The regulator performance framework

1.1 Regulations are sets of rules established by government authorities that aim to deliver better economic, social, and environmental outcomes for Australians and businesses.⁷ The Australian Government’s regulator performance framework was first established in 2014. It involved voluntary ‘Statements of Expectations’ (SOE)⁸ and a set of six outcomes-based key performance indicators assessed through annual self-assessment.

1.2 SOE are issued by responsible ministers to a regulator to provide ‘greater clarity about government policies and objectives relevant to the regulator in line with its statutory objectives and the priorities the minister expects it to observe in conducting its operations’. Statements of Intent (SOI) respond to the expectations set out in Ministerial Statements of Expectations, outlining ‘how the regulator intends to meet those expectations including how it will demonstrate progress.’⁹ The importance of publication of SOE was highlighted in 2004: ‘allowing the Parliament and the community to be aware of government’s expectations and the responses by statutory authorities.’¹⁰ Similarly, guidance from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is that defining a regulator’s relationship, responsibilities and lines of accountability through an SOE is ‘central to both external governance arrangements and independence’.¹¹

1.3 In April 2021, the Australian Government was advised by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) that one-third of regulators had a publicly available SOE and that 60 per cent of SOE were more than two years old, with 50 per cent having a responding Regulator Statement of Intent (SOI).¹² To improve this situation, a revised principles and outcomes-based approach to setting expectations for regulator performance was to be adopted. This approach would apply to stand-alone regulators as well as those that administered regulatory functions within policy departments. The key element was a renewed focus on the SOE and responding SOI, to be updated with every: change in minister, regulatory leadership or Commonwealth policy or every two years.

1.4 The regulator performance framework outlines that an SOE and responding SOI ‘should’ be in place and refreshed at least every two years. SOE and SOI are not mandated through for example, the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014 (PGPA Rule).¹³ In this respect, in February 2025, the Department of Finance (Finance), which has stewardship responsibility for the regulator performance framework including issuing Regulator Performance (Resource Management Guide (RMG) 128), advised the ANAO that:

Ultimately, however, ministers and accountable authorities are responsible for identifying and settling the regulatory functions within their responsibilities, and whether a Statement of Expectations is issued to a regulator is a matter for the relevant minister. As such, while Finance will continue to support these activities, it is neither appropriate nor meaningful for Finance to take a compliance role in relation to RMG 128.

1.5 Commencing in 2023–24, regulator performance reporting was required to be incorporated into reporting processes through the corporate plan and annual report (including annual performance statements).

1.6 In March 2025, the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audits commented that:

not having a ministerial statement of expectations or regulator statement of intent in place is clearly not acceptable and goes to the rigour with which an entity performs its regulatory functions and the seriousness with which it takes them.¹⁴

1.7 The Committee recommended (Recommendation 9) that:

the Department of Finance updates the requirements for the Regulator Stocktake to require each entity with regulatory functions to publish a Regulator Statement, on a common template and reviewed annually, that would provide, at a minimum, the following:

• itemised regulatory obligations with reference to legislation
• detail of the regulated population
• the risk-based approach to compliance, including information on how risk is calculated
• the compliance and enforcement process
• the regulatory powers available to the regulator
• offences and penalties under legislation
• regulator measures of impact, and appropriate and robust performance measures.¹⁵

1.8 The Committee also made a recommendation (Recommendation 8) to Finance in relation to its approach to stewardship (similar to a recommendation the Committee had made in June 2024 in the report of its inquiry into probity and ethics in the Australian public sector)¹⁶:

The Committee recommends the Department of Finance develops an approach, including robust metrics, to provide reasonable assurance that the policy framework it administers with regard to regulatory policy, practice and performance is effective in ensuring regulatory systems remain fit-for-purpose. An update is to be provided to the Committee within six months, including timelines to complete this work.¹⁷

Responsibility for regulatory policy and reform

1.9 Until mid-2022, PM&C had responsibility for regulatory policy. In October 2014, PM&C had released the Regulator Performance Framework. Under the revised approach decided upon by the Australian Government in April 2021, PM&C’s key role was to work with ministers and portfolio agencies to update existing SOE and align with the new approach. In July 2021, the October 2014 Regulator Performance Framework document was replaced with the Regulator Performance Guide of July 2021.

1.10 From 1 July 2022¹⁸, stewardship responsibility for regulatory policy and reform (including maintenance of the Australian Government regulator stocktake first undertaken by PM&C) moved to Finance. Finance was provided with $38.2 million in the October 2022–23 Budget for regulatory policy and reform.¹⁹ In the 2023–24 Mid-Year Economic Fiscal Outlook, a further $27.9 million was provided over four years, with $9.4 million per annum ongoing from 2027–28. With the resources it had been provided, Finance identified that it would be able to deliver oversight through a centrally coordinated and driven approach to support entities improve regulatory systems.

1.11 In December 2022 Finance issued RMG 128. It replaced the Regulator Performance Guide of July 2021. RMG 128 was updated in July 2023. Finance has also issued a guidance note for RMG 128. The guidance note sets out that Finance’s role involves ‘supporting ministers, departments and regulators to issue or refresh Ministerial Statements of Expectations for regulators, and corresponding Regulator Statements of Intent’, and that this includes assisting entities to apply the definitions to functions within their remit. The guidance note also provides SOE considerations for different governance models and information on what SOE and SOI should contain.

1.12 In February 2025, Finance advised the ANAO that:

It is important to note that the Government provided funding to Finance for the measure A Revitalised Regulatory Reform Agenda to deliver whole-of-government leadership to modernise Australia’s regulation and ensure it is fit for purpose in the digital era. This is a large and broad-ranging agenda which includes driving priority cross-portfolio regulatory reform priorities for government, such as care sector worker screening, the development of a regulatory reform omnibus legislative package, the revitalisation of the regulatory eco-system, and digital document execution.

The agenda includes supporting and guiding regulatory practice and performance, and uplifting regulatory skills and capability. Within this program of work, Finance provides specific guidance and support to entities by reference to RMG 128, and the development of Statements of Expectations and responding Statements of Intent (SOE/Is). This supports the renewed focus of the guidance and timing of statement renewal agreed … in 2021.

Rationale for undertaking the audit

1.13 Regulation is an important function of the Australian Government and high-quality regulation — whether of the private, not-for-profit or public sector — is important for the protection and effective functioning of the economy, society and the environment. ²⁰ Australian government regulators and those responsible for regulatory functions are expected to have a current SOE and SOI in place. SOE and SOI are a key accountability mechanism to ensure regulators fulfil their statutory objectives in line with government expectations and policy, and provide transparency to regulated parties. This audit provides assurance to the Parliament about this element of the regulator performance framework.

Audit approach

Audit objective, criteria and scope

1.14 The audit objective was to assess the effectiveness of the framework in place to have a regulatory Ministerial SOE and a responding SOI in place.

