Background

1. The Australian and state and territory governments have committed to address suicide through two national agreements.

• The July 2020 National Agreement on Closing the Gap (Closing the Gap Agreement) includes socio-economic outcome 14: ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people enjoy high levels of social and emotional wellbeing’; and target 14: a ‘significant and sustained reduction in suicide of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people towards zero’.¹ Under the Closing the Gap Agreement, governments committed to work in full and genuine partnership with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in policy development including in relation to ‘social and emotional wellbeing (mental health)’.
• The March 2022 National Mental Health and Suicide Prevention Agreement (National Agreement) includes the objective to implement whole-of-government approaches to suicide prevention, including beyond the mental health system, to progress the goal of zero lives lost to suicide and to deliver a suicide prevention system that is comprehensive, coordinated, consumer focused and compassionate to benefit all Australians.²

2. The Australian Government Department of Health, Disability and Ageing (DHDA) is responsible for administering the National Agreement, providing policy advice on suicide prevention, and administering specific suicide prevention measures.

Rationale for undertaking the audit

3. In 2024, there were more than 3,300 deaths by suicide in Australia. Suicide is the leading cause of death for Australians aged 15 to 44 years. The suicide rate for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people is more than double the rate for non-Indigenous Australians and is increasing.

4. Reducing suicide deaths is a public health priority for all Australian governments. Under the National Agreement, the Australian Government has a national leadership role in suicide prevention. The Closing the Gap Agreement includes a target of a significant and sustained reduction in suicide of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people towards zero. From 2022–23 to 2025–26, Australian Government expenditure on suicide prevention measures was approximately $1 billion.

5. This audit provides assurance to the Australian Parliament over whether Australian Government suicide prevention measures have been informed by robust policy advice and are effectively monitored and evaluated.

Audit objective and criteria

6. The audit objective was to assess whether DHDA effectively developed and monitored suicide prevention measures.

7. To form a conclusion against the objective, the ANAO adopted two high-level audit criteria.

• Has DHDA provided robust policy advice on suicide prevention measures?
• Has DHDA effectively monitored and evaluated suicide prevention measures?

Conclusion

8. DHDA’s development and monitoring of suicide prevention measures was partly effective. The Australian Government committed to address suicide through two national agreements. DHDA did not fully support these commitments through robust policy development, including in genuine partnership with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, or effective performance monitoring. While new suicide prevention measures were implemented, DHDA has not established arrangements to determine whether outcomes are being achieved.

9. Policy advice on two national suicide prevention strategies and six suicide prevention measures was not fully robust. Advice lacked consideration of program logics, implementation, stakeholder input, evaluation findings, and performance measurement and monitoring. Policy advice included consideration of how the proposed measures would be evaluated. Australian Government commitments to develop policy in partnership with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were partly met. A lack of clear roles and responsibilities impacted on policy development effectiveness, including the way in which the policy was developed in partnership with First Nations peoples.

10. DHDA’s monitoring and evaluation of suicide prevention measures was partly effective. Nearly four years after the National Mental Health and Suicide Prevention Agreement, and over five years since the National Agreement on Closing the Gap, government objectives to reduce suicide have not been achieved. An appropriate performance measurement framework for suicide prevention agreements, measures and grants was not established. Monitoring and reporting was incomplete, compliance focused, based on unverified performance information and provided little insight into the achievement of intended outcomes. Although evaluations are planned and underway, a lack of fit-for-purpose performance data limits DHDA’s ability to conduct robust evaluations of suicide prevention measures. As a result, there is limited information available to DHDA and the public about the extent to which Australian Government investment in mental health and suicide prevention is contributing to reducing suicide.

