seeker obtaining a skill or qualification or for books and equipment essential to or related to a training or educational activity;
  • clothing and equipment (12 per cent)—includes any clothing or equipment purchased for a job seeker for employment–related activities or to facilitate access to employment opportunities;
  • professional services (13 per cent)—includes vocational counselling and rehabilitation; drug, alcohol and mental health counselling; medical services; and marketing job seekers to potential employers (reverse marketing); and
  • transport assistance, fares and petrol (9 per cent)—includes purchasing transport for a job seeker (for example, a bicycle) and costs associated with obtaining transport such as driving lessons, licences, registrations and insurance. It also includes fares and petrol purchased for job seekers for employment or job search related activities.

Verifying JSKA transactions

Approximately one million claims for reimbursement from the JSKA are made each year by almost 10 000 Job Network staff at 1 154 sites across Australia.

The decision on who to help, what to buy and how much to spend using JSKA funds is made by individual Job Network staff members. DEWR, therefore, depends to a large extent on the integrity of Job Network Members to ensure JSKA claims are valid.

The nature of JSKA payments is such that it is difficult to verify the appropriateness of many individual JSKA transactions and more than one third of all items purchased, including clothing and bus tickets, are attractive for personal use and, therefore, subject to a higher level of potential fraud. Verifying such expenditure could require significant administrative effort and is further complicated where services are delivered by an outsourced provider to a third party.

In administering the JSKA, DEWR faces the challenge of balancing the need for assurance that Commonwealth funds have been spent appropriately with the need for a workable and flexible approach that is not overly burdensome for Job Network Members or for DEWR.

Audit objective

The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of DEWR's administration of the JSKA in ensuring its optimal usage in achieving job seeker outcomes. The ANAO examined the following aspects of the JSKA: guidance provided to Job Network Members on its operation; identification and assessment of contract risks; management of contract risks and Job Network Member performance; claims and payments; encouraging economy; and performance information.

Overall audit conclusion

The overall approach taken by DEWR to administer the JSKA is sound. The department has put in place a risk management framework and associated tools, guidance for Job Network Members on eligible claims, a post-claim monitoring regime and an evaluation strategy.

While DEWR's overall approach is appropriate, the ANAO identified three areas where DEWR could strengthen its administration of the JSKA. In particular, the department could:

  • better identify, assess and monitor the specific risks relating to the JSKA (including the potential for fraud) presented by particular Job Network Member organisations and sites;
  • place greater reliance on existing controls around the processes and procedures undertaken by Job Network Members that take effect prior to reimbursement of JSKA claims; and
  • implement and report on DEWR's evaluation strategy.

Identifying, assessing and monitoring specific risks relating to JSKA

DEWR has a structured approach to risk management, both at the departmental level and when managing risks presented by contracted organisations. Under DEWR's National Contract Management Framework, contract risks are defined and applied across all the department's outsourced programmes. Risk assessments are undertaken by DEWR's contract managers for all Job Network Member organisations and sites and these form the basis for DEWR's approach to contract monitoring. Within this framework, the ANAO assessed whether DEWR appropriately identifies and monitors the specific risks relating to the JSKA.

While DEWR contract managers advised the ANAO that a significant proportion of their time was spent monitoring JSKA activity (in recognition of the higher level of risk presented by JSKA payments), DEWR's risk framework does not separately identify risks relating to JSKA at the Job Network Member organisation or site level. This approach relies heavily on the use of appropriate indicators and benchmarks for each of the different elements of the Job Network and on the skills of DEWR contract managers to adequately assess and balance these different elements to arrive at a single risk rating for each Job Network organisation or site risk. Risk mitigation strategies could be better targeted by separately rating JSKA risks, clarifying risk descriptions and improving associated risk indicators and benchmarks.