1.15 To form a conclusion against the objective, the ANAO examined:

• Which functions are subject to Ministerial Statements of Expectations and responding Regulator Statements of Intent?
• What Ministerial Statements of Expectations and responding Regulator Statements of Intent are in place?

Audit methodology

1.16 The audit team:

• examined relevant records held by Finance and met with Finance officials;
• analysed the Australian Government regulator stocktake, Australian Government Organisations Register, the Federal Register of Legislation which includes regulator enabling legislation, the Administrative Arrangements Orders and entity websites and, on the basis of this analysis, obtained input from regulators and entities with regulatory functions; and
• shared the preliminary audit findings with Finance as well as 94 other bodies that were identified as having one or more regulatory functions. A response was received from 62 recipients (including Finance) (individual bodies contacted are set out in Appendix 3).

1.17 The audit was conducted in accordance with ANAO Auditing Standards at a cost to the ANAO of approximately $560,000.

1.18 The team members for this audit were Jocelyn Watts, Katarina Ivanovic-Likic, Tomislav Kesina, Damon Styan, Sharini Arulkumaran, Rowena Thomson, Tracey Bremner and Brian Boyd.

2.1 Regulator Performance (Resource Management Guide (RMG) 128 outlines that Statements of Expectations are issued by the relevant minister to provide clarity about government objectives and policies relevant to the regulator’s functions and how it conducts its operations. The responding Statement of Intent is to outline how the regulator will deliver on government expectations. Visibility of the spread of regulatory functions across Australian Government is intended to be provided through Finance’s Australian Government Regulator Stocktake website. The ANAO examined the identification of regulators and regulatory functions as this is necessary for identifying which entities should have an SOE and SOI and whether these were disclosed on the Regulator stocktake.

How are regulators and regulatory functions identified?

2.2 There is no complete list of Australian Government regulators or regulatory functions. The regulator stocktake published by Finance is the approach taken to identify Australian Government regulators and regulatory functions. The stocktake is incomplete and inaccurate (refer to paragraphs 2.29 to 2.44). The Administrative Arrangements Order does not identify regulatory functions in each portfolio. The list of Commonwealth entities and companies under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) published by Finance does not identify which have regulatory functions. Neither does the Australian Government Organisations Register.

2.3 By way of comparison, the approach in Victoria has been to publish the list of state regulators covered by its SOE framework as an appendix to the document that sets out the framework.²¹ The Victorian framework document states that ministers ‘will’ provide an SOE letter to each listed entity. In New Zealand, legislation requires that all Crown entities produce a statement of performance expectations.²²

2.4 In August 2024, the Department of Finance advised the ANAO that:

The process for identifying whether a statement of expectation and responding statement of intent need to be in place involves the portfolio department considering the regulatory stocktake, the administrative arrangements orders, relevant scheme legislation to consider whether RMG 128 applies. Departments and entities may seek guidance and advice from Regulatory Reform in Department of Finance, internal governance areas or legal advice as appropriate. The department/entity provides their views to Regulatory Reform who consider the views. Regulatory Reform considers the same materials to consider whether RMG 128 applies. If Regulatory Reform has a different opinion to the department/entity we will share that view. The relevant authorised authority is the decision maker.

2.5 The process was not documented for Finance staff in an internal Standard Operating Procedure. Finance had identified the need for a Standard Operating Procedure and advised the ANAO in August 2024 that one was under development. Finance advised the ANAO in February 2025 that it ‘has developed standard operating procedures and policy documents to ensure consistency of practice. These documents will continue to be reviewed for further enhancements.’ The Standard Operating Procedures stated that the approval date was ‘TBC’²³ and identified that two future updates were planned:

• Develop a chapter on assessing whether a Commonwealth entity is a regulator and subject to RMG 128
• Reporting on SOE/SOI published

Definition of ‘regulator’

2.6 The effective implementation of the regulatory performance framework requires appropriate definitions. Finance’s RMG 128 outlines that:

Regulation may be defined as “Any rule endorsed by government where there is an expectation of compliance”. Regulatory functions are exercised across a range of governance arrangements and structures. They may be located within Commonwealth entities not publicly identifiable in their own right as a regulator, and may also hold responsibility for other, non-regulatory functions.²⁴

2.7 This definition was sourced from the former ‘Australian Government Guide to Regulatory Impact Analysis’.²⁵ In September 2022, it was decided to rename the Office of Best Practice Regulation the Office of Impact Analysis (OIA).²⁶ The OIA sits within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and supports entities to develop evidence based impact analysis for policy proposals. The name change to the OIA reflected a refocus from ‘regulation’ to the impact of regulation (particularly new regulation) on people, businesses or community organisations. The OIA is one of eight priorities in the ‘Progressing Australia’s Regulatory Reform Agenda’ (the agenda), for which Finance has overall responsibility.²⁷ In February 2025, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet advised the ANAO that:

The OIA administer Impact Analysis arrangement for any policy proposal or action of government, with an expectation of compliance, that would result in a more than minor change in behaviour or impact for people, businesses, or community organisations. The name change from the Office of Best Practice Regulation to the Office of Impact Analysis (OIA) was to provide a more accurate reflection of the service the OIA provides to government.

2.8 On 12 July 2024, the Australian Government Regulatory Policy, Practice and Performance Framework²⁸ (the framework) was approved by the Assistant Minister to the Prime Minister and Assistant Minister for the Public Service.²⁹ The document supporting the framework sets-out that: ‘Regulations are sets of rules established by government authorities to deliver better economic, social, and environmental outcomes for Australians and businesses’ and that ‘A regulatory system encompasses:

• regulations;
• the regulator, including its tools, processes, resourcing and operations;
• regulatory policymakers, who continuously monitor and reform the system; and
• the regulated community.³⁰

2.9 RMG 128 remains a key element of the framework, with the supporting document setting-out that: ‘In managing regulation, regulators should consult RMG 128 for best practice advice on taking a risk-based and data-driven approach’. RMG 128 has not been updated.

2.10 In relation to applying the definitions in RMG 128, in October 2024 the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) advised the ANAO that ‘the definition of regulatory activity available to entities is limited, broad and quite motherhood in nature’ and ‘more robust guidance to the sector on the application of RMG 128 would assist in ensuring greater consistency in the approach to what regulatory functions require to be specified in the SOE/SOI to provide the right balance between focussing on core functions and reflecting the broader regulatory functions that departments in particular undertake’.

2.11 The Australian Communications and Media Authority advised the ANAO in February 2025 that:

The existing definitions and guidance are drafted from a perspective that all are PGPA Act entities, but this will not always be the case. There will be instances where a statutory office holder is a regulator and accountable to the Minister for their statutory obligations including through the requirement in their establishing legislation to prepare an annual report on their activities (see for example section 183 of the Online Safety Act 2021) but is specified as being an official of another entity for the purposes of the finance law (see for example section 170 of the Online Safety Act 2021 which prescribes the eSafety Commissioner as an official of the ACMA for the purposes of the finance law).