Supporting findings

Policy advice

11. In 2019 and 2021, the Australian Government committed to developing two national strategies for suicide prevention: the National Suicide Prevention Strategy and the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Suicide Prevention Strategy. The National Suicide Prevention Office and Gayaa Dhuwi (Proud Spirit) Australia (Gayaa Dhuwi), respectively, were responsible for developing the strategies. DHDA did not establish clear roles for all parties in the development and approval of the strategies, which impacted DHDA’s ability to effectively advise government and contributed to delays in the strategies being finalised. DHDA’s advice to government on the development of the strategies was not always complete. DHDA’s guidance and instructions to the National Suicide Prevention Office were not fully aligned with its advice to government, and its guidance and instructions to Gayaa Dhuwi were unclear or inconsistent with a commitment to work in partnership. The strategies were initially intended to be finalised in 2021 and 2023 but were released in 2024 and 2025 respectively. As at September 2025, there was no implementation plan and DHDA had not provided advice to government on implementation of either strategy. (See paragraphs 2.4 to 2.28)

12. Policy advice on the establishment or expansion of six suicide prevention measures between April 2021 and March 2022 was aligned with government objectives. Advice did not present stakeholder feedback and largely did not present relevant evaluation evidence, options or specific benefits. Regulatory impact statements were completed for each measure and regulatory costs were estimated for five of six measures. Legal and reputational risks were identified, however proposed mitigations were incomplete. Implementation risks were identified for two of six measures. Between April and October 2024, DHDA advised government on possible extension of four of the suicide prevention measures. Despite having access to evaluation evidence for three of the four measures, the advice to extend provided limited evidence from evaluations. (See paragraphs 2.29 to 2.43)

13. DHDA developed program logics for the six suicide prevention measures examined. None were completed in time to inform policy advice to government and the quality of the models was inconsistent. Advice on the six measures contained limited information on how the measures would be implemented. Advice proposed that all six measures would be evaluated and sought evaluation funding. Advice did not include information on how performance would be monitored or how DHDA would measure success. Evaluation plans were subsequently developed for all six measures. (See paragraphs 2.44 to 2.54)

14. The Social and Emotional Policy Partnership (Policy Partnership) was established in part to reduce Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander suicide rates. DHDA is the lead Australian Government entity for developing and supporting the Policy Partnership. DHDA put in place governance and funding arrangements for the Policy Partnership that were not consistent with the principles of strong partnership and shared decision-making. As at September 2025, DHDA had not effectively ensured that the Policy Partnership was a genuine partner in suicide prevention policy development. A suicide prevention measure, Culture Care Connect, is an advisory arrangement funded under a grant agreement with the National Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisation (NACCHO). By helping to build the Aboriginal community-controlled sector, it contributes to the achievement of Closing the Gap Priority Reform 2, however it does not meet the criteria of a policy partnership. (See paragraphs 2.55 to 2.84)

Monitoring and evaluation

15. Performance indicators for suicide prevention activities at the national agreement and enterprise level have improved and are continuing to develop. For the six suicide prevention measures examined, performance indicators were established for four measures. In addition, performance indicators for grantees were established in grant agreements with third-party providers for four measures. Established indicators largely focus on the delivery of activities and outputs and provide limited information about the impact and effectiveness of that work. Performance indicators in grant agreements are not verifiable due to a lack of a clear measurement and reporting methodology. Overall, there was no performance measurement framework to guide DHDA in its measurement, monitoring and reporting on the Australian Government’s contribution to achieving suicide prevention objectives. (See paragraphs 3.3 to 3.13)

16. DHDA has established arrangements for monitoring and reporting on suicide prevention measures at the agreement and enterprise levels. Arrangements at the program level are largely incomplete and arrangements at the provider level focus on compliance. In practice, DHDA’s monitoring and reporting at the agreement and enterprise level does not provide insight into the achievement of outcomes. DHDA did not monitor or report on program-level performance for the six suicide prevention measures examined. Provider-level performance information was collected but not verified. DHDA evaluated or was evaluating all six measures. Completed evaluations showed some evidence that short-term outcomes were being achieved but identified a lack of fit-for-purpose performance data. DHDA did not publish evaluation findings. (See paragraphs 3.14 to 3.36)

Recommendations

Summary of entity response

17. The proposed audit report was provided to DHDA. An extract of the proposed audit report was provided to the National Indigenous Australians Agency (NIAA), Gayaa Dhuwi (Proud Spirit) Australia (Gayaa Dhuwi), and the National Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisation (NACCHO). DHDA’s summary response is reproduced below. Full responses from DHDA and NACCHO are in Appendix 1. NIAA did not provide comments and Gayaa Dhuwi did not provide a letter of response. Improvements observed by the ANAO during the course of the audit are listed at Appendix 2.