DEWR could also improve risk assessments for Job Network Member organisations and sites by ensuring that its approach to assessing the likelihood of JSKA risks eventuating is consistent and is documented. This would give DEWR greater assurance that its risk assessments provide an accurate basis for managing JSKA risks at both the organisational and site levels.

DEWR has given considerable priority to monitoring JSKA usage through desktop reviews and site visits. This monitoring could be better targeted at Job Network Member sites that present the highest level of risk. Such an approach would provide DEWR with greater assurance that Job Network Members are complying with DEWR principles and guidelines for using the JSKA. Improvements to DEWR's monitoring regime, informed by revised risk assessments, would provide greater assurance that the one million JSKA transactions that occur each year are legitimate.

Considering placing greater reliance on existing controls around the processes and procedures undertaken by Job Network Members

In circumstances where individual Job Network staff exercise discretion and make judgements in regard to JSKA assistance that have a direct impact on claims against DEWR, the department has a responsibility to make sure that appropriate controls exist and operate effectively.

After providing a JSKA-eligible service, the Job Network Member submits a claim for reimbursement to DEWR. When making a JSKA claim, the individual Job Network staff member must certify that the details provided in the claim are true and correct. DEWR has also put in place preventative measures that require each Job Network Member to comply with DEWR's Employment Services Code of Practice and to implement a fraud control plan.

While DEWR can expect that Job Network Members will have sufficient internal processes and controls to support JSKA claims, by requiring certification and compliance with other contractual requirements, DEWR could obtain greater assurance that the controls underpinning JSKA transactions within Job Network Members are in place and operating effectively.

Some Job Network providers, for instance, have implemented their own internal controls for JSKA expenditure. While the content and quality of these controls vary, they place these particular Job Network Members in a better position to assess, monitor and certify their JSKA-related expenditure.

Given the nature of the expenditure that takes place under the JSKA, the very large number of individual transactions involved, and the large number of individuals with access to undertake JSKA claims, the ANAO considers that DEWR could benefit from an increased focus on overall system integrity. This would include placing greater reliance on selective testing of Job Network Member controls, involving judgement regarding both the areas to be tested and the nature, timing and extent of tests to be performed. Such an approach would give DEWR greater confidence that any significant misuse or fraudulent use of the JSKA will be identified.

As well as providing additional assurance, this approach has the potential to allow DEWR's contract managers to focus their post-claim monitoring activities on higher risk Job Network organisations, that is, Job Network providers that are assessed as having inadequate JSKA controls in place. Currently, DEWR contract managers review the evidence for approximately 2.25 per cent of JSKA transactions. Increasing its emphasis on testing the preventative controls already in place would provide DEWR with the opportunity to consider a more targeted approach to its transaction-based monitoring.

Implementing and reporting on DEWR's evaluation strategy

DEWR undertook a range of evaluation activities relating to the JSKA during the contract period, and published the Jobseeker Account Evaluation Report on its workplace website4 in December 2006. This report seeks to synthesise salient points from this body of research. However, DEWR is yet to complete an evaluation of the Active Participation Model as a whole, and without this broader analysis of the Active Participation Model and of exogenous factors such as macro-economic conditions and the state of the labour market, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which job placements over the first three years of the JSKA can be attributed to use of the JSKA.

Guidance provided to Job Network Members on the operation of the Job Seeker Account (Chapter 2)

Over the three years that the JSKA has been in operation, DEWR has provided considerable guidance to Job Network Members on how they may use the JSKA. This guidance has included additional explanation of the JSKA expenditure principles, changes to what is acceptable under particular categories, the prohibition of certain items of expenditure, and information on what is required to support claims under the JSKA. The effect of the additional guidance has been to make the administration of the JSKA very complex. This complexity has led to many Job Network Members using their own resources to develop guidance for staff that is based on the material available from DEWR, often involving lists of approved and prohibited items. As a result, considerable Job Network Member resources are devoted to determining what is, or is not, allowed under the available guidance.