For example, the eSafety Commissioner is Australia’s regulator for online safety but is not a PGPA Act entity. As a result, the entity for PGPA purposes is the ACMA, including all staff supporting the eSafety Commissioner. For the purpose of the Finance Law the eSafety Commissioner, who is an independent statutory officer holder is considered an official of the ACMA. In this case the Chair of the ACMA, as the accountable authority, is responsible for the activities of the statutory office holder as they relate to the PGPA Act including performance, planning and reporting. As a result, the Minister recognises the eSafety Commissioner as a regulator in her own right (and has issued the eSafety Commissioner with a Statement of Expectations (and the eSafety Commissioner has responded with a Regulator Statement of Intent)), but the eSafety Commissioner is not captured in the Regulator Stocktake, the purpose of which is to provide visibility of the spread of regulatory functions across the Australian Government and support greater transparency on the issuing of Ministerial Statements of Expectations (SOE) and Regulator Statements of Intentions (SOI).

2.12 Challenges with the existing definitions under the RMG 128 framework were also reflected in evolving advice from some entities to the ANAO over the course of the audit. For example, in October 2024, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) advised the ANAO that the National Residue Survey was a regulatory function within the meaning of RMG 128. Further advice from the department to the ANAO in February 2025 was that:

the National Residue Survey (NRS) is a voluntary program for residue monitoring that supports other regulatory programs such as those related to exports but is not in itself a regulatory function of the department within the meaning of RMG28 [sic]. Where an industry opts to use the NRS, they are levied to fund the monitoring and compliance costs, the collection of which is then regulated by DAFF under the Primary Industries Levies and Charges Collection Act 2024, which is described in our SOE. However, the activities of the NRS do not impose rules in relation to which there is an expectation of compliance.

Characteristics of regulators

2.13 RMG 128 also sets out that regulatory functions ‘may include’ administering (for example, providing approvals, making operational rules about, handling complaints on), monitoring, promoting compliance with and enforcing regulations. This approach to definitions is less precise than the approach taken in other frameworks for which Finance is responsible:

• the Commonwealth Procurement Rules includes a clear definition of what a procurement ‘is’ as well as identifying transactions that are not a procurement³¹ and
• similarly, the Commonwealth Grants Rules and Principles identifies what a grant ‘is’ as well as identifying ‘arrangements that are taken not to be grants’.³²

2.14 Entity advice to the ANAO reflected the ambiguity within Finance guidance regarding whether one or more of these regulatory characteristics were required for RMG 128 to apply. Regarding this definition, the Department of Health, Disability and Ageing (DHDA) advised the ANAO in November 2024:

We note that under RMG128, regulatory function is defined as any rule endorsed by government where there is an expectation of compliance. Due to its broad definition, there would be countless activities within the department which would be captured by this definition where performance reporting and compliance with RMG128 would not be feasible.

2.15 DHDA further advised the ANAO it considers ‘the department’s activities to have a regulatory function’ if legislation provides the department with investigative powers to investigate a third party and legislation provides the department with powers to enforce the third party to comply. DHDA advised the ANAO that it did not consider the following activities to constitute a regulatory function:

• where the department is given the power to investigate but cannot enforce compliance;
• where the department merely provides advice or education to third parties on matters of compliance; and
• where the department investigates a third party’s conduct with their consent but does not have the power to mandate investigation.

2.16 Later advice from DHDA was that this working definition should be disregarded. February 2025 advice from DHDA to the ANAO was that:

This definition was initially provided to the ANAO to ensure the department aligned with the intent of the audit. The department’s response was subsequently updated following internal consultation with the Best Practice Policy and Regulation Section, Finance Branch. The updated response and the operations of the department aligns with RMG 128.

Law enforcement agencies

2.17 In PM&C’s January 2015 guidance on the coverage of the Regulator Performance Framework, ‘law enforcement agencies as defined by the Crimes Act 1914, such as the Australian Federal Police’ were identified as not subject to the framework.³³

2.18 When the framework was replaced by Regulator Performance Guide of July 2021, it did not include the previous exemptions for a law enforcement agency, a regulator ‘jointly owned by the Commonwealth with other Governments’, or an activity to ‘primarily maintain programme integrity or eligibility’. It stated that:

the application of this Guide is broader than that of the 2014 Regulator Performance Framework, and supports alignment with the Government’s program of work to lift performance, capability and culture across all Commonwealth regulatory functions.

2.19 Notwithstanding this statement, the definition of regulator and regulatory functions did not change from the Regulator Performance Guide of July 2021 to RMG 128. Two law enforcement agencies raised concerns with the ANAO about the application of RMG 128 to them.³⁴

• The Australian Federal Police (AFP) advised the ANAO in October 2024 in relation to its functions under, for example, the Criminal Code Act 1995 that ‘AFP’s role is an enforcement body. AFP’s involvement is not considered a regulatory function within the meaning of the RMG 128.’ Further advice from the Australian Federal Police to the ANAO in February 2025 was that:

The AFP would value a more comprehensive definition of regulatory functions to support clear identification of regulators. We are committed to conducting a review of the AFP’s functions on whether any would constitute regulatory activities once improved definitions are issued by the Department of Finance.

• The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) advised the ANAO in February 2025 that:

the current definition in RMG 128 is overly broad and not aligned with common or practical understanding of government regulation or regulators. While the CDPP does not consider that the office itself meets the current definition, the broad terms encourage the inclusion of non-regulatory entities or functions when performing a high level or cursory analysis.³⁵

Other entity feedback on RMG 128 guidance

2.20 Other entities also advised the ANAO of a lack of clarity in the RMG 128 framework where legislation is administered by more than one agency. For example, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), which has regulatory responsibilities under various Acts without an SOE in place³⁶:

There is likely to be various legislation that are regulatory functions or are administered by more than one agency. There is a lack of clarity in the differences between a regulator and administrators role which may be adding complexity …

2.21 The Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA), which does not have an SOE or SOI in place for its regulatory function (see Table 2.1), referred to the Administrative Arrangement Orders not RMG 128 when advising the ANAO on whether or not it had regulatory functions under four pieces of legislation administered by the portfolio. DVA advised the ANAO that it had no regulatory functions under the four pieces of legislation and that:

Under the Administrative Arrangements Order, the matters dealt with by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs include no reference to ‘regulation’. Where a department has responsibility for regulation, this is expressly stated under the matters dealt with by the department. See, for example, the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (p. 8), the Department of Education (p. 12), the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (p. 14) and the Department of Health and Aged Care (p. 21).

