In 1997, and subsequently in 1999, the Australian Government introduced two major spending packages with a total value of almost $1 billion. These spending packages were designed to address the challenges posed by the issue of climate change and to meet Australia's domestic and international commitments. Since its inception in 1998, the Australian Greenhouse Office has been responsible for the implementation of greenhouse related programs from these two major spending packages. The objective of the audit was to examine and report on the administrative efficiency and effectiveness of seven major programs administered by the Australian Greenhouse Office.

The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of procedures and processes used by DEST and the ATO to record HECS–HELP student loans. To achieve this, the ANAO assessed the performance of DEST and the ATO against three criteria as follows:

• DEST monitored student contributions set by higher education providers for consistency with Australian Government policy;
• DEST paid HECS–HELP advance payments to higher education providers based on sound estimates, and recorded, reconciled and reported these payments; and
• the ATO has established procedures and processes to correctly record HECS–HELP loans against student tax records.

The objective of the audit was to examine the effectiveness of Centrelink's approach to investigating and responding to external fraud. The ANAO's assessment was based on four key criteria. In particular, the ANAO assessed whether Centrelink:

• had established a management framework, business systems and guidelines, that support the investigation, prosecution and reporting of fraud;
• had implemented appropriate case selection strategies and controls to ensure resources are targeted to the cases of highest priority;
• complied with relevant external and internal requirements when investigating fraud and referring cases for consideration of prosecution; and
• had implemented an effective training program that supports high quality investigations and prosecution referrals.

The audit objective was to assess the effectiveness of CRS Australia’s delivery of Disability Management Services. In assessing CRS Australia’s performance, the ANAO examined whether:

• services are delivered in accordance with CRS Australia’s operating procedures, which incorporate the Disability Services Standards and the requirements of the DEEWR MOU;
• CRS Australia has an effective client feedback (including complaints) system, which is used to identify and address business risks and areas for improving service delivery; and
• sound governance arrangements (including performance monitoring and reporting) are in place to monitor service delivery.

The audit did not specifically examine issues and information relating to the commercial nature of the business, such as profitability levels and competitive neutrality arrangements.

The objective of this audit was to assess whether the WSA program has been administered effectively by the NWC/DEWHA, as relevant, and is achieving its stated program objective. Specifically, the ANAO examined whether:

• funding proposals have been assessed and approved in a fair, consistent manner and in accordance with applicable criteria, program guidelines and better practice;
• appropriate funding arrangements have been established with proponents, having regard to the size of the grant, the type of entity involved and the nature of the project; and
• DEWHA (and previously the NWC) is actively monitoring whether proponents are complying with their obligations, and grant payments are made only in accordance with funding agreements.

More broadly, the audit examined DEWHA's strategy for evaluating and reporting on the long-term benefits of the program.

This edition of audit insights outlines key messages from a series of recent audits examining the effectiveness of governance boards in four corporate Commonwealth entities. The audit observations from this series of audits relate primarily to the ‘soft’ attributes of effective governance such as relationships, behaviours and culture, while also recognising the important interplay with the ‘hard’ attributes of governance such as board composition, appointment processes and independence. The key messages may be relevant for the operations of other Commonwealth boards as well as broader governance arrangements in Commonwealth entities.

The objective of the audit was to examine how effectively Health manages the risk of PBS drugs not being used according to PBS subsidy conditions. The audit examined two areas: during listing, how Health identified and implemented measures to decrease the risks of PBS drugs being used outside subsidy conditions; and following listing, how Health confirmed that usage and expenditure on PBS drugs was consistent with estimates. The report examines selected approaches used by Health, which have evolved in recent years, to manage the risk of PBS drugs being used outside subsidy conditions. The report also acknowledges and describes the role of the expert committees. The scope of the audit was limited to PBS drugs for which Health pays a subsidy. The audit did not examine Health's role in educating consumers, prescribers, and other health professionals, or the implications of the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement for the PBS. Additionally, the ANAO did not form an opinion on the success of Medicare Australia's compliance role. To form an opinion against the audit objective, the ANAO interviewed Health personnel, committee members and stakeholders, examined relevant documents and files, analysed drug usage and expenditure data, and attended a number of committee meetings. To assist the audit process, the ANAO selected a sample of eight drugs. The drugs were selected due to their high cost to the PBS and/or high usage, or because the drug has had a particularly interesting PBS history. The sample is not representative of all drugs on the PBS. In 2004–05, 15.3 million prescriptions were written for these eight drugs, with the Government subsidy totalling $1.05 billion.

The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of the Tribunals' management of their operations. To this end, the audit examined whether the MRT and the RRT:

• have achieved intended operational efficiencies from the introduction of common facilities, services and resourcing;
• have established appropriate arrangements for governance, business planning and guidance of Members and staff, and for performance monitoring and reporting of Tribunal operations;
• finalise cases within Tribunal time and productivity standards; and
• provide applicants with services in accordance with service standards.

The audit covered Tribunal operations for review of visa decisions. The correctness of individual decisions was not assessed as part of the audit.

The audit focused particularly on developments in the Tribunals' management performance in the four year period from 2001–02 to 2004–05.

The objective of the audit was to assess the efficiency and the effectiveness of DEWR's administrative oversight for the WfD programme. The components of administration examined included whether:

• the operation of the WfD programme was guided by sound business planning including risk assessment;
• DEWR effectively and efficiently managed, monitored and reported the performance of CWCs in meeting contractual obligations;
• adequate support was provided to DEWR contract managers and account managers to assist in the delivery of WfD outcomes;
• there was evaluation of the performance of CWCs in delivering WfD objectives on behalf of the department;
• DEWR measures the effectiveness of WfD against programme objectives; and
• DEWR had implemented agreed recommendations from the previous WfD audit, where current and relevant.

The objective of the audit was to assess whether selected regulatory agencies have cost recovery procedures and practices which comply with the Government's guidelines. To address this objective, the audit assessed the management of cost recovery against the following criteria:

• regulatory agencies have clear and consistent cost recovery procedures to identify their activities and costs, and set fees and levies;
• regulatory agencies have effectively implemented their cost recovery procedures;
• regulatory agencies regularly monitor and review their cost recovery activities; and
• regulatory agencies regularly report on their cost recovery.