The ANAO suggests that DEWR make available a streamlined and consolidated version of JSKA guidance on the DEWR secure intranet site for Job Network Members.

The ANAO notes that DEWR recently reviewed the principles and guidance provided to Job Network Members. Revised principles and guidance were posted on the secure intranet site for Job Network Members on 14 November 2006. As this development occurred late in the audit it has not been reviewed by the ANAO.

Identification and assessment of contract risks relating to the Job Seeker Account (Chapter 3)

DEWR's National Contract Management Framework is underpinned by risk assessments of Job Network Member organisations and sites completed by DEWR contract managers, desktop monitoring of data from DEWR's computer application EA3000,5 and site visits.

The department has identified two levels of risk relating to its contracts: organisational risks and site risks. Contract risks are defined and applied across the Job Network and cannot be modified or added to by individual contract or account managers. Organisational risks and site risks apply to all of DEWR's labour market programmes and are classified into four risk families: financial, servicing, performance and compliance.

Identifying JSKA-related risks

The nature of the risk presented by the JSKA to the Commonwealth is different to that for other Job Network payment types such as service fees and outcome fees. This is because many JSKA transactions are difficult to verify and some of the items purchased, such as clothing and bus tickets, are attractive to individuals and, therefore, subject to a higher level of potential fraud. In addition, approximately 15 per cent of JSKA payments are made to related entities of the Job Network Member that decides who to help, what to buy and how much to spend using JSKA funds.

The risks listed in DEWR's Risk Management Module (which are standard for a wide range of DEWR programmes) cover, at a broad level, the range of risks presented by the JSKA: potentially fraudulent use; use not consistent with guidelines; inequitable use; poorly targeted use; and errors in claims. However, because DEWR develops only programme-level risk ratings for each organisation and site delivering a programme, the JSKA, as one element of Job Network services, is not separately rated.

The ANAO found that indicators and benchmarks for the risks most likely to be affected by JSKA usage were either absent or of limited use in assisting contract managers to identify and assess the specific risks presented by the JSKA.

Assessing JSKA risks at the site level

In order to manage the risks presented by the JSKA at the Job Network site level, DEWR assesses the risk level for each of the 1 154 individual Job Network sites. Risk ratings for each site, and for each DEWR programme administered by that site, are recorded electronically in DEWR's Risk Management Module.

The ANAO reviewed the risk ratings for 11 of the 1 154 sites in the Job Network. The sites were jointly selected with DEWR and represent a range of metropolitan and non-metropolitan locations for five organisations in two States (including one large provider and a range of medium and small providers).

The ANAO reviewed site risk ratings relevant to the JSKA for the 11 sites visited. The majority of risks reviewed received a ‘moderate' rating. Five were rated as ‘high' and two as ‘low'. This limited range of ratings is partly due to the fact that all risks relevant to the JSKA are considered to have either moderate or major impacts and, therefore, the lowest overall risk rating that could be achieved based on DEWR's risk rating matrix, is ‘moderate'.

For the 11 sites reviewed, the ANAO found that where the same contract manager was responsible for monitoring multiple sites that were part of the same organisation, risk ratings and commentary were identical across the sites. The ANAO found this practice in the three State/regional offices visited. In some cases, these identical ratings and comments may be valid owing to similar practices in the same organisation impacting on the risk ratings of sites. However, JSKA risk ratings for the 11 sites reviewed by the ANAO were not sufficiently supported with documented analysis to provide confidence that the risk assessments were accurate.

Management of contract risks and Job Network Member performance (Chapter 4)

DEWR has approximately 200 contract managers who monitor the services provided by Job Network Members. Their activities cover all types of DEWR payments made to Job Network Members, including JSKA payments. Contract managers undertake a range of monitoring activities, including desktop reviews of JSKA usage data and reports for each Job Network site (usually monthly) and site visits to check documentation supporting JSKA claims (annually or bi-annually). DEWR also has a quality audit programme and a programme assurance function that assist it to manage contract risks and Job Network Member performance relating to the JSKA.