2.22 The stewardship approach adopted by Finance has not involved mandating an SOE and SOI, with accountable authorities responsible for identifying whether an SOE and SOI is required (based on the framework promulgated by Finance) and then advising ministers on the development of an SOE and then preparing the responding SOI. The engagement process with the ANAO as part of this performance audit led some entities to undertake a review of their adherence to the regulator performance framework. Entities did not point to Finance or, prior to the transfer of policy responsibility in mid-2022, PM&C having been active in seeking to promote greater adherence to the expectation for an SOE and SOI. For example:

• The Department of Employment and Workplace Relations: ‘DEWR had not previously appreciated the breadth of RMG 128 and had considered that ASQA was the National VET Regulator. Consequently, DEWR did not appreciate that it should have identified itself as having a regulatory role for the purposes of the Vet Student Loans program.’
• The National Indigenous Australians Agency: ‘Following further review we now consider that NIAA’s administration of the Low Aromatic Fuel Act 2013 does form a regulatory function within the scope of RMG 128’.
• The National Disability Insurance Agency: ‘The NDIA considered RMG 128, the RMG 128 Guidance Note, and the PM&C Australian Government Guide to Regulatory Impact Analysis. It is on the basis of these definitions that the NDIA advised you on 10 October that we will consider whether our responsibilities for implementing the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 amount to the performance of a regulatory function. At this stage, we are unable to speculate on what the outcome of this review might be.’ ³⁷
• The Department of Social Services: ‘is in the process of considering if it does have a regulatory function in regard to the Marriage Act Part 1A in terms of what is normally seen as a regulatory role. An internal review to assess if the Department does have a regulatory role under the Act, as previously advised, is underway. We have commenced liaising with AGD as part of this review. This internal review is expected to be completed by early to mid-2025.’

2.23 In July 2024, Finance advised the ANAO:

The definitions provided sufficiently capture those that perform regulatory functions and therefore are required to develop SOE/I’s and adhere to RMG 128 and the best practice principles. Working with portfolios and regulators over the last 18 months has indicated that iterating the definition of regulators, regulatory functions and the guidance around the definition and its application is worthy of further consideration which the Division is currently undertaking.

What regulators and regulatory functions are subject to Statements of Expectations and Statements of Intent?

2.29 The regulator stocktake is one of the eight priorities of the Australian Government’s ‘Progressing Australia’s Regulatory Reform Agenda’. The aim of the regulator stocktake is to provide ‘visibility of the spread of regulatory functions across the Australian Government and supports greater transparency on the issuing of Ministerial Statements of Expectations (SOE) and Regulator Statements of Intentions (SOI)’. Finance is responsible for updating the regulator stocktake.

Regulators

2.30 As of December 2024, the stocktake published on Finance’s Regulatory Reform website³⁸ identified 103 regulatory functions.³⁹ These related to 67 regulators⁴⁰ or 52 Australian Government entities reflecting that some entities have multiple regulatory responsibilities.⁴¹

2.31 Not included in the stocktake were at least 21 regulators that either advised the ANAO that they have a regulatory function or may have a regulatory function according to ANAO analysis of entities’ functions against the characteristics of regulators set out in RMG 128 (see Table 2.1).⁴²

Table 2.1: Identified instances of entities with regulatory functions not included in the stocktake

Note a: AHRC’s functions relating to the positive duty in relation to sex discrimination were incorporated into the AHRC Act through the Anti-Discrimination and Human Rights Legislation Amendment (Respect at Work) Act 2022.

Note b: ARPANSA’s responding SOI of 22 October 2020 states, under the heading, ‘Regulatory Framework’ that ‘ARPANSA is committed to the adoption of a risk informed approach to regulation that minimises unnecessary regulatory burden, whilst ensuring the safe use of radiation by Commonwealth entities. ARPANSA will also continue to promote the adoption of nationally consistent regulation particularly to enable a consistent level of safety for all Australians, while also eliminating unnecessary complexity for licensed users of radiation across Australia.’

Note c: February 2025 advice to the ANAO from IPEA was that it was ‘not relying on the guidance note for RMG 128, but rather the information on the RMG 128 landing page on the Finance website about applicability of RMG 128, in forming our view that we regulate Commonwealth employees and are therefore out of scope … Please note that IPEA is currently preparing a public facing Assurance Strategy which will address the regulatory best practice contained in RMG 128. March 2025 advice to the ANAO from IPEA was that it was seeking advice from Finance ‘on its status in regard to RMG 128, and this will if appropriate include options for the Ministerial Statement of Intent.’

Note d: Blue shading indicates regulatory functions within departments with external governance arrangements.

Source: ANAO analysis and advice from entities to the ANAO.

2.32 As illustrated in Table 2.1, ANAO analysis indicated that DVA has a regulatory function under the Protection of Word “Anzac” Act 1920. Although it does not have an SOE or SOI, the department publishes a Word Anzac Regulator Framework report. The most recent report, for 2022–23, included the following findings:

• 63 applications were received of which 41 were approved, two were declined, three were withdrawn, one was still under consideration and three were closed administratively (due to nil response from applicants). The other 13 applications did not require approval.
• 59 complaints were received about potential misuse of ‘Anzac’. The majority of the complaints were found by the department to not to be a breach and required no further action. Twelve ‘compliance actions’ were undertaken, involving the contacting of offending parties to explain the rules around using the word ‘Anzac’.⁴³

2.33 Table 2.1 does not include some entities who informed the ANAO that they consider they do not have a regulatory function. For example, Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) was established by the Food Standards Australia New Zealand Act 1991.⁴⁴ The entity’s corporate plan for 2024–25 describes the ‘fundamentals’ of FSANZ’s work as being ‘setting food standards, monitoring the safety of the food supply, supporting consumers to make informed choices and coordinating food incidents and recalls in Australia’.⁴⁵ FSANZ advised the ANAO in October 2024 that it did not consider itself to be a regulator given, in relation to food standards:

FSANZ develops draft standards for others to approve, amend or reject. Once approved and gazetted, those standards then become part of Australian and New Zealand food laws for which FSANZ is not responsible. Nor does FSANZ administer or enforce those laws. Nor can it. FSANZ’s role and responsibilities in this regard generally end once a draft standard is provided to Food Ministers. At that point, there is and can be no expectation of compliance with the draft standards.⁴⁶

2.34 There were also instances where an entity that accepted it had some regulatory functions although not to the full extent identified by the ANAO’s analysis. For example, the Department of Social Services’ initial October 2024 response to the ANAO was that the approval of voluntary organisations⁴⁷ under Part IA ‘Marriage education’ of the Marriage Act 1961 was subject to RMG 128 and that preparation of an SOE and SOI was underway. Subsequent (December 2024) advice to the ANAO from the department was that RMG 128 was not ‘enlivened’ as:

As it is clear that these provisions relate to the approval of grants, our view is that RMG–128 does not apply. Therefore a Statement of Intent is not required.

[Section] 9C does not require the administration of a grant to provide approval, though the only effect of this approval (in terms of actions by the Minister under Part 1A) is that an organisation has the status of an approved organisation which thus qualifies them for a grant under section 9B.