Department of Health, Disability and Ageing

The Department of Health, Disability and Ageing (the department) welcomes the findings in the report. The department agrees with three recommendations and agrees in principle with three recommendations. The department is committed to effective implementation of Australian National Audit Office recommendations and is already taking steps to address some of the issues identified in this audit.

The audit identified opportunities to strengthen governance, planning and accountability when developing and monitoring suicide prevention measures. To address these findings the department will clarify suicide prevention responsibilities with the National Suicide Prevention Office, provide advice to government on implementation of national suicide prevention strategies, and develop and embed stronger suicide prevention performance monitoring and reporting frameworks.

The audit also identified opportunities to improve empowerment and decision-making in relation to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander stakeholders. The department is committed to working in partnership with First Nations Australians and will prioritise actions to achieve this goal within the scope of the department’s policy remit. The department will also continue to support the delivery of social and emotional wellbeing and suicide prevention initiatives led and designed by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.

Background

1. The Settlement Engagement and Transition Support (SETS) program is an early intervention program intended to contribute to humanitarian entrants and other eligible vulnerable migrants and communities achieving full participation in Australian society as soon as possible, reducing the chance of long-term welfare dependency and isolation. The objectives of the SETS program are to:

• equip and empower humanitarian entrants and other vulnerable migrants with the tools to address their settlement needs and improve social and economic participation, and community integration;
• build the capacity of small and/or ethno-specific organisations to better support their local communities; and
• foster a whole-of-community approach to achieve settlement and integration outcomes.

2. SETS commenced on 1 January 2019 as a revised version of the Settlements Grants program. The Settlement Grants program had commenced on 1 July 2006.

3. Funding has been awarded to SETS service providers primarily through two funding rounds, with 205 grants awarded worth $579 million across the two rounds.

4. Most providers who have received SETS grants have a long history with the program (see paragraph 1.3). Continuing providers have received a greater share of the available funding than new providers both in the transition to SETS and comparing the second and first SETS funding rounds.

Rationale for undertaking the audit

5. The Home Affairs portfolio is responsible for significant grants programs. Reflecting this, grants administration is an area of ANAO audit focus for the portfolio. SETS is a long standing and high value grant program for the department. The audit provides assurance to Parliament over the effectiveness of the management of the grants in achieving the objectives of the SETS program.

Audit objective and criteria

6. The objective of the audit was to assess whether the management of funding under the Settlement Engagement and Transition Support program was effective in achieving the program objectives and consistent with the Commonwealth Grant Rules and Principles (CGRPs).¹

7. To form a conclusion against the objective, the following high-level audit criteria were applied.

• Are appropriate grant agreements in place?
• Has there been active management to support effective delivery of the grant agreements?
• Are the services being provided to humanitarian entrants and vulnerable migrants?

Conclusion

8. The management of funding under the SETS program has been partly effective in achieving program objectives and partly consistent with the Commonwealth Grant Rules and Principles. The management of grant funding awarded under the SETS program has not placed Home Affairs in a sound position to assure itself that the program has been effective in assisting humanitarian entrants and vulnerable migrants to achieve full participation in Australian society as soon as possible, thereby reducing the chance of long-term welfare dependency and isolation. With the next round of program funding due to commence in July 2027, there is an opportunity to improve the design and administration of the program in pursuit of its objectives.

9. Grant agreements are in place for each grant that was awarded and accepted by the applicant. The signed grant agreements are not appropriate, as they do not:

• include each of the key performance indicators (KPIs) that the grant opportunity guidelines stated would be used to assess service provider performance; and
• clearly and directly link grant payments to the progress with, and performance of, the funded grant activity by each service provider.

10. Variations to the agreements, particularly the variation to extend first round funding by two years, did not adequately address how value for money would be achieved.

11. The approach to managing grant agreements has not been effective in ensuring that service providers consistently meet the requirements of the grant agreements.