The ANAO assessed whether DEWR appropriately manages the contract risks relating to the JSKA.

The ANAO found that DEWR's desktop monitoring regime does not focus on monitoring the relevant risk indicators (as set out in DEWR's Risk Management Module) and is not well documented.6 Rather, DEWR's desktop monitoring relies largely on basic data analysis and reviews of standard reports. DEWR contract managers do not have sufficient tools to adequately analyse JSKA data to identify trends in JSKA usage that could lead to discovery of invalid claims or fraudulent activity.

Site visits involve DEWR contract managers reviewing evidence for a small proportion of JSKA transactions on either an annual or bi-annual basis. The ANAO estimated that approximately 2.25 per cent of JSKA transactions are reviewed annually across all sites. DEWR does not collate data on the number of JSKA transactions that are reviewed through its monitoring activities.

While DEWR requires that monitoring activity is recorded in its Risk Management Module, the ANAO found the data did not present a clear picture of when monitoring occurred, what was covered and relevant findings or actions. The data, in its present form is not conducive to management understanding of the extent of monitoring that has actually occurred (across a range of sites and/or organisations).

Where DEWR contract managers identified inappropriate use of the JSKA through monitoring activity, site risk ratings did not always reflect these findings. For example, one Job Network Member reviewed by the ANAO had been found by DEWR to be using post placement support for claim tracking (across three sites) which is in breach of DEWR guidelines and, therefore, an inappropriate use of funds. However, DEWR's likelihood rating for the relevant risk (inappropriate use of funds), was ‘unlikely' therefore the overall risk rating was ‘moderate'.

Overall, the findings of DEWR monitoring activity were not always reflected in site risk assessments and, therefore, in individual site ratings.

With regard to the effectiveness of DEWR's monitoring activities in identifying inappropriate use of funds, a high proportion of recoveries appear to be self-identified by Job Network Members through their own quality processes. DEWR does not record the nature or originator of recovery action.

Job Seeker Account claims and payments (Chapter 5)

The ANAO assessed DEWR's controls framework as it relates to expenditure under the JSKA.

When a Job Network staff member makes a JSKA claim, DEWR requires that individual to certify that the details provided in the claim are true and correct, the activity has been undertaken, any required documentation is available and the purchase was made in accordance with the Employment Services Contract and Job Seeker Account expenditure principles. Contractual arrangements also require each Job Network Member to comply with DEWR's Employment Services Code of Practice and to implement an appropriate fraud control plan.

Job Network Members themselves have instituted a number of controls within their own organisations relating to the JSKA. While the content and quality of these controls vary, they generally involve the use of delegations, approval processes, reconciliations and reviews of claims by compliance officers or audit officers.

However, DEWR does not currently test whether Job Network Members have appropriate controls in place within their own organisations to support the Job Network Members' JSKA certification or to provide assurance that they are complying with the department's code of practice. For example, DEWR does not routinely request and review Job Network Members' fraud control plans.

DEWR relies heavily on transaction-based testing of a relatively small number of JSKA transactions (approximately 2.25 per cent) after claims have been paid. Checking 22 500 claims out of the one million JSKA transactions per year places a limit on DEWR's effectiveness in identifying and combating invalid claims and fraudulent activity. Since the beginning of 2005, DEWR's Investigations Branch has investigated or examined 10 separate instances of fraud, or potential fraud, involving the JSKA: five instances arose from information provided to DEWR by individuals external to DEWR; two were identified by Job Network Members; and three arose from DEWR's own examinations.

Encouraging economy (Chapter 6)

Job Network Members use the JSKA to assist job seekers into sustainable work. Inherent in the design of the JSKA is an incentive for Job Network Members to spend JSKA funds to increase the chances of job seekers gaining sustainable employment. When a job seeker is employed for a period of 13 weeks, the Job Network Member receives an outcome payment; a further payment is made when the job seeker has been employed for 26 weeks. Outcome payments range from a total of $550 for a person unemployed for less than four months to $6 600 for a person unemployed for longer than three years.