… the Minister’s power to make such an approval is intrinsically connected and confined to the qualification for a grant under Part IA.

Regulatory functions

2.35 As noted at paragraph 2.30, as of December 2024 the stocktake identified 103 regulatory functions across 67 regulators. The ANAO’s engagement with entities as part of this audit identified that there are regulators with multiple regulatory functions where some of those functions have not been identified in the stocktake.

2.36 For example, the stocktake identifies a single regulatory function for the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations being the Federal Safety Commissioner. In October 2024, the department advised the ANAO that it also has a regulatory function in relation to the VET Student Loans program. The department further advised the ANAO that:

DEWR had not previously appreciated the breadth of RMG 128 and had considered that ASQA was the National VET Regulator. Consequently, DEWR did not appreciate that it should have identified itself as having a regulatory role for the purposes of the VSL program.

We are progressing as matter of priority, the issuing of a Ministerial Statement of Expectations in close consultation with the Secretary and will then respond with a regulator Statement of Intent on how the department will deliver on the Government’s expectations. We are aiming to complete these by early 2025.

2.37 Another example was the Department of Defence (Defence). The stocktake identifies two regulatory functions in Defence, one relating to export trade controls and the other relating to the Woomera Protected Area, with the stocktake reporting that no SOE or SOI is in place for either regulatory function. The ANAO’s analysis identified seven Acts where the Department of Defence advised the ANAO in October 2024 that there was a regulatory function subject to RMG 128. In relation to those regulatory functions, Defence advised the ANAO that an SOE (and SOI) was planned but not yet commenced for regulatory functions under four Acts and was not planned for the regulatory functions under the other three Acts. Further advice was provided by Defence in relation to two of the Acts:

Defence is currently working on ensuring that, where required, necessary steps are taken to ensure compliance with RMG 128, including that appropriate action on Ministerial Statements of Expectation (SOEs) and Regulator Statements of Intent (SOI) are undertaken. In relation to the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 (DTC Act) and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995, Defence notes that the DTC Act was substantially amended in 2024, following a formal review of the Act in late 2023. The amended Act and Regulations came into force on 1 September 2024. Penalties for new offences will commence on 1 March 2025. Defence is due to provide Ministerial updates on the new legislation by the end of 2024. Accordingly, Defence will be best placed to develop the Ministerial SOEs and Regulator SOI for both the DTC Act and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 in 2025.

2.38 Further work is required by Finance to ensure a consistent approach to identifying regulatory ‘functions’ in the stocktake published on its website, and whether these are ‘internal’ or ‘external’ to the entity. For example, there are five internal functions reported in the Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry portfolio including biosecurity, export, illegal logging, imported food and levies as ‘regulators’. In contrast, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) is reported as being a single ‘external’ regulator, notwithstanding that the ATO has regulatory functions under at least four pieces of legislation.

Statements of Expectations and responding Statements of Intent

2.39 Finance set an internal target for 30 June 2024 for 70 per cent of known regulators to have a current SOE/SOI published. This target was set in December 2023, when Finance estimated that ‘only 28% of SOE’s were published, therefore an increase to 70% without legislation mandating the requirement to produce statements, was considered a reasonable target.’ As of December 2024, Finance’s stocktake identified that 52 of the 103 listed ‘regulatory functions’ (50 per cent) were covered by an SOE⁴⁸ and 35 of 67 identified regulators had SOE in place (52 per cent).⁴⁹ The stocktake also identified 33 SOI.

2.40 The stocktake reported that 32 of the listed regulators did not have an SOE. The stocktake was incomplete as it did not recognise that some of those 32 entities had an SOE. In total, as illustrated by Table 2.2, there were at least a further 21 SOE belonging to 21 regulators not recognised by the stocktake. In February 2025, Finance advised the ANAO that:

In reference to Table 2.2 Finance notes that its role as steward is to support regulators in the development of Statements. Accuracy of the Regulator Stocktake relies on support from regulators which includes notifying Finance upon publication of Statements which in turn can be reflected in the Regulator Stocktake.

Since providing evidence to ANAO during the fieldwork stage of the audit on 4 July 2024, we have updated evidence of our engagements with entities on SOE/I and RMG 128 This includes over 200 engagements with entities between 5 July 2024 and 31 January 2025.

Table 2.2: Identified instances of regulators with a Statement of Expectations not recognised in the stocktake

Note a: The minister had approved a Statement of Expectations for the nine regulatory schemes in August 2023, anticipating the formation of Environment Protection Australia.

Note b: Blue shading indicates regulatory functions within departments with external governance arrangements. These regulators were issued with separate SOE to the portfolio department.

Source: ANAO analysis and advice from entities to the ANAO.

2.41 The ANAO identified that Finance counts each entry that has an SOE link as being a separate SOE, whereas the ANAO’s analysis counted each unique SOE once only. For example, the Department of Education has four entries in the stocktake and all four entries contain a link to the same SOE. Other issues with Finance’s reporting of SOE identified as part of the audit included that some of the links are not correct: the SOE link in the stocktake for the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission goes to the wrong webpage on the Commission’s site (an outdated link) and the SOE link for the ACNC goes to the wrong entity’s SOE (the Federal Safety Commissioner’s).

Note a: ANAO contacted entities as part of audit fieldwork and examined the coverage of each SOE for those entities based on regulatory functions they advised to the ANAO and whether these were covered in each entity SOE. Further regulators and further regulatory functions were identified as the audit proceeded. The same analysis was not undertaken of regulators/regulatory functions identified later in the audit process, which is why the numbers in the first two dot points are ‘at least’ and the total number does not add to 90.

3.1 The ANAO examined the extent to which Statements of Expectation and responding Statements of Intent are in place because of the important role that those documents are to perform in:

• providing clarity about government objectives and policies relevant to the regulator’s functions and how it conducts its operations, and how the regulator will deliver on government expectations; and
• setting performance expectations in corporate plans and reporting on performance in annual reports.

How many regulators have a Statement of Expectations in place?

3.2 Finance guidance to entities is that

Ministerial Statement of Expectations are issued by the responsible minister to a regulator to provide greater clarity about government policies and objectives relevant to the regulator in line with its statutory objectives and the priorities the minister expects it to observe in conducting its operations.⁵⁰

3.3 Figure 3.1 illustrates that there were at least 57 regulatory SOE in place as at December 2024 across portfolios.⁵¹ The number of SOE disclosed on the Regulator Stocktake was lower (35).⁵² There were at least 34 regulators⁵³ with no SOE as of December 2024.

3.4 Finance guidance to entities also sets out that SOE should be made publicly available on the regulator website or on the Transparency portal as part of the corporate plan and/or annual report.⁵⁴ The number of SOE published on departmental websites was 50. There were seven SOE provided to the ANAO by entities during the ANAO’s audit work that were not published as of December 2024.⁵⁵

Figure 3.1: Number of SOE by portfolio

Source: ANAO analysis of SOE and Finance’s regulator stocktake.