• A consistent feature of program administration has been late reporting and data quality issues with reports when they are received. For example, for 11 or more of the 13 reporting periods to date, performance reports submitted by the majority of providers either failed to meet the reporting requirements or required follow up to address service delivery and data quality issues.
• 94 per cent of critical incidents are not reported to Home Affairs, including circumstances where SETS clients have died. Critical incident reporting identifies possible program issues and is a risk management measure which supports the achievement of program outcomes. Home Affairs’ approach has given insufficient weight to the insights that can come from a robust approach to critical incident reporting, instead focussing on reputational risks relating to critical incidents being associated with the program.
• Rollover of annual funding amounts has been common, with less than 35 per cent of service providers reporting that they had fully spent grant funding to provide services to clients each year. In addition, $1.1 million of unspent first round funding was rolled over to the 2024–25 financial year for 28 providers (36 per cent), following which $4.44 million was then rolled over from 2024–25 to 2025–26 for 42 providers (41 per cent). Rollover processes did not seek to identify opportunities to redistribute funding to providers who were fully spending their grant with the potential to then assist further clients.
• 55 per cent of planned assurance visits to providers did not occur. This included visits not occurring for providers identified as having recurring issues with their reporting, and/or as high risk. Where they have been conducted, the visits do not often result in action items being directed to service providers to improve performance. No action items have been directed to any service provider since 2021–22.

12. Services are being provided across Australia, with individual clients primarily located in major cities. Program data indicates that the program has become less successful at targeting recent humanitarian entrants and other vulnerable migrants. There has been mixed performance in aggregate for the program, and within service providers, in relation to key program metrics relating to the clients being assisted and the events/services being provided for the grant funding that was awarded. Performance has also been mixed in terms of the extent to which the data demonstrates the program is improving client independence, participation in Australian society and wellbeing.

Supporting findings

Grant agreements

13. Grant agreements are in place for each grant that was awarded and accepted by the applicant. There were delays in having grant agreements in place for each round. The amount of grant funding specified in the grant agreements varies considerably, with a small number of large providers (or lead entities in a consortium arrangement) receiving a significant proportion of the grant funding. In the first funding round administered by DSS, the obligation to report to the Finance Minister a decision by the Minister to award funding to a not recommended application was not met. (See paragraphs 2.1 to 2.16)

14. Grant agreements have not included a fit-for-purpose framework of measurable deliverables and performance indicators. The approach taken provided benefits for DSS in terms of ease of management of the grant agreements. It was not consistent with the grant opportunity guidelines and does not place Home Affairs, as program owner, in a sound position to assess whether service providers are performing satisfactorily and, consequently, whether program objectives are being met and intended outcomes are being achieved.

15. Under the terms of the grant agreement, an Activity Work Plan (AWP) is to be agreed to identify how the grant activity will be delivered and to measure the success and outcomes achieved for the funded grant program. For the second round, 33 per cent of AWPs were identified by Home Affairs to be missing important information relating to deliverables and timeframes for services to be provided. There have also been delays in AWPs being finalised. (See paragraphs 2.17 to 2.29)

16. Appropriate payment arrangements have not been established. The approach taken does not clearly and directly link grant payments to the progress with, and performance of, the funded grant activity by each service provider. As a result, it does not support proper use and management of relevant money. (See paragraphs 2.31 to 2.44)

17. Value with relevant money was not appropriately addressed in considering and approving grant agreement variations. (See paragraphs 2.45 to 2.62)

Management of grant agreements

18. Grant administration is not ensuring that the grant recipients have met, and are meeting, their reporting obligations.

• Performance reports: Most performance reports (on average 80 per cent) submitted by the grant recipients are incomplete, and/or reveal service delivery or data quality issues. In the 13 reporting periods to date across both rounds, no more than 10 per cent of performance reports have been assessed as receiving a pass. For five of the 13 reporting periods, more providers failed to meet their reporting obligations than were assessed to have met them. Issues have persisted, highlighting that follow up action has been ineffective.
• Milestone reports: Reports are consistently late. For example, 27 per cent of Activity Work Plans (AWPs) have been provided late and 37 per cent of AWP progress reports have been late.
• Critical incident reporting: This reporting was introduced in the first SETS round following a review of the predecessor program. The design of the reporting obligation, and its administration, for that round undermined the intent of, and value from, this reporting. For the second round, the grant agreements did not include a requirement to report critical incidents. Most (94 per cent) critical incidents are not reported to Home Affairs, including circumstances where SETS clients have died. (See paragraphs 3.1 to 3.33)