The ANAO examined the extent to which DEWR ensures that Job Network Members are using JSKA funds economically, that is, when required to address individual needs in order to assist a job seeker to secure an employment outcome relevant to the labour market.

While Job Network Members are required to comply with DEWR principles and guidelines in order to make a claim from the JSKA, the fact that Job Network Members generally have a considerable notional account balance7 reduces their incentive to economise in their use of the JSKA.

Certain types of JSKA expenditure lead to a direct financial benefit for the Job Network Member and are, therefore, at greater risk of being used when not clearly required (on the basis of individual needs). Examples include where the Job Network Member is the service provider and, therefore, receiving the JSKA payment directly, or where the JSKA expenditure directly contributes to the achievement of an outcome payment (such as in the case of wage subsidies).

Wage subsidies accounted for 38.5 per cent of JSKA expenditure in 2005–06 and have been trending upwards over the contract period. The ANAO found that wage subsidies are often paid to employers at 13 weeks and then at 26 weeks to coincide with the timing of outcome payments to Job Network Members. Provision of a wage subsidy can assist a Job Network Member to achieve an outcome payment in a situation where there is concern that the payment may not otherwise be achieved. This can occur where:

  • a job is unlikely to provide the required hours over the required period; or
  • a job seeker has found employment independently and does not provide the relevant paperwork to the Job Network Member so that an outcome payment can be claimed (providing a wage subsidy maintains contact with the recently employed job seeker and the employer).

ANAO analysis shows that nearly 30 per cent of wage subsidies are provided to job seekers who found their own employment and half8 of wage subsidy dollars are spent on job seekers who are not classified as Highly Disadvantaged9. Approximately $10 million of wage subsidy expenditure in 2005–06 was on job seekers who had been unemployed for less than 12 months and were not classified as Highly Disadvantaged.

Documentation supporting the need for a wage subsidy is generally poor. DEWR requires greater assurance that wage subsidies are being used efficiently and are provided on the basis of individual need for sustainable jobs.

Services provided by Job Network Members for which they receive payment from DEWR through the JSKA include reverse marketing, post-placement support and other additional contacts. The nature of these services (telephone calls and meetings) means that DEWR cannot independently validate that the services claimed were provided. Documentation to support such claims is generally poor. Overall, DEWR requires greater assurance that claims relating to these services are appropriate, that is, that services are being provided on the basis of individual need to assist job seekers to secure and maintain employment.

Performance information (Chapter 7)

The intention of DEWR's Outcome 1: efficient and effective labour market assistance is to make it easier for job seekers to be placed in employment. DEWR intends that the JSKA will contribute to this outcome. However, DEWR's current level of aggregation of performance information, and subsequent reporting, makes it difficult to identify the contribution that the JSKA makes in assisting job seekers to secure and maintain employment, particularly those job seekers who are most disadvantaged.

Policy and programme evaluation goes some way to measuring the contribution of individual public sector initiatives in a cost-effective manner. DEWR's evaluation strategy for the Active Participation Model (of which the JSKA is one element) acknowledges the challenges of evaluating elements of the Job Network, noting that:

[S]eparating out the impact of a programme element from other elements and from the compliance regime poses difficulties, and at the end of the day is probably impossible. One of the major challenges for these studies will be to isolate the effects of the Active Participation Model from those of other policy and of the broader economic changes.

DEWR undertook a range of evaluation activities relating to the JSKA during the contract period, and published the Jobseeker Account Evaluation Report on its workplace internet site in December 2006. This report seeks to synthesise salient points from the body of research relating to the JSKA. DEWR is yet to complete an evaluation of the Active Participation Model as a whole. Without this broader analysis of the Active Participation Model and of exogenous factors such as macro-economic conditions and the state of the labour market, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which job placements over the first three years of the JSKA can be attributed to use of the JSKA.