Reasons why SOE are not in place (as advised to the ANAO)

Reliance on the minister, portfolio department or both

3.5 A reason provided by some regulators for the absence of an SOE was reliance on the involvement of lead portfolio departments in developing SOE on behalf of portfolio entities or ‘ongoing negotiations’ with the relevant minister. Examples of entity responses are at Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Entity responses: reliance on the minister, portfolio department or both

Source: ANAO analysis and entity advice to the ANAO between October 2024 and April 2025.

RMG 128 exemptions

3.6 RMG 128 does not apply in two circumstances:

• an entity is only responsible for the setting of policy, standards, the approval of grants or is a tribunal; and
• the regulatory function is only to regulate Commonwealth entities or employees.⁵⁶

3.7 Finance guidance sets out that officials should consider the information in the guidance and determine the applicability of the principles. Seven regulators contacted by the ANAO identified one of these reasons as the basis for not having put an SOE in place (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Entities contacted who claimed exemptions from having an SOE

Source: ANAO analysis.

3.8 The scope of the RMG 128 Commonwealth entities and employees exemption has been interpreted differently by entities. For example: in relation to its interpretation of RMG 128 that ‘parliamentarians’ are to be aligned with that of a ‘Commonwealth employee’ (see Table 3.2) IPEA also advised the ANAO in October 2024 that ‘IPEA has consulted with the Governance and Resource Management Division of the Department of Finance.’ Finance advised the ANAO in February 2025 that IPEA had sought guidance from Finance in October 2024.

3.9 ARPANSA also advised the ANAO in October 2024 that:

In terms of ARPANSA’s regulatory responsibilities intersecting with private operators, this occurs only with Silex Systems due to their operation being at ANSTO’s Lucas Heights precinct and private entities who seek a permit for the import or export of radioactive material (in line with Prohibited Import/Export Regs). We have tested both of these with the Department of Health (then the Best Practice Regulation Section) and Department of Finance for both the former Regulator Performance Framework and the current RMG 128, however the advice has consistency [sic] been that as these activities are small in nature and the bulk of our regulatory activities relate to the regulation of Commonwealth entities, we were not required to apply them. The last guidance we received was in 2021 when PM&C sent a request on status of SOEs and SOI and stocktake of regulatory functions. During this process PM&C again confirmed that advice.

3.10 In relation to the coverage of RMG 128, in February 2025 the NACC advised the ANAO that it did not consider that it undertakes any regulatory functions for the purposes of the regulator performance framework and that Finance should ‘reconsider the definitions that underpin the identification of Australian Government regulators and regulatory functions, and that further clarity should be provided regarding the scope of the two exceptions (particularly regarding regulation of Commonwealth employees and Tribunals) would be beneficial’. In relation to those particular exemptions, the NACC commented that:

• ‘the NACC’s regulatory function (if there is one) only applies to Commonwealth entities or employees (public officials)’⁵⁷ and that the NACC ‘is able to investigate alleged corrupt conduct involving Commonwealth public officials. Although third parties may be involved and may also engage in corrupt conduct under the Act, the touchstone is always the involvement of a Commonwealth official’; and
• ‘the NACC, as a Commission, holds the power under the Act to examine witnesses on oath and may therefore be considered a Tribunal.’

Currency of SOE

3.13 The guidance in RMG 128 sets out that ‘SOE should be refreshed with every change in minister, change in regulator leadership, change in Commonwealth policy or every two years’.⁵⁸ Of the regulatory SOE examined by the ANAO, nine SOE (16 per cent) were more than two years old as of December 2024. The oldest published SOE was the Tax Practitioners Board’s (TPB), more than 10 years old as of December 2024. TPB advised the ANAO in October 2024 that ‘we anticipate that an updated Statement of Expectations may issue to the TPB imminently.’

3.14 There were 11 SOE (19 per cent) that had not been updated as a result of a change in minister as of December 2024. This included four SOE that were not updated following the change of Government at the May 2022 Federal Election. For example:

• the ASIC published SOE is dated August 2021. ASIC advised the ANAO in October 2024 that ’drafts of the SOI/SOE have been exchanged between ASIC and Treasury across the past 12 months (one series of exchanges in October/November 2023, and another in June/July 2024). ASIC has no visibility on discussions between Treasury and the minister or his office on the SOE.’
• the Reserve Bank of Australia advised the ANAO in October 2024 in relation to the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 and the Reserve Bank Act 1959 (in so far as it covers the functions of the Payments System Board) that it was planning but had not yet commenced an update of an SOE (and SOI) that had been issued in 2018 (see more information in Table 2.2).

3.15 In addition to those 11 SOE, there were 15 SOE where the minister had been appointed in June 2022 with a delay of 12 months or longer before the SOE was issued.

3.16 As at December 2024, there were eight SOE (14 per cent) that had not been updated following a change in regulator leadership. Three related to changes of regulatory leadership in 2024: Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority (APVMA)⁵⁹ (new Chair of the Board appointed in July 2024), NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission (new Commissioner commenced in October 2024) and Sport Integrity Australia (Acting Chief Executive Officer appointed from August 2024). More significant delays were evident with five regulators, for example: ASIC (not updated since August 2021), Department of Health, Disability and Ageing (DHDA) (18 months since retirement of Secretary), National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (22 months since appointment of new Chief Executive Officer), Reserve Bank of Australia (15 months since appointment of new Governor) and Tax Practitioners Board (not updated since 2014).

3.17 Advice from the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) addressed the requirement to refresh regulator SOE following a change in minister and regulator leadership.

During the period June 2022-July 2024 … and noting various machinery-of-government changes following the election and then the appointment of Secretary Fennessy in place of Secretary Metcalfe on 18 September 2023, Minister Watt signed two SOE … The process has recommenced following the appointment of Minister Collins on 29 July 2024.⁶⁰

Coverage of SOE

3.18 There is no requirement within RMG 128 for entities to list all Acts under which they are conferred regulatory functions. RMG 128 does set out that:

Some regulatory functions within a department can be quite small, diffuse or have low visibility. Departments may consider covering these through a more generic Statement of Expectations from the minister to the secretary that outlines the minister’s broad expectations for the conduct of regulatory functions undertaken within the department. It may make sense to include this as part of a Statement of Expectations to the secretary about broader functions of the department. Again the expectations articulated by the minister can then be communicated by the secretary to senior leaders in the regulatory functions. A responding Statement of Intent could then be provided by the secretary to the minister, setting out how the department will exercise its general regulatory functions to meet the minister’s expectations (and can be included in the department’s corporate plan and annual report).⁶¹

3.19 There were at least 14 SOE that did not address the full range of regulatory functions. For those 14 SOE, either the SOE listed some regulatory functions or Acts (but did not cover all Acts) or functions were outlined in broad or generic terms. For example, the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts had regulatory responsibilities in relation to three aspects of Federal airports, with incomplete coverage by its SOE and SOI, as set out in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Regulation of federal airports

Source: ANAO analysis and Infrastructure advice.