19. Administration of payments has not been in line with the grant agreements. The most significant issue relates to the rollover of unspent grant funds, with less than 35 per cent of service providers reporting that they had fully spent grant funding for each financial year of the term of the agreement. Rollovers are common across each year covered by the grant agreements for the two rounds. In addition, and at odds with the published grant opportunity guidelines for the second round, Home Affairs allowed $4.44 million of unspent first round funding to be rolled over to the 2025–26 financial year for 42 providers. (See paragraphs 3.34 to 3.55)

20. The arrangements in place provide inadequate assurance over the accuracy and completeness of performance data reported by grant recipients. Following a 2020 internal audit, an April 2021 strategy to address identified data quality issues was not fully and effectively implemented, with data quality issues continuing to be identified in a 2023 evaluation commissioned by Home Affairs and in the ANAO’s Performance Statements Audit work.

21. A key assurance activity for each round was to be a program of site visits to providers. More than 55 per cent of site visits that should have been conducted between 2019–20 and 2024–25 have not been conducted. The planned but not conducted site visits include those to providers where the departments have identified ‘serious governance/service delivery issues’ and some with a history of low quality/late reports. Where they have been conducted, the engagements do not often result in action items being directed to service providers to improve performance. No action items have been directed to any service providers in 2022–23, 2023–24 or 2024–25. (See paragraphs 3.56 to 3.73)

Provision of services to humanitarian entrants and vulnerable migrants

22. The grant agreements included the service locations to be covered by each service provider, with service providers engaged to provide coverage planned for all states and territories. Service provider reporting indicates that services are being provided across Australia, with individual clients primarily located in major cities. Rather than specifying the type and quantum of services to be provided, program design involved the departments identifying key indicators against which service provider performance would be assessed by benchmarking each provider’s performance against other similar providers. Data reported by service providers indicates that over the six years to June 2025, one million individual sessions and nearly 202,000 group sessions were provided to 192,618 clients through 651 service provider outlets. (See paragraphs 4.2 to 4.9)

23. The data reported by grant recipients reveals mixed performance against the performance indicators specified in their grant agreements. It also shows considerable variability in the extent to which service providers, and the program more broadly, appear to have assisted humanitarian entrants and other vulnerable migrants to participate in Australian society. (See paragraphs 4.10 to 4.54)

Recommendations

Summary of entity response

24. The proposed audit report was provided to the Department of Home Affairs and the Department of Social Services. The departments’ summary responses to the report are provided below. Appendix 1 includes the full responses. Changes to program administration that Home Affairs advised the ANAO it had made during the course of the audit are at Appendix 2.

Department of Home Affairs

The Department of Home Affairs agrees with the recommendations of the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) and welcomes the assurance and insights provided through this audit. The Settlement Engagement and Transition Support (SETS) program has provided critical early-intervention support to more than 200,000 refugees and vulnerable migrants since 2019. A number of enhancements have been implemented as part of the second round of SETS funding which commenced in 2024, including embedding the Refugee and Humanitarian Entrant Settlement and Integration Outcomes Framework, addressing findings from the 2023 evaluation, and streamlining program administration.

In 2025, the Department strengthened data quality through a new attestation process for the Data Exchange (DEX) system and increased engagement with providers through the national Community of Practice to drive consistent, best-practice service delivery. Work is underway to implement the 2026-27 Settlement Grants Quality Assurance Strategy, which will enhance oversight of provider performance and align grant management with the Commonwealth Grants Rules and Principles 2024. The Department is also considering how to embed the audit’s findings into broader grants administration processes.

The Department will continue to work closely with DSS Community Grants Hub to ensure full implementation of all recommendations and continuous improvement in program stewardship.

Department of Social Services

The Department of Social Services (the department) welcomes the insights and opportunities for improvement outlined in the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) report on the Settlement Engagement and Transition Support (SETS) Program.

The department acknowledges the ANAO’s conclusion that the management of funding under the SETS program has been partly effective, with lessons for the department in strengthening program design and in how best to ensure there is a robust performance framework in grant agreements to support measurement of program objectives.

The department agrees with the two recommendations relevant to it and will take steps to address the suggested opportunities for improvement.