One of the guiding principles for the JSKA is that expenditure should be based on individual need. The JSKA was designed to help the most disadvantaged. However, in 2005–06, while Job Network Member credits on behalf of Highly Disadvantaged job seekers accounted for 59 per cent of total credits, Highly Disadvantaged job seekers received 44 per cent of the expenditure in that year. Future evaluation activity by DEWR could place a greater focus on whether JSKA use is being guided by the principle that expenditure should be based on individual need, and whether it is meeting the requirements of those job seekers most in need.

The ANAO supports the publication of the Jobseeker Account Evaluation Report and encourages publication of the Active Participation Model evaluation upon completion as it will contribute to an understanding of whether the JSKA has succeeded in:

  • increasing assistance provided to job seekers, particularly the most disadvantaged, to help them secure work; and
  • improving outcomes for those who receive assistance.

DEWR's response to the audit

A detailed response to the audit report was provided by DEWR and is included at Appendix 4. ANAO comment on DEWR's detailed response is also included at Appendix 4. DEWR also provided a summary response as follows:

DEWR's response

The Job Seeker Account (JSKA) is an integral part of Job Network's record success in helping job seekers into sustainable work. The flexibility of JSKA gives JNMs the ability to individually tailor assistance to job seekers – such as assistance with transport, wage subsidies, training or equipment – to successfully assist a job seeker into work.

Since its introduction in July 2003 to December 31 2006 over 800 000 job seekers have received JSKA assistance. Seventy-three per cent of job seekers who were provided with assistance through the JSKA in the last twelve months have been placed into employment.

The Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) welcomes the ANAO's conclusion that the overall approach the department has taken to administer the JSKA is sound. The ANAO has recognised that the department has put in place a risk management framework and associated tools; guidance for Job Network Members on eligible claims; a post-claim monitoring regime and an evaluation strategy. The report also recognises DEWR's structured approach to risk management, both at the departmental level and when managing risks presented by contracted organisations. The ANAO has also recognised the considerable priority that the department gives to monitoring JSKA usage.

The Report makes two recommendations. DEWR agrees in part with the first recommendation and disagrees with the second recommendation. DEWR considers that the costs/risks associated with these disagreed recommendations outweigh the benefits. DEWR is also concerned that some areas of the report do not present findings in an appropriate context. DEWR's response clarifies many aspects of the administration, management and evaluation of the JSKA and provides this context.

Footnotes

1 Under the previous Employment Services Contract (ESC2), any money spent on job seekers (to purchase goods or services) was funded by the Job Network Members themselves.

2 JSKA Fact Sheet, current as at April 2006, available on a DEWR web site, the Employment Services Network (ESN) accessible to Job Network Members.

3 In 2005–06, 33 per cent of eligible job seekers were classified by DEWR as Highly Disadvantaged using DEWR's Job Seeker Classification Instrument.

4 <www.workplace.gov.au>.

5 EA3000 was developed to facilitate implementation of the Active Participation Model in July 2003.

6 While DEWR requires that all desktop monitoring activity is recorded in the Risk Management Module, the ANAO found that this data was unreliable and not able to be easily analysed to provide reports on the type and extent of monitoring across a range of sites or organisations.

7 In June 2006, the balance of the total JSKA notional account was $240.9 million and had been trending upwards during 2006.

8 ANAO analysis of JSKA expenditure data for 2005–06.

9 Level of disadvantage is calculated using the Job Seeker Classification Instrument administered by Centrelink and subject to review by Job Network Members.

10 Reverse marketing refers to Job Network Members contacting targeted employers to market a particular ‘job-ready' job seeker.

11 Evaluation Strategy for the Active Participation Model, DEWR, April 2004, p. 13.

12 <www.workplace.gov.au>.