3.20 Eight entities identified functions being small, diffuse or having low visibility as a reason for not having an SOE that addressed the regulatory function. These were: Attorney-General’s Department (AGD), ARPANSA, Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Department of Education, DHDA, Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) and National Indigenous Australians Agency.

3.21 For example, the AGD’s 2023 SOE addresses seven of the department’s regulatory responsibilities. In relation to a further five pieces of legislation⁶² involving a regulatory function the department advised the ANAO in October 2024 that these were not referenced in the SOE and SOI because:

these functions are small, low visibility and limited in scope. In accordance with RMG 128 guidance, we’d consider these functions to be covered in the SOE under the broader sections The Government’s policy priorities and objectives that notes the called out regulatory functions to be core functions, but goes on to set expectations for regulation more broadly. Our SOI responds to this.

3.22 In relation to DVA, ANAO analysis of DVA functions indicated a regulatory function under the Protection of Word “Anzac” Act 1920. The department advised the ANAO in October 2024 that ‘The former Minister for Veterans’ Affairs and Assistant Minister to the Prime Minister formalised an agreement through Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, that the Minister was not expected to prepare a Statement of Expectations or Statements of Intent as the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs does not have responsibility for key regulatory agencies or functions.’ This was the only instance of an entity providing evidence that it has obtained Ministerial agreement to not having an SOE (noting that the department has not taken steps to ascertain if its current Minister, and the current minister responsible for oversight of the regulator performance framework, support this situation continuing).

3.23 Machinery of government changes can see changes in entity responsibility for regulatory functions. At the time of the audit, the Machinery of Government Changes Guide⁶³ published jointly by the Australian Public Service Commission and Finance includes no guidance relevant to SOE and SOI. In February 2025, Finance advised the ANAO that:

Finance undertakes a number of activities in relation to the accuracy and completeness of the regulatory stocktake which provides visibility of the spread of regulatory functions across the Australian government and supports greater transparency on SOE/I, including:

• proposing RMG 128: Regulatory performance, and Guidance Note: Statements of Expectation & Intent information be included in the Machinery of Government Changes Guide
• providing information about the Government’s regulatory reform agenda including SOE/I to newly appointed accountable authorities and heads of regulators.

Do the Statements of Expectations identify the government’s expectations?

3.24 RMG 128 ‘provides factors for consideration … to support consistency across portfolios’ in the content of an SOE.⁶⁴ There are seven factors relevant to SOE outlined in RMG 128 which are summarised in Figure 3.2 below. The ANAO assessed the alignment of 55 SOE that were in place as of December 2024 against the factors.⁶⁵

Figure 3.2: Content of Statements of Expectations

Note: RMG 128 states that an SOE should:

Component 1: consider the economic and social environment in which the regulator operates, and the Government’s policy objectives and priorities, including the regulatory reform agenda

Component 2: provide strategic direction (to the extent allowed by legislation) on the conduct of the regulator, its role, and how the regulator should engage with business, the community, other regulators and policy departments including the states and territories

Component 3: reference any major projects, reforms, and key developments (for example, cost recovery, implementation of reviews) the regulator will be progressing over the next 2 years and the Minister’s expectations for these, including considering whether the Statement of Expectations needs to be delayed until a review is finalised

Component 4: expect regulators to act in accordance with best practice, embedding the Government’s principles of regulator best practice, striving for continuous improvement against these principles and considering international best practice, as relevant

Component 4a: Best Practice Principle 1: Continuous improvement and building trust

Component 4b: Best Practice Principle 2: Risk based and data driven

Component 4c: Best Practice Principle 3: Collaboration and engagement

Component 5: propose how the responsible minister will engage with the regulator, including undertakings on how the minister will help provide an enabling environment for the regulator to consistently implement best practice

Component 6: request the regulator responds via a Regulator Statement of Intent, outlining how it will deliver on the minister’s expectations and both the Statement of Expectation and Statement of Intent be made publicly available on the regulator’s website

Component 7: request that the Statement of Expectation be incorporated into PGPA Act processes (that is, corporate plan and annual report).

Source: ANAO analysis of SOE.

3.25 Figure 3.2 illustrates that a high proportion of SOE addressed the first three factors for consideration (98 per cent of SOE addressed the first and second factor and 95 per cent of SOE addressed the third factor). In relation to the exceptions:

• Services Australia’s SOE did not consider the economic and social environment in which the regulator operates or provide strategic direction on the conduct of the regulator; and
• the Offshore Infrastructure Registrar, the Offshore Infrastructure Regulator and the Professional Services Review SOE did not address any major projects, reforms or key developments the regulator would be progressing over the next two years.

3.26 Entities SOE’s were less likely to align with the final three components outlined in RMG 128:

• 29 per cent of SOE did not set out how the responsible minister would provide an enabling environment for the regulator to consistently implement best practice.
• 20 per cent of SOE did not request the regulator respond via SOI and make both documents publicly available on the regulator website. Despite not always addressing this requirement, 86 per cent of SOE examined against best practice principles were published on the departmental or regulator website.
• 22 per cent of SOE examined did not request the SOE be incorporated into PGPA Act processes.

3.27 Figure 3.3 sets out that there were 13 SOE (23 per cent of SOE examined) which fully addressed all components set out in RMG 128 guidance. The 13 SOE were those of: the Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission, Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, Australian Financial Security Authority, Australian Human Rights Commission, Comcare, Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission, DAFF, Inspector-General of Water Compliance, Director of National Parks, Fair Work Commission, Murray–Darling Basin Authority, Seafarers Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Authority and Wine Australia. There were seven SOE that fully addressed less than five components set out in RMG 128. These were: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, National Capital Authority, Sydney Harbour Federation Trust, NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission, Australian Communications and Media Authority, Professional Services Review and Services Australia.

Figure 3.3: SOE that fully addressed all components of the RMG 128 guidance

Source: ANAO analysis of Statements of Expectations.

Which regulators have a current Statement of Intent?

3.28 Accountable authorities of entities respond to an SOE with an SOI, which ‘outlines how the regulator intends to meet those expectations including how it will demonstrate progress’. As with SOE, the SOI should be made publicly available.

3.29 There were 49 SOI in place as of December 2024. The regulator stocktake indicates that there were 33 SOI in place as of December 2024 (a difference of 16).⁶⁶ There were eight SOI that had been in place for more than two years as of December 2024. Four of these were issued prior to 2022 and four were issued in 2022.

3.30 Three entities did not have an SOI in place responding to the latest SOE. For all entities, these were in circumstances where ministers had provided updated SOE to Commonwealth entities in 2024: May 2024 SOE for the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA), October 2024 for ARPANSA and December 2024 for Australian Communications and Media Authority.⁶⁷ Regarding the seven-month delay, AFMA advised the ANAO in February 2025 that:

An SOE was issued by Minister Watt to me in May 2024 … We commenced preparation of an SOI, and this was reviewed by the AFMA Commission at its meeting in July 2024 … We were in the final stages of clearing the SOI with DAFF when Minister Watt moved to a different portfolio, and Minister Collins assumed the AFF portfolio. We are awaiting advice from DAFF and Minister Collins on her preferred approach to the SOE.

3.31 Finance guidance does not specify the timeframe or when corresponding SOI should be issued following receipt of an SOE. ANAO analysis of SOI indicates that:

• 37 SOI were issued by entities within three months of receipt of an SOE;
• six SOI were issued by entities between three and six months following receipt of an SOE; and
• one SOI was issued more than six months following receipt of an SOE (Australian Energy Regulator⁶⁸).⁶⁹

Which regulators have a current Statement of Intent that identifies how the government’s expectations will be delivered?

3.32 The guidance to RMG 128 sets out that SOI should have four components in responding to the Statement of Expectations.⁷⁰ The ANAO assessed the 46 SOI that were in place as of December 2024 (and had been issued after April 2021⁷¹) against the four components. As illustrated by Figure 3.4, regulators are developing SOI that are consistent with the RMG 128 guidance. The one exception of note relates to the guidance that the SOI should outline how the regulator intends to engage with policy departments and the minister at a high level, note how progress against meeting the minister’s expectations will be measured and reported on by the regulator.

Figure 3.4: Content of Statements of Intent

Note: RMG 128 states that an SOI should:

Component 1: In responding to the Statement of Expectations, provide regulator perspective on its purpose, strategic direction and delivery of statutory objectives.

Component 2: Articulate how the regulator intends to deliver against the minister’s expectations set out in the Statement of Expectations in practical terms. This can include describing internal initiatives or structures, changes in systems or governance, efforts to build staff capability and to foster an organisational culture that supports regulator best practice.

Component 3: Outline how the regulator intends to engage with regulated entities, other regulators and other stakeholders.

Component 4: Outline how the regulator intends to engage with policy departments and the minister at a high level, note how progress against meeting the minister’s expectations will be measured and reported on by the regulator.

Source: ANAO analysis of Statements of Intent.

3.33 As illustrated by Figure 3.5. ANAO analysis of regulator SOI indicated there were 27 SOI (55 per cent of SOI examined) which addressed all four components and 19 SOI that fully addressed three of the four components. The 27 comprised the SOI of: Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission, Australian Communications and Media Authority, eSafety Commissioner, Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Clean Energy Regulator, Coal Mining Industry (Long Service Leave Funding) Corporation, Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (two SOI), Australian Energy Regulator, Department of Education, Department of Health, Disability and Ageing, Department of Home Affairs, Offshore Infrastructure Registrar, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts, National Capital Authority, National Health and Medical Research Council, National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority, NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commission, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman, Professional Services Review, Services Australia, Sport Integrity Australia, Sydney Harbour Federation Trust and Wine Australia.

Figure 3.5: SOI that fully address all components of the RMG 128 guidance

Source: ANAO analysis of Statements of Intent.

Appendix 1 Entity responses

Department of Finance

Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission

Attorney-General’s Department

Australian Digital Health Agency

Australian Electoral Commission

Australian Energy Regulator

Australian Federal Police

Australian Financial Security Authority

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water

Department of Defence

Department of Education

Department of Employment and Workplace Relations

Department of Health, Disability and Ageing

Department of Industry, Science and Resources

Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts

Department of Social Services

Department of the Treasury

Department of Veterans’ Affairs

Murray–Darling Basin Authority

National Anti-Corruption Commission

National Disability Insurance Agency

National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority

Office of the Special Investigator

Professional Services Review

Services Australia

Sydney Harbour Federation Trust

Wine Australia

Appendix 2 Improvements observed by the ANAO

1. The existence of independent external audit, and the accompanying potential for scrutiny improves performance. Improvements in administrative and management practices usually occur: in anticipation of ANAO audit activity; during an audit engagement; as interim findings are made; and/or after the audit has been completed and formal findings are communicated.

2. The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) has encouraged the ANAO to consider ways in which the ANAO could capture and describe some of these impacts. The ANAO’s corporate plan states that the ANAO’s annual performance statements will provide a narrative that will consider, amongst other matters, analysis of key improvements made by entities during a performance audit process based on information included in tabled performance audit reports.

3. Performance audits involve close engagement between the ANAO and the audited entity as well as other stakeholders involved in the program or activity being audited. Throughout the audit engagement, the ANAO outlines to the entity the preliminary audit findings, conclusions and potential audit recommendations. This ensures that final recommendations are appropriately targeted and encourages entities to take early remedial action on any identified matters during the course of an audit. Remedial actions entities may take during the audit include:

• strengthening governance arrangements;
• introducing or revising policies, strategies, guidelines or administrative processes; and
• initiating reviews or investigations.

4. During the course of the audit, the ANAO was informed of the following changes in Finance’s approach to oversight of the regulator performance framework:

• documenting some of its processes in a Standard Operating Procedure (see paragraph 2.5)
• proposing guidance on RMG 128 be included in the Machinery of Government Changes Guide (see paragraph 3.23); and
• providing information about the government’s regulatory reform agenda including SOE and SOI to newly appointed accountable authorities and heads of regulators (see paragraph 3.23)

5. The ANAO has not sought to obtain assurance over whether these actions have been appropriately implemented, other than observing that the Standard Operating Procedure does not yet address two key processes (assessing whether a Commonwealth entity is a regulator and subject to RMG 128; and reporting on the publication of SOE and SOI).

6. There were also a number of entities that implemented, or updated, their SOE and/or SOI during the course of the audit. In addition, there were entities that advised the ANAO that they are reviewing whether they undertake regulatory functions. Table A.1 sets out the entities which have published or updated SOE since the performance audit commenced in June 2024.

Table A.1: Regulators with updated SOE since June 2024

Note a: Blue shading indicates regulatory functions within departments with external governance arrangements. These regulators were issued with separate SOE to the portfolio department.

Source: ANAO analysis of entities’ records.

7. The following regulators also had their SOI updated since December 2024:

• Australian Communications and Media Authority (March 2025);
• Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (March 2025);
• Clean Energy Regulator (draft document dated March 2025);
• Offshore Infrastructure Regulator (February 2025); and
• Coal LSL (March 2025).

Appendix 3 Bodies that were provided with the opportunity to comment on the preliminary audit findings

Key: ✔ Yes ✘ No

Note a: Blue shading indicates regulatory functions within departments with external governance arrangements.

Note b: Preliminary audit findings were not provided by NIAA to the Registrar.

Note c: These bodies were identified following National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority’s response to the preliminary audit findings.

Source: ANAO analysis of entity